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14 October 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 14 October 2024 The loss of a New Zealand naval vessel reflects the same decline of niche maritime capability that Australia suffers from. (Image: HMNZS Manawanui on an anti-drug patrol before its loss off Samoa.   New Zealand Police) It is rare for a developed nation’s Navy to lose a big vessel in peacetime. The sinking of the New Zealand Navy’s HMNZS Manawanui after it ran aground on a Samoan reef this month – the country’s first naval loss since World War II – has raised important questions about naval preparedness. Fortunately, all 75 crew members were rescued, a testament to the ship’s commanding officer and crew. Although the exact cause of the incident is under investigation, it highlights broader issues about the state of readiness, not just for New Zealand but also for allied and partner navies, including Australia. This incident underscores several concerning issues about naval preparedness: insufficient naval capability, workforce challenges, budget constraints and the failure to invest in critical enablers. Each is acutely relevant to New Zealand and Australia, highlighting key vulnerabilities. HMNZS Manawanui was the only mine warfare and hydrographic survey vessel in its fleet, a crucial asset for a maritime nation with the fifth-largest exclusive economic zone in the world. The loss of this ship leaves a glaring gap in New Zealand’s naval capabilities. New Zealand’s Navy, like many smaller ones, has long been operating with minimal capability across several domains. The HMNZS Manawanui’s loss illustrates the risks inherent in this minimalist approach: when one ship is the sole platform for a critical capability, losing it – even temporarily – paralyses that mission set. This situation should sound alarm bells in Australia as well. The country’s decision to scrap its future mine warfare ship program, alongside the expansion of its at-sea replenishment capabilities in the latest Defence Integrated Investment Program, echoes New Zealand’s dangerous underinvestment in niche but vital capabilities. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant hypothetical. The justification for cancelling the mine warfare ship program was that autonomous systems would replace the capability. However, without a platform to deploy from, these systems cannot cover the full spectrum of operations needed to protect Australia’s shipping routes from naval mines – something it should expect in the event of a conflict in the region. During World War II, Australian waters were heavily mined. There were minefields between Sydney and Newcastle, in the Bass Strait, off Hobart, and in the Spencer Gulf. Australia’s hydrographic capability, used for seabed surveys, is in a precarious state, with five of its six ships decommissioned in the past three years and the last likely to follow soon. The 2020 decision to outsource nearly all of the Navy’s hydrographic responsibilities has severely weakened its capacity in this area. Another issue exacerbating the challenges in enabling capabilities is the shortage of Australian replenishment vessels. Both its replenishment ships are out of action until 2025, and while the problems are reportedly being dealt with under the warranties, it raises a broader question: why does Australia have only two? The money allocated to expanding this capability was removed in the latest Defence Integrated Investment Program. There are many examples of such underinvestment in the Navy’s enabling capabilities. The failure to maintain and expand these capabilities now could leave the country dangerously exposed in the event of a maritime crisis. The under-investment and lack of preparedness come at a time when Australia’s defence strategy has stopped assuming that the country will get a 10-year warning period of an emerging conflict. Despite the Australian government’s recent Defence budget uplift in May, the funding allocation, which equates to about 2.1 per cent of GDP, is simply not enough to tackle the issues. Major recapitalisation While the figure in nominal terms might be historic, in real terms as a percentage of GDP, it is low – particularly at a time that Defence, and specifically the Navy, are going through a major recapitalisation following the underinvestment since the end of the Cold War. According to the 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy, the country is facing its most challenging strategic environment since World War II. Yet, this has not been met with equally robust investment. During the Cold War, Australia’s defence spending averaged 2.7 per cent of GDP, and even higher during periods of heightened tension or major recapitalisation. Despite the current strategic environment and the largest defence recapitalisation in decades, defence spending is projected to reach only 2.4 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade – well below the Cold War average. Although funding has been allocated for new surface combatants and submarines, there is little left to enhance other naval capabilities, leaving many of these atrophying and compromising naval preparedness at a critical time. This inconsistency between our strategic statements about the chances of conflict in the region and our investment is glaring – and our naval preparedness is paying the price. The sinking of the HMNZS Manawanui should be a wake-up call for Australia and New Zealand. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific region is no longer a distant hypothetical. Regional tensions are rising, and our naval forces are likely to be at the forefront of any confrontation. The ability to prevail in such a conflict depends not just on major warships and submarines but also on the enabling capabilities that underpin maritime operations: replenishment, hydrography, mine warfare and other niche but vital domains. If there is an immediate lesson to be learned from the Manawanui’s sinking, it is that failure to invest in naval preparedness will not just weaken our ability to respond to crises; it also weaken our ability to deter one. Investing in preparedness is our national security insurance policy. Australia must take this as an opportunity to rethink investment in naval preparedness – while our strategic circumstances draw parallels in our Defence strategy to Word War II – our Defence spending does not.

August 16 2024 | Jennifer Parker * Originally published in Lowy's the Interpreter on 16 August. Settling on a definition of an overused buzzword is the first step for Australia to ensure successful military partnerships in Southeast Asia. Image: HMAS Broome conducts a boarding exercise during Exercise Cassowary with Indonesia 2024 held off the coast of Darwin, Northern Territory. Photo Credit: Defence Images The rise of minilaterals, quadrilaterals, and other groupings in the Indo-Pacific have become increasingly important to the regional security architecture. However, a significant challenge to what Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles has described as this “ latticework of partnerships ” approach is the ability bring together the military elements of these groupings in the event of a crisis – whether in response to a disaster or a regional conflict. This “interoperability” is key to military relationships. However, unlike organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which have agreed-upon frameworks and generalised strategic alignment, the Indo-Pacific latticework approach lacks the necessary functionality. The omnipresence of the word interoperability in military diplomacy at times overshadows its true meaning. The challenge for Australia then becomes to define interoperability in the context of its relationships in Southeast Asia, to determine how can it be harnessed and enhanced. This means being deliberate about setting Australia’s goals, understanding the likely common missions, and the boundaries of the relationships. Being specific and deliberate about the nature of interoperability is important. It has become common parlance for politicians, diplomats and Defence personnel alike to list a key outcome of an exercise or working group activities as one of “interoperability”, or as Marles has done previously been “ interchangeable ”. But the omnipresence of the word interoperability in military diplomacy at times overshadows its true meaning, which in turn can distort important aspects of military engagement that should be the focus. The term interoperability is not unique to the military setting, but even within the defence realm it is often poorly defined. NATO defines interoperability as the “ ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives ”. The challenge in applying this definition to Australia’s relationship with Southeast Asian nations is that the operational and strategic objectives may not always align, and it occurs outside the framework of an alliance. Australian military doctrine places a greater emphasis on “systems” defining interoperability, as the “ ability of systems, units or forces to act together, to provide services to or from, or exchange information with partner systems, units or forces ”. With its technical emphasis, this definition focuses on the ease in which information can be exchanged, such as the ability to pass data or undertake classified communications. Doing so is predicated on a commonality of communications networks along with high level agreements regarding the sharing of secrets. These elements can be achieved in an inter-service or even in an alliance scenario. But this is less applicable to Australia’s relationships in Southeast Asia. For one reason, many of Australia’s most prominent Southeast Asian partners – such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia – acquire their systems from a vast array of partners, some including Russia and China. For Indonesia, the diversity of defence acquisition sources is considered part of the policy of non-alignment. By focusing on shared mission sets and realistic goals for collaboration, Australia can build more meaningful and effective operational partnerships in the region. A more fitting definition of the interoperability sought between Australia and its Southeast Asian partners might emphasise a shared familiarity. This means agreeing at the political level on the mission sets and scenario planning, which can be unique to the relationship or grouping where the goal is being pursued. Interoperability exists on a spectrum – it’s not a binary measure, fully interoperable or not, but rather it occurs in varying degrees. The Royal Australian Air Force breaks these degrees down to the areas of deconflicted, compatible and integrated , and this approach would have broader applicability to kind of military interoperability sought between Australia and Southeast Asian countries. These can serve as aspirational goals within the agreed mission sets or operational scenarios. “Interchangeability” implies something more, yet there is no publicly available Australian military definition for it. NATO defines interchangeability as “ the ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements ”. But for Australia, this kind of ambition is most likely to be achieved with alliance partners such as the United States and New Zealand. It is unlikely to be achieved in the context of the latticework approach to the Indo-Pacific, or in Australia’s current, bilateral or minilateral relationships in Southeast Asia. But by focusing on shared mission sets and realistic goals for collaboration, Australia can build more meaningful and effective operational partnerships in the region. Australia cannot define interoperability as a one-size-fits-all solution, but as a flexible, context-driven approach, tailored to the specific needs and challenges of its Southeast Asian partners.

11 October 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in Lowy's the Interpreter on 11 October 2024 Ukraine’s effective strategy in the Black Sea offers a masterclass in how a smaller, determined naval force can challenge a much larger one. Image: Mobile launcher for the Neptune missile, which sank the Russian cruiser “Moskva”. (Wikimedia Commons) Ukraine’s bold naval campaign against Russia in the Black Sea offers crucial lessons for Australia. Despite facing a far superior navy, Ukraine has used innovative tactics, rapid adaptation and modern technology to disrupt Russian operations in the Black Sea. Although Australia’s geography differs from that of Ukraine, the lessons from Ukraine’s sea-denial campaign are highly relevant. For Australia, a nation reliant on the sea for both trade and security, these insights are invaluable. However, it’s crucial that we focus on learning the right lessons and applying them effectively to our unique maritime environment. Ukraine’s ability to challenge a dominant naval power in a contested sea demonstrates that, with the right strategy and capabilities, Australia can safeguard its own maritime interests. Sea denial Ukraine has implemented a highly successful strategy of sea denial, the ability to deny an adversary’s maritime freedom of manoeuvre. Although Australia’s geography differs from that of Ukraine, the lessons from Ukraine’s sea-denial campaign are highly relevant. Ukraine has used its geography to maximum effect, leveraging the semi-enclosed nature of the Black Sea to disrupt Russian naval operations. For Australia, strategic chokepoints such as the Sunda and Lombok Straits hold similar importance. In any regional conflict, denying access to these waterways would significantly hinder adversary movement. China is heavily reliant on key chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait. By developing a deployable capability, Australia could apply the lessons from Ukraine’s sea denial strategy to these critical areas. By targeting Russia’s maritime capabilities at greater than 300 nautical miles, Ukraine has dramatically extended the range that its land-based forces can influence Russian maritime operations. Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and surface vessels (USVs), as well as cruise missiles, have meant that a force operating from the land can successfully attack naval forces at sea well beyond traditional coastal boundaries. Australia can draw a parallel by accelerating the acquisition of the Army’s land-based maritime strike missile capabilities . However, Ukraine’s example also highlights the need for Australia to broaden its focus beyond land-based systems. Australia has a strong capacity to build small craft and UAVs, and mobilising this capability to develop armed USVs and UAVs for rapid deployment in chokepoint protection could significantly enhance the ADF’s capabilities. Projecting Australian power Australia’s geography differs from Ukraine’s in a key way: our seas are not enclosed. If Australia’s maritime domain becomes contested, sea denial alone will not be enough. Australia’s dependence on seaborne supply, the provision of fuel, ammunition and more across the seas, will require Australia to have a broader maritime strategy than that enacted by Ukraine in the Black Sea. The vast coastline and open ocean environment require a strategy that includes limited sea control and power projection, with the resources to carry out these tasks. This means that, in addition to investing in maritime strike capabilities for coastal and chokepoint protection, Australia must maintain traditional assets for sea and air control far from its shores – submarines, warships, replenishment vessels, and aviation assets. A further lesson from the Black Sea can be drawn from the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva , despite that vessel’s technological superiority . The Moskva was sunk by two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missiles – a threat which the cruiser, designed for anti-air warfare, should have easily countered. However, poor crew preparedness and maintenance failures in its defence systems resulted in defeat to a relatively simple threat. This highlights a critical point: ship readiness and posture can determine the outcome of naval engagements. Ukraine has dramatically extended the range that its land-based forces can influence Russian maritime operations. For Australia, this is a reminder that having a well-prepared, flexible fleet is just as important as having the latest technologies. Ships must be ready to respond quickly, with crews trained for high-intensity operations. Agility, rather than sheer size, will be key to Australia’s naval effectiveness in any conflict. Ukraine’s employment of USVs has been significant but USVs can be defeated, as we have also seen in the Black Sea. This balance between capability and counter-capability is essential in modern naval warfare. Australia must ensure its maritime forces strike this balance effectively. Offensive capabilities should be developed alongside defensive measures, including electronic warfare systems, enhanced sensor networks, and robust ship survivability. The ability to rapidly counter evolving threats, whilst also embracing new capabilities such as USVs for offensive operations, will be key. Ukraine’s effective sea denial strategy in the Black Sea offers a masterclass in how a smaller, determined naval force can challenge a much larger one. For Australia, these lessons are clear. Sea denial in key chokepoints, enhanced ship posture and preparedness, a balance between offensive and defensive capabilities, rapid adaptation, and the protection of trade and ports are all essential to safeguarding national interests. However, Australia’s vast maritime geography also requires a strategy that goes beyond sea denial. Should its maritime domain become contested, Australia must be ready to achieve limited sea control and project power over vast distances. This will require an adaptable, highly capable navy, prepared for the full spectrum of naval warfare in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

4 October 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 4 October 2024 Image: This picture shows projectiles being intercepted by Israel near the northern city of Baqa al-Gharbiya For much of its recent history, Australia has had the luxury of seeing conflict as a distant event, experienced by most through television, computer screens or newspapers. However, while the recent escalation between Iran and Israel might seem remote, Australia cannot afford to be complacent . The lessons from this escalation should serve as a stark warning for Australia – and the Australian public must take notice. The normative behaviours that have underpinned the global world order are fraying. This was clear when Russia illegally invaded Ukraine in 2022. It was clear when China’s People’s Liberation Army air force deployed chaff in front of Australian aircraft in international airspace in 2022 and 2024. And it is abundantly clear with the launch of hundreds of Iranian missiles against Israel for the second time in six months. While global or regional conflict involving Australia is neither inevitable nor probable, the fraying of international norms, the latest example of which is Iran’s ballistic missile attack , makes the trendlines clear: the likelihood of conflict in Australia’s region is increasing as international norms break down. In this fraying of the international world order, China may seek to seize the opportunity to invade Taiwan as China’s internal economic situation deteriorates. Its increased aggression towards The Philippines in the South China Sea may result in a miscalculation that quickly sparks a broader conflict. Or North Korea, the nuclear pariah, could launch an unexpected nuclear strike on South Korea – just as it surprised the world with its torpedo attack on a South Korean warship in 2010, killing 46 sailors. These scenarios are not probable; however, until 2024, neither was Iran launching hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel. If the key lesson for Australia from this week’s Iranian missile attack on Israel is that the erosion of global norms increases the likelihood of conflict, the second lesson is that Australia must contemplate the nuclear implications of this increasingly unstable world. Underpinning the dynamics in the Middle East is the estimation that Iran may be on the path to becoming a nuclear weapons state. Whether Iran has made this decision, and exactly how long it would take to achieve such a capability, are unclear. What is clear is that Iran is failing to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Its strategy of engaging proxy forces across the region is being broken down by Israeli attacks in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and Yemen – and it may well be resorting to a new strategy – a nuclear weapons strategy. The taboo around the proliferation of nuclear weapons is cracking. The thought that a country such as Iran, willing to launch hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel, may shortly acquire nuclear weapons is chilling. But it may also have wider implications, sparking increased proliferation of nuclear weapons across the Middle East and globally. A nuclear-armed Iran could prompt Saudi Arabia and other countries to pursue their own nuclear capabilities. This situation may increasingly strain the successful 44-year-old Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear capabilities, the South Korean public increasingly debates the benefits of nuclear weapons, China accelerates its nuclear weapons program, and Russia regularly threatens the use of tactical nuclear weapons, further eroding the nuclear taboo. As Australians watch footage of Iranian ballistic missiles being intercepted over Israel, they must recognise that the threat of nuclear war is also rising, with increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and a diminishing threshold for their use. The trendlines from the escalating conflict in the Middle East resonate in Australia’s backyard. The threat of conflict involving Australia is no longer negligible and may carry nuclear implications. So, what does this new reality mean for Australia? First and foremost, it means we must double down on diplomacy, continue our proud tradition as a leader in multilateral and mini-lateral forums, strengthen communication with China to understand its position, and shine a light on the erosion of global norms, including China’s aggressive behaviour from the maritime to the cyber domain. But we must do more than this; we must focus on preparedness, engage in difficult societal conversations and invest in defence. Yes, the current government has announced record investments across the Defence portfolio, but the funding comes too late. Defence lacks the necessary resources, and Australia lacks the capabilities it needs. While terms such as “Iron Dome”, Israel’s missile defence system, have entered common parlance, the truth is Australia does not have the same ability to protect its cities and critical infrastructure. Australia would not be as successful as Israel in intercepting hundreds of ballistic missiles, should our region turn to conflict. As the Australian public witnesses the graphic images of Iranian ballistic missiles targeting Israel, we must heed the warnings about the changing world order. Australia must not only double down on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict, it must also engage the public. We must have the difficult conversations to ensure we can develop a prepared and resilient society – resilience that will strengthen our deterrence. We must enhance our defence capabilities to deter conflict and protect our interests if necessary. Complacency is no longer an option for Australia.

28 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published with the United States Studies Centre on 28 August Breaking down the figures of Australia’s ambitious nuclear-powered submarine project and debunking the myths of cheaper alternate capability options. Image: Chief of the Nuclear Powered Submarine Taskforce Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead AO, RAN, Minister for Defence Industry, the Hon. Pat Conroy MP, Australian Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles MP, Minister for Defence Personnel, the Hon. Matt Keogh MP, and U.S Rear Admiral Richard Seif on board United States Navy Submarine USS Asheville during a visit to HMAS Stirling, Western Australia Australian ambition to acquire nuclear-powered submarines is not a new concept. From a strategic, operational and tactical perspective, it makes sense, given Australia’s vast maritime domain and extensive maritime vulnerabilities. Aside from the obvious hurdle of United States support, the question has always been one of opportunity cost, or put crudely, ‘bang for buck.’ Cost of nuclear-powered submarines To address the ‘bang for buck’ question, you must start with the ‘buck’: how much will Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines cost? If yelled into a press pack, you would quickly hear the answer $368 billion — but that answer would be wrong. Cost comes in many forms: impacts on workforce, infrastructure, defence industry and timeframes are all encompassed in the ‘cost’ of the project. But let’s talk monetary cost for a moment — the eyewatering $368 billion initial price tag. It’s tempting to argue that you can acquire a B-21 for just under a billion dollars, 1 yet we are paying $368 billion for 8 submarines. This is an emotive comparison, but it is one that is invariably wrong. For want of a better analogy, its comparing apples and oranges. A key problem with discussion around defence project costs is that the arguments are almost invariably comparing different metrics. To understand cost, it is critical to understand key variables, including the time period it is over and whether the costed amount includes sustainment, infrastructure, workforce costs etc. These are seemingly mundane but exceptionally important issues. So with that in mind — what does the government’s quoted $368 billion dollars cover? Significantly, the projected cost of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine pathway is not $368 billion dollars — it’s $244.7 billion over a period of 31 years from 2023-24 to 2054-55. 2 The difference between the $244.7 billion and the quoted $368 billion is a $122.9 billion contingency figure, representing 50% of the project. Contrary to the persistent comments that $368 billion dollars is likely an underestimate, it is in fact a deliberate 50% overestimate. Every defence project in the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) is allocated a contingency. Contingency amounts are effectively unfunded reserves that can be drawn on with approval should an ‘unforeseen’ event occur. 3 Think of them as a margin applied for project risk. Most defence projects in the IIP are assigned between 5-10% contingency. DEF 1, the project name for Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines has been assigned a 50% contingency. This means the risk is acknowledged in the funding profile. Contrary to the persistent comments that $368 billion dollars is likely an underestimate, it is in fact a deliberate 50% overestimate. 4 Does this mean that costs won’t change? No — AUKUS is highly complex and the cost estimate spans 31 years, so the notion of identifying the ultimate cost with certainty is laughable. But it does mean that the risk has been accounted for to date. The amount of $244.7 billion accounts for much more than the acquisition of 8 submarines. It includes the whole of program costs — like workforce, infrastructure, regulatory requirements, and the cost of sustaining these submarines and their supporting facilities until 2055. This is important to understand because, when critics argue that Australia should acquire B-21 Bombers at a cost just under a billion dollars an aircraft 5 or a French Barracuda class conventional-submarine at $2.5 billion per submarine, 6 the quoted price for alternative capabilities doesn’t include the cost of the whole program or the cost of sustaining that program. Is AUKUS eating the defence budget? When it comes to cost, long term costs are invariably less reliable. So, whilst it’s important to put the often quoted ‘$368 billion’ dollar figure into perspective, a more accurate assessment is the cost over the near to medium term. Delivery of the submarine optimal pathway is costed at a window of $53-63 billion dollars from 2024-25 to 2033-34, including acquisition, sustainment and supporting infrastructure. 7 The breakdown of this figure is not publicly available, but reportedly contains whole of program costs, including those entailed with both the execution of Submarine Rotational Force West (SRF-W) and the delivery of the first Virginia -class submarine. These 2 capability milestones are significant because they debunk the erroneous claims that AUKUS won’t deliver submarine capability for 40 years. 8 Whilst it’s important to put the often quoted ‘$368 billion’ dollar figure into perspective, a more accurate assessment is the cost over the near to medium term. In response to the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), the announcement of the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway and the planned expansion of the surface combatant fleet, the current government announced in May 2024 that it would increase the Australian defence budget by $50.3 billion over the decade. 9 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) agreed a defence budget growth profile of 5-6% per annum, which would have equated to an uplift of approximately $716.4 billion over the decade. 10 The uplift in the defence budget announced in May 2024 will provide for defence spending of $765.4, providing approximately an additional $49 billion beyond the DSU growth profile over the next 10 years. 11 The Attack-class submarine program that preceded AUKUS was expected to cost approximately $30 billion over the next 10 years. 12 The nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway costs an additional $33 billion over the same timeframe. The increased defence budget committed to by the current government more than accounts for the gap between the planned Attack-class spend and the AUKUS submarine optimal pathway. Overall, the AUKUS Pillar 1 spend over the total decade roughly accounts for 7-8% of the defence budget. 13 Defence’s most expensive project, yes — but eating the defence budget? Hardly. This isn’t to say that the defence budget is adequate or increasing in the right timeframe — it just means that AUKUS Pillar 1 isn’t consuming the defence budget. Of course, the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines won’t address all of the Department of Defence’s capability issues — but that’s a different conversation. But are there cheaper alternatives? Well — yes, but not any that would deliver the same degree of capability and control over those capabilities that Australia desires. There has been a plethora of alternatives put forward. Proposed alternatives include outsourcing the functions required of Australian submarines to a permanent UK and US presence, effectively giving up Australia’s ability to operate submarines becoming a “pit stop power”; 14 acquiring 40 conventional submarines; 15 acquiring B21 bombers — the list goes on. Some have suggested ceasing the acquisition of submarines altogether and investing in combatting climate change, healthcare and education. There is neither space, nor the desire to breakdown every proposed alternative here, so I’ll address some key elements. Australia’s 2020 DSU, 2023 DSR and 2024 National Defence Strategy, alongside the strategic documents of Australia’s allies and partners, have one thing in common: a recognition that the world order is changing rapidly and that conflict in the Indo-Pacific, although not inevitable, is increasingly possible. Whilst national social welfare and combatting climate change are incredibly important, they will not protect Australia’s national interests in a worsening strategic environment. On the outsourcing question — it is simply not logical that Australia, an island nation, would outsource its maritime security. There is a reason Australia has established its submarine service 3 times in its history; every time we have considered foregoing the capability it has become apparent that they provide an asymmetric advantage for a maritime nation. There is a reason Australia has established its submarine service three times in its history; every time we have considered foregoing the capability it has become apparent that they provide an asymmetric advantage for a maritime nation. The argument that the current capability plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines should be replaced with the acquisition of B-21s or additional conventional submarines is a dangerous one. AUKUS, whilst in essence a capability transfer pact, is also central to Australia’s deterrent signalling. The signalling effect of AUKUS cooperation has been palpable, marked by China’s extensive efforts to release misinformation about the pact and lobby the International Atomic Energy Agency to obstruct it. Whatever its risks, right now Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines is on track. 16 Whilst it may not always remain so, changing course without a catastrophic failing of the plan would fundamentally undermine the signalling element of AUKUS and the trust Australia’s AUKUS partners hold in Australia. Submarines provide a vast array of capabilities from intelligence to surveillance and reconnaissance to mine-laying to maritime strike to land-strike to anti-submarine warfare. In the maritime domain they are unrivalled. Whilst acquiring B-21s could substitute some of the strike elements of submarine operations, they would fail to fulfill the remaining functions. Could a series of capabilities address the spectrum of these functions? Maybe. But not with the versatility of submarines and there is no guarantee that a collection of these mythical capabilities would be cheaper. This is not to say that Australia should not invest in long-range strike options such as B-21s, but it should not do so at the expense of submarines. As for the suggestion of a greater number of conventionally powered submarines, a number of challenges make this proposal imprudent. Major impediments would include crewing, industrial capacity to build them or buy them in a strategically relevant timeframe, and most significantly, the likelihood of this being a more expensive approach than the AUKUS pathway. The unique nature of Australia’s maritime domain and the distances and depths involved mean that Australia cannot just operate any submarine, invariably it needs to be larger and more capable than the average conventional submarine. Australia’s operating environment is dramatically different to that of submarine producing countries like Japan and Germany. Let’s remember — Australia went down the path of attempting to acquire 12 conventional submarines from France. This was not orders of magnitude cheaper than Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. At the time of cancellation, the acquisition cost for the French Attack-class submarine was listed as $90 billion, which did not include sustainment, supporting facilities or a contingency allocation. 17 The life of type sustainment costs until 2080 were quoted as $145 billion, but again this did not include supporting costs such as infrastructure and workforce. 18 The nuclear-powered optimal pathway is costed at $244.7 billion until 2055. The Attack-class fleet of conventionally-powered Barracuda submarines was costed at $235 billion until 2080, but this was known to be an underestimate. 19 With rough maths you can see that increasing an order like this from 12 to 40 conventional submarines would be no cheaper than Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine pathway and clearly unsustainable from a workforce perspective. 20 Capability speed The Attack-class program with all its challenges was due to deliver its first submarine in 2036 and its final submarine in 2054. 21 Under the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway, Australia will have Australian sailors and officers operating from HMAS Stirling in US and UK submarines from 2027. This is of course not ideal, as the tasking of SRF-W will not be controlled by Australia. However, from a wider regional perspective, SRF-W will have a net regional effect far earlier than the previously planned 2036 timeframe of the first Attack-class submarine. Under the optimal pathway, Australia will be operating two Virginia -class submarines, with a third on its way, before the first Attack-class submarine was due to be delivered. The optimal pathway will provide a capability quicker than Australia’s abandoned plan to acquire conventional submarines, and most certainly quicker than any new plan could deliver at this point. So, does the current optimal pathway provide ‘bang for buck’? Australian-owned and operated submarines are critical to Australia’s defence as a maritime nation. The current plan, whilst expensive and risky, is presently on track and delivers capability to service earlier than any prior plan. Whilst it is more expensive than the Attack-class project, it is not orders of magnitude more expensive nor is it ‘eating’ the defence budget. At this point in the journey, it certainly does provide ‘bang for buck.’

27 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian on 27 August 2024 Image: Indonesian Defence Minister and President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the Prime Minister of Australia, The Hon Anthony Albanese MP and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP speaking at a press conference at Parliament House in Canberra. Source: Defence Images In recent years the defence relationship between Australia and Indonesia has developed significantly, with a range of more complex activities occurring between the two countries. The enhancement of the relationship will shortly culminate in the signing of a treaty-level Defence Cooperation Agreement, one Richard Marles labelled as “profoundly historic”. The Indonesia-Australia defence relationship is critical to Australia’s defence. Geography is an unalterable truth. When Australia looks north, it sees Indonesia. But when Indonesia looks north it doesn’t see Australia. The relationship is important, but it will never be as close as Australia would wish. Australia must understand the constraints of the relationship, work within these constraints and avoid representing it as something it is not. In the joint media statement last week Anthony Albanese and Marles spoke of “strong defence co-operation” and “strengthening interoperability”, while Indonesian President-elect Prabowo spoke of “more Australian participation in our economy” and Australian assistance in “agriculture, food ­security”. The difference in language between the two countries is important. It is symbolic of the differences in how both partners view the relationship. Dramatic fluctuations have been the hallmark of the relationship since Indonesia’s independence, and will remain a feature of the relationship. Both countries have a very different strategic focus, alignment, outlook and development priorities. Efforts like the DCA can help to smooth out the bumps in the relationship, but they will not fundamentally change it. The agreement joins a long list of defence-related strategic deals between Australia and Indonesia, commencing with the ill-fated 1995 security agreement. That arrangement committed the partners to consult in the event of “adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interest”. In many ways, this, the first treaty of its kind ever signed by Indonesia, was “profoundly historic”; the DCA, while significant, is less so. Indonesia cancelled the 1995 agreement in light of Australia’s 1999 United Nations-endorsed International Force East Timor intervention. The cancellation of the 1995 security treaty is not a blip in the history of the relationship, but an example of the limits of a relationship between two countries with different strategic priorities. These priorities have been on show since the landslide election of the outward-looking Prabowo. Prabowo, who will assume the role of Indonesian president in October, chose to visit China in his first international visit since the 2024 Indonesian election. It would have been much quicker to hop on a plane to Australia. Prabowo’s symbolic visit to China was followed in July by a visit to Russia, his fourth in four years. During his visit, Prabowo sought support from Putin to help Indonesia develop a civil nuclear industry, while requesting that Russia’s Defence Minister, Andrey Belousov, provide technology to develop Indonesia’s defence industry – a sentiment that would not have been lost on Australian politicians and officials at the May Shangri-la dialogue in Singapore. In his speech to the audience, Prabowo avoided condemning the illegal Russian invasion of the Ukraine. Indonesia is fiercely non-aligned, and while it courts close friendships with its neighbours like Australia, there will always be limits to the strategic depth of the relationship. Indonesia is desperate to develop its infrastructure and broader economy. This was made clear in the joint press conference announcing the completion of negotiations of the Defence Cooperation Agreement. While Australia talks defence, Indonesia talks development. Australia must recognise the realities of the relationship and avoid overreaching or trying to push Indonesia too far on operationalising the security relationship. It is perhaps Australia’s desire to operationalise the defence relationship that has historically resulted in limited success, despite the plethora of defence-related agreements between the countries, high-level talks and military exercises. Australia is of course right to court a closer defence relationship with Indonesia. Indonesia’s geographic position makes it central to Australia’s security. Not only does two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade pass through the Indonesian archipelago, so would any prospective adversarial naval task group or air threat. Short of conflict, co-operation with Indonesia is critical to Australia’s ability to deal with a vast spectrum of civil threats, from irregular migration to terrorism. Even before the completion of negotiations for the DCA, the Indonesia–Australia defence relationship had reached a high point in recent years, with a greater number of exercises conducted between the two defence forces. No better case study exists for this than Exercise Keris Woomera, a bilateral amphibious activity that includes complex air, land and maritime training between Australia and Indonesia as part of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Endeavour regional deployment. The defence relationship between the two countries has grown substantially in recent years, and the signing of the new DCA will give it a renewed vigour. Australia and Indonesia should be proud of these achievements. But Australia must remain cognisant that Indonesia matters more to Australian security than Australia does to Indonesian security. Australia must recognise the strategic limits of the relationship, listen to what Indonesia says its focus is and work within those boundaries to avoid pushing it too far and overestimating the nature of the defence relationship.

22 August 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Strategist on 23 August 2024. Image: HMAS Darwin replenishing from USNS Richard Byrd in the Arabian Sea in 2014. Photo credit: Department of Defence Australia must become more active in the western Indian Ocean, not least because the country’s fuel supplies depend on tanker traffic through the region. The Royal Australian Navy has operated in the western Indian Ocean consistently for more than a quarter of its history. Those operations have spanned a spectrum of tasks from counter-piracy, counter-narcotics and counterterrorism to support to both Gulf Wars in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The nature and persistence of such operations is often attributed to Australia–US alliance responsibilities or the need for operational experience. However, the overarching reason is that western Indian Ocean maritime security directly affects Australia’s national security. While maritime operations in the region are understandably not Australia’s primary focus, ignoring the region and its impact on national security may have significant consequences as the Indian Ocean becomes more contested. Maritime operations and capacity building in the western Indian Ocean must be factored into Australia’s maritime strategy. Since the articulation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept in the 2013 Defence White Paper and the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia has limited its Indo-Pacific imagination to the eastern Indian Ocean. That focus has been reinforced repeatedly since then, including in the recent National Defence Strategy (NDS) . The NDS defines Australia’s primary area of military interest as ‘the immediate region encompassing the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific’. A primary focus on the northeastern Indian Ocean makes sense for many reasons. The obvious ones are the importance of the oil and gas reserves on Australia’s northwest shelf, Australia’s northern approaches and the ‘general proximity’ argument. The Malacca Strait between Singapore and Indonesia, and the Sunda and Lombok straits through the Indonesian archipelago, are central to Australia’s maritime trade dependencies . In a time of crisis or conflict, any direct threat to Australia beyond missile and long-range bomber attacks would likely transit through the northeastern Indian Ocean, although not exclusively. The Australian Defence Force and the current and previous governments have actively sought to bolster the defence presence in the northeastern Indian Ocean. This has taken the form of naval diplomacy through the Indo-Pacific Endeavour regional engagement activity and the bolstering of facilities in Australia’s Indian Ocean territories. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands have become a focus: a significant investment is being made to upgrade the airstrip there on West Island to support Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, and there has been talk of potential deployments of the Australian Army’s new HIMARS missile launchers there for maritime strike capability. This emphasis has been underwritten by the new era of maritime patrol aircraft diplomacy , including visits to the Maldives and a suite of new defence attache appointments. The focus on the eastern Indian Ocean is extended by the expansion of Australia’s naval base in Rockingham, Western Australia. The base HMAS Stirling will not only play host to Submarine Rotational Force–West from 2027 and Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines; it will also inevitably be host to Australia’s expanding surface combatant fleet, albeit in the 2030s. In many respects, Australia’s increased emphasis on the eastern Indian Ocean is realising what Kim Beazley hoped for with his 1987 two-ocean Navy strategy . However, Australia’s Indian Ocean defence engagement cannot be confined just to the eastern Indian Ocean or subscribe to an artificial line drawn south from India in its conception of the Indo-Pacific. There are several reasons for this, from population growth in Africa to Australia’s important trade relationships with the European Union, Australia’s third-largest trading partner. However, the most compelling and strategically significant is Australia’s fuel supply. Australia imports 90 percent of its fuel . Any interruption to the fuel supply would have dramatic and immediate effects not only on the Australian economy, but also on Australia’s ability to defend itself. F-35 fighters would not be able to fly, and HIMARS launchers could not be moved around the country, to name but two of the effects. In conversations about Australian fuel supply across the Indian Ocean, it is common for concerns to be dismissed by pointing out that Australia imports most of its fuel from its north. In June 2024, the top three exporters of fuel to Australia were South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia . But there is a catch: those imports are of refined fuel, because all but two Australian oil refineries have closed. South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia all import most of their crude oil from the Middle East, so any interruption to the crude-oil supply across the Indian Ocean will directly affect Australia’s fuel supplies and its national security. While many countries in the region are also vulnerable, Australia’s vulnerability is twofold. Australia’s fuel needs to cross the Indian Ocean twice, first as crude oil from the western Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait to be refined in Asia, then through the Indonesian archipelago back into the Indian Ocean as refined fuel to be imported into Australia. Australia’s fuel supply is but one obvious example of why Australia should care about maritime security in the western Indian Ocean. While there have been calls for Australia to bolster its fuel-supply resilience , policies developed to do so will not have an effect in the near to medium term. The western Indian Ocean is increasingly a contested maritime domain, not only as a result of increased piracy and Houthi attacks on shipping, but also because China is gaining a foothold in the region. In 2017, China established a base in Djibouti and has since invested in ports across the western Indian Ocean. In the event of a crisis, it is not a stretch to think that Australia’s fuel supply would be directly affected. While the claim has been made that Australia relies on its partnerships and alliances to ensure maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, that’s not entirely accurate. Australia has relied on partners and allies, in concert with its independent operations, to ensure maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, as evidenced by the near 30 years of continuous Australian naval deployments to this region. Given the implications for it of western Indian Ocean maritime security matters, Australia must become more active in this region through semi-regular deployments of ships and aircraft and through investment in capacity building. This will ensure presence, build relationships in the region and grow the Royal Australian Navy’s fluency with operating in the region—a baseline of familiarity that would be essential to surging operations in the event of a crisis. Australia is correct to prioritise the northeastern Indian Ocean in its military calculus, but that prioritisation should not mean that the western Indian Ocean is ignored. It’s time for Australia to incorporate a greater presence in the western Indian Ocean into its maritime strategy.

Jennifer Parker | 9 August 2024 *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 9 August 2024 2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announceables. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results. Image: The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, joined their counterparts US Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken and US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III ahead of the 34th AUSMIN Photo Credit: Defence Images The unremarkable communique issued following the 34th Australia-US Ministerial consultations ( AUSMIN ) could be interpreted as a stagnation in the relationship. In many ways it highlights the strength of the relationship and an increased alignment in strategic thinking. However, the pressure will now be on at 2025 AUSMIN for the watershed of announcements in recent years to start delivering. 2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announcements, towards updates on ongoing commitments. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results. Successes include the rotation of US bombers and other aircraft through Australia, which is slated to increase. Increases in the US marine rotational force capability and integration with the Australian Army are also a success. What is lacking is progress on upgrades to northern bases and Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO). The downplaying of AUKUS in the communique could be interpreted as an attempt to take the heat of the AUKUS debate in Australia, which has reached a fervour pitch, at times devoid of facts. But more broadly, it represents a comfort level between the four principles of AUKUS pillar one. But the pressure will ramp up in coming years to deliver the infrastructure groundwork in preparation for phase one – the rotation of US and UK submarines through Western Australia. The detailed comments on China, the Middle East and Russia make clear the level of strategic alignment. But the priority should be completion of Australia’s upgrade of its northern air-base infrastructure, which the US clearly sees as central to its ability to project force from Australia in the event of a crisis of conflict. The rotation of US aircraft through Australia’s northern air bases is another success story. But as the communique highlights, progress is still ongoing to upgrade RAAF bases Darwin and Tindal, with site surveys being undertaken of several of the remaining northern air bases. The issue here is that upgrades to the northern air bases were a key feature of the 2012 Defence Force Posture Review and the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP). While enhancing infrastructure in the north is complicated by workforce and resources, the lack of progress in 10 years clearly shows a lack of investment and prioritisation. Australia’s fledgling GWEO Enterprise gets more of a focus in the 2024 communique and was clearly a major discussion point. Another feature of the 2020 FSP, this is critical to sustaining the fight in the event of a conflict and likely crucial to the US’ clear plans to project from Australia in the event of a crisis or a conflict. The challenge here too is insufficient progress, partially as this requires US support. Australia after all operates predominantly US weapons. AUSMIN 2023 indicated the US was focused on providing this support, and AUSMIN 2024 takes the conversation further. There is a commitment to streamlining co-operation on missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle technologies, shadowing agreements on the production of the army precision strike missile in Australia, and a re-statement on their focus on co-production of the army’s guided multiple-launch rocket systems in Australia by 2025. But even this is symbolic. To make sure Australia’s GWEO Enterprise achieves its strategic objectives, it will need to expand to producing more complex and readily used missiles such as the anti-ship and anti-air missiles used by the navy. As the Red Sea has taught the countries who chose to send ships, these expensive missiles are depleted quickly in a modern conflict. AUSMIN 2024 represents more than a decade of hard work to rapidly enhance the defence relationship between the US and Australia. In many ways, 2024 represents a high point in alliance achievements. But this should not give rise to a false sense that the outcomes are where they need to be. For AUSMIN 2025, announcements need to transition into more accelerated outcomes for the alliance to be prepared to deal with the rapidly evolving strategic circumstances.

22 July 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 22 July 2024 The Houthis have been remarkably persistent in disrupting global trade. But there is a deeper strategic cost to Australia as well. Image: HMAS Hobart conducts a replenishment at sea with JMSDF Hamana while conducting Operation Argos in the East China Sea as part of a Regional Presence Deployment. Over the weekend, Israel struck back at the Houthis in Yemen after a fatal Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv. But it is the Houthi’s persistent and indiscriminate targeting of merchant ships in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean that Australia should be most concerned about. It hurts Australia’s national interests, and it’s time to do something about it. Seven months ago, the Houthis, a terrorist organisation based in Yemen, commenced an illegal blockade on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic waterway connecting Europe and Asia. Australia’s continued refusal to contribute a ship to protect shipping in this area or interdict weapons from Iran supporting the Houthis sends a concerning signal to state and non-state actors who seek to interfere with maritime trade. It’s a dangerous message to send by a maritime nation dependent on maritime trade. Over the past seven days, Houthi attacks on shipping have intensified with three vessels hit by a combination of explosive uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed aerial vehicles and ballistic missiles. It is time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea and a message that in an increasingly contested maritime domain, it intends to defend the maritime trade and innocent seafarers that keep economies such as its own functioning. The Houthis initially claimed that their attacks were directed only towards ships linked to Israel, or en route to Israel. That category was later expanded to the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in practice, their attacks have been indiscriminate, at times even attacking vessels en route to their backer, Iran. In the initial months of the attacks, many nations scrambled to provide support to the vessels transiting through this strategic waterway. The United States, Australia’s closest ally, requested that Australia send a support ship. The Australian government declined , stating that it preferred to focus on its immediate region. Ships from the Netherlands, Greece, and Germany among others flocked to the region to protect shipping. Ships from Japan, South Korea and India maintained their continued presence in the region to support counter-piracy operations. It is clear the Australian navy has capability problems decades in the making. Australia has increased its Defence Force personnel in the region to support the operations protecting ships in the area and has nominally supported US and UK strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, although the exact nature of this support is unclear. But the lack of a Royal Australian Navy ship is a glaring omission. It is clear the Navy has capability problems decades in the making. Despite a recent independent review team recommending that it needed to expand, the Navy has shrunk this year with the decommissioning of HMAS ANZAC, one of its 11 surface combatants and its two replenishment vessels seemingly out of action. The diminished fleet is further pressured by the need to upgrade its surface combatants – pressures further compounded by the need for a presence in South-East Asia and support to Operation Sovereign Borders, which detects and intercepts irregular migrants en route to Australia. These challenges will plague the Royal Australian Navy for years to come, but even without these problems, governments need to make decisions about scarce resources. Australia should prioritise the deployment of a Navy ship to the Red Sea for three key reasons. These waterways matter to Australian trade. There have been reports of Australian exports of livestock being stranded at sea, imports of consumer goods from Europe being delayed by the extended trip, and further delays due to increased congestion in Singapore. After all, the European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner. Second, and more important than the disruption of trade is the message Australia’s absence sends to state and non-state actors in an increasingly contested maritime domain. Australia’s stated strategy is one of deterrence by denial, that is deterring would-be adversaries from interfering with its national interests. Deterrence requires three elements: capability, intent and credibility. The freedom of international maritime trade is at the core of Australia’s national interests , and failing to send a ship fundamentally undermines a deterrence strategy, bringing into question Australia’s capability and credibility in the maritime domain. Thirdly, as well as the strategic justification for sending a ship, such a deployment would also provide unrivalled benefits to Royal Australian Navy personnel in understanding how their untested systems, weapons, tactics and procedures perform against the Houthis’ missiles and drones. Countries that have deployed vessels to the region have gained invaluable information on how their systems, tactics and procedures will fare in an operational environment, including a Danish frigate, which reportedly experienced critical failures with its radar and combat management systems and had to return home. It is better to gain this experience and understanding now against the Houthis, than in a conflict involving a much more competent and credible adversary. And let’s not forget, we no longer have strategic warning time – the chances of the ADF’s women and men having to defend against these threats on a greater scale are increasing. When Australia declined to send a ship to the Red Sea in December last year, the government probably thought the Houthi attacks on shipping would be a short-term phenomenon. But despite international condemnation and strikes from the US and the UK on targets, the Houthis have displayed an unexpected persistence and resilience to hold international shipping at risk. This strategic waterway is an area that matters to Australia, as does the country’s credibility and capability when it comes to protecting maritime trade. It’s time for Australia to send a ship to the Red Sea.

4 July 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on Friday 5 July The “optimal pathway” may not run exactly to plan, but the risk is known, is being managed, and all three partners have demonstrated their commitment to the process. Image: Collins Class Submarine at Henderson Marine Complex, Western Australia. Photo credit: Defence images The Australian Financial Review ’s James Curran’s Questioning AUKUS series launches a broadside against the $368 billion project to acquire nuclear-powered submarines amid claims that the ambitious plan “is a mess and risks leaving Australia with no submarine capability”. Curran’s investigation series fails to present a catastrophic failing of the “optimal pathway”. There is risk, but managing risk is a key element of any complicated defence project and has been acknowledged upfront by the current and former governments, alongside Defence. Although the series has many issues, two points warrant immediate challenge. The first is the characterisation of the United Kingdom’s ability to support AUKUS and the second is the proposal of the so-called “Plan B”. AUKUS is a critical project for the UK, and Australia needs the UK’s support for it to succeed. Curran is right to highlight the stresses on the UK submarine industrial base, and UK officials have consistently highlighted that the production of its replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is its priority, followed by AUKUS. Currently, the UK operates four SSBNs commissioned during the 1990s. These submarines are critical to its defence strategy, as they are the sole arm of its strategic nuclear deterrent. The UK’s ageing Vanguard submarines are being replaced by four Dreadnought class vessels. The construction of three of the four is under way, and the first is expected to be operational in the early 2030s. Despite Curran’s assertion that the delivery timeframe has not been updated in six years and might have slipped, the 2022-2023 UK Ministry of Defence annual report lists the Dreadnought program as on track for delivery in the early 2030s. As much as the replacement of its nuclear deterrent is rightly the top priority for the UK, the AUKUS SSN is also crucial to the UK’s nuclear strategy. To have a submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability, you need to have nuclear-powered attack submarines to protect it (SSNs). Deeply invested party Not only is the UK’s AUKUS SSN given its SSBN protection role at the core of the country’s defence strategy, but also the partnership with the UK and Australia will alleviate some of the pressures on the former’s submarine industrial base. The significance here is that the UK is a deeply invested party to AUKUS Pillar 1. It is at the core of their defence strategy. It is tempting to jump to the counterargument that there is nothing in this for Australia, and that it is being used to prop up the submarine industrial base of the UK. Not true. The UK is essential to Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines for several reasons. The UK was critical in convincing the US to allow the technology to be transferred and remain a critical balance to any changing US political whims. A bilateral arrangement for the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines is more easily abandoned than a trilateral one that includes an invested partner such as the UK. And let’s not forget, that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is also a critical part of NATO’s deterrence strategy. The UK’s involvement in AUKUS complicates any potential future exit strategy by the US – think of it as insurance. Curran’s investigation series appears to promote a nuclear-powered submarine pathway “Plan B”. The point that is ignored in the platforming of a “Plan B” is that the “Plan B” carries with it greater risk than the “optimal pathway”. The “optimal pathway” has been heavily consulted and agreed upon at the highest levels of government and defence in all three AUKUS partners. Its endorsement by all three partners is an important risk-reduction measure in itself. Untested Plan B The so-called “Plan B”, which relies on Australia being supported to build the US’ close-hold Virginia class submarines in Australia within the next decade is untested and – based on Australia’s difficult journey of attempting to obtain a licence to produce US missiles under its Guided Weapons Enterprise – is simply unlikely to gain agreement and support in the near to medium term. More importantly, although the “optimal pathway” is complex and hence unlikely to run exactly to plan, there is no evidence to date of a catastrophic failing of the pathway, nor the development of a level of extreme risk that cannot be managed. This is not to say this won’t manifest in future; none of us has a crystal ball, but there is no such indication to date. Without a catastrophic failure of an element of the “optimal pathway” or the generation of an unmanageable risk level, any knee-jerk reaction of Australia to change the pathway within two years of its announcement would disastrously undermine confidence in its commitment to AUKUS Pillar 1 and probably drive its AUKUS partners to question its ability to support the ambitious project. It is simply nonsensical to abandon an agreed plan with known risk, which is being treated, for an unconsulted plan with significant risk, without a reason or catalyst. Debate on AUKUS is important. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will not go exactly to plan – you simply cannot predict the next 34 years. But right now, the risk is known, it appears that it is being managed, and all three partners have demonstrated their commitment to the process. The measure of success here is not whether the “optimal pathway” hits every milestone exactly on time; rather, it is whether 10 years from now, Australia is operating a nuclear-powered submarine capability. At present, there is no strong reason to believe this won’t be the case.

*Published in Australian Foreign Affairs Issue 20 Feb 24 June 2024 | Jennifer Parker * *Originally published in Australian Foreign Affairs Issue 21 Image: Los Angeles-class submarine USS Annapolis (SSN 760) arriving alongside Diamantina Pier at Fleet Base West, HMAS Stirling, WA. Photo credit: Defence Images The decision to acquire nuclear- powered submarines represents a significant milestone in Australia’s defence capability. Both the cost and the transition to a nuclear- powered capability in a country without a civilian nuclear industry warrants robust debate. There are pros and cons associated with the acquisition decision and its associated ‘optimal pathway’. The core of the debate really centres on two elements. Is the opportunity cost of Australia’s acquisition of nuclear- powered submarines worth the monetary and other costs? And can the risk be managed? On these two points, reasonable arguments can be progressed on either side. Unfortunately, White’s well- written, 46- page article does not progress the debate. White’s argument, framed entirely in the negative, appears to misrepresent facts, to take liberties with assumptions represented as fact and to misunderstand key aspects of submarine employment and the requirements of a nation such as Australia that is an island dependent on maritime trade. An 800- word rebuttal cannot engage with all the issues within the piece, but I hope to encourage readers to cast a careful eye over its arguments. Here I focus primarily on some of the many problems with White’s interpretation of maritime strategy and operations. White is correct to suggest that Australia needs to articulate a strategy on which capability decisions are based, as I argued in my 2023 report, An Australian Maritime Strategy: Resourcing the Royal Australian Navy . However, he misunderstands essential elements of maritime strategy. For example, he suggests that an alternative to the acquisition of submarines could be to ‘focus our defence closer to home, relying on a shallower but denser defensive shield’. The obvious flaw in this argument is that Australia is a maritime nation: 98 per cent of our trade passes through the maritime domain, and 91 per cent of our fuel is imported, including all our aviation fuel to support the Royal Australian Air Force’s F- 35 operations, inevitably required to support White’s suggested ‘shallower defensive shield’. Why would an adversary attack Australia, when our trade – or, more accurately, our critical seaborne supply – is left undefended and ripe for the picking, as White suggests would be prudent? As the famed maritime strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan highlights, ‘wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea’, particularly wars against island nations. White’s misunderstanding of maritime strategy is underpinned by erroneous assertions that the defence of seaborne trade is no longer feasible. The explanation given for this bold but unjustified and unqualified statement is that ‘technological trends' have made ships of all kinds easier to find and hit’. Of course, as we have seen in the Red Sea, the proliferation of uncrewed explosive surface and aerial vehicles alongside anti- ship cruise missiles has increased the complexity of operations for warships in the littoral environment, which is the area of sea that can be influenced by threats from land. But unlike the Russian experience in the Black Sea, efforts of the United States and other allies and partners show that a well- defended ship with a well- trained crew can defeat these capabilities. As offensive capabilities evolve, so do counter-capabilities. This is the historical dance of naval warfare. Quick to dismiss the value of nuclear- powered submarine operations, White suggests that the only argument put forward to support the need for Australia to acquire nuclear- powered submarines is the protection of maritime trade. It is not. The presence of unlocated nuclear- powered submarines significantly complicates an adversary’s calculations and serves as a deterrent. White’s dismissal of the role of nuclear- powered submarines in the protection of maritime trade again misunderstands the fundamentals of maritime strategy and maritime operations. White suggests that eight submarines cannot protect the ‘over 17,000 voyages to Australian ports from overseas’ and that submarines are ‘very effective for attacking ships " but " not at all suited to defending them’. On the former: Australia does not need to protect all ships that visit Australian shores, it only needs to protect essential seaborne supply, comprising the fuel, ammunition and critical supplies that make up a much smaller subset of these voyages. On the latter: of course submarines will not be escorting ships along key trade routes. One look at Australian geography would show that carefully positioned submarines in the vicinity of key chokepoints would put at risk any adversary seeking to hold Australian seaborne supply at risk. The length of this piece only permits a surface- level summary of some of the flaws in White’s case against the delivery of AUKUS Pillar 1, of which there are many. While there are strong arguments for and against Australia’s acquisition of nuclear- powered submarines, White’s logic misunderstands the capability, its employment and the basic tenets of maritime strategy, and so must not be allowed to proceed unchallenged.

21 June 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review on 21 June 2024 The officer second in charge of the Royal Australian Navy will shortly rotate, opening the way for a historic first appointment of a female. Image: HMA Ships Adelaide and Canberra sail in formation at sunrise before entering Sydney Harbour. Photo Credit: Defence images The Navy and the broader Australian Defence Force have undertaken significant cultural change in the last 30 years, with much to be proud of. When I joined the Navy in 2002 as a teen from rural Australia, women had only served at sea in permanent positions for just over 10 years. In 2002, several roles in the Navy were still prohibited for women, and while women were consistently serving at sea in 2002, a female had never commanded an Australian Navy surface combatant, let alone served as the deputy chief of Navy. Inclusivity for women in the Navy has been a long, hard road, with progress built on the back of many resilient and persistent naval sailors and officers, both male and female, and some inspired senior leaders who sought to challenge the status quo. Twenty-two years on, in 2024, the Navy has achieved many milestones, with all branches now open to women, and females now commanding ships at sea and establishments ashore, albeit not yet at the same rate as their male counterparts. In some ways, this progression has been ahead of much of our immediate region and impressive by world standards. Although it must be acknowledged that in some areas, it has been behind some of Australia’s Five Eyes counterpart navies. Notably, the United States, which appointed their first female chief of naval operations in 2023. While it would be easy to list the many achievements in increasing diversity in the Australian Navy, gender diversity in the Navy’s hierarchy remains an area that requires progress. Not only is it an issue for those young women joining the Navy who aspire to the top positions, as they should, but also an issue for the normative behaviours we seek to shape in the region and beyond. The rotation of the deputy chief of Navy without a named replacement represents an opportunity. An opportunity for the Navy, the ADF, and Australia more broadly to move the journey forward by finally selecting a woman to the position. From my vantage point, having left full-time naval service after more than 20 years, there are several well-credentialled candidates at the one star and two-star ranks, with both the experience and leadership to step into the role of Navy’s second-in-command. The Australian Army will soon promote its third female three-star general, and has already had a female deputy chief of Army and commander Forces Command. The appointments of the then-major general Natasha Fox as the deputy chief of Army and major general Susan Coyle as the commander Forces Command provided not only insights into these prominent leadership roles, but also provided role models for a significant portion of the Australian Army. Not only women within the Australian Army, but those who represent the more diverse ends of the scale than the traditional appointees to the Australian Defence Force’s senior leadership. While the Navy appointed its first female two-star admiral in 2011, a surgeon-general and its first female warrant officer of the Navy in 2019, most of Navy’s key senior leadership positions are yet to be filled by women. In the last Defence annual report, the Navy had 18 admirals, only four of which were female. Notably, even though traditionally most admiral positions are filled by warfare officers, the Navy has never promoted a female warfare officer to the rank of admiral. Very few have ever been promoted to one-star despite female warfare officers having served at sea for more than 30 years, just as long as many of the Navy two-star admiral cohort have been in service. There will, of course, be many criticisms of this call to seize the opportunity and appoint a woman as the deputy chief of Navy. There are some who will never be swayed on these points. The first repechage to the call will be that we should select our top Navy leadership based on merit. The natural prolongation of this argument is that the right woman will get there when the merit is presented. Given women have served in the Navy for quite some time, and at sea in the Navy for over 30 years, a further prolongation of this merit argument is that the women who have gone before have not had “sufficient” merit – when stated as such, you can see how ridiculous the merit argument becomes. There have been clear barriers in the past. Of course, there will be some who argue the very existence of this article is an example of the increasing wokeness of defence discourse. I would challenge that much of this commentary will come from many who have never served. The selection of a female deputy chief of Navy will not address all the remaining barriers to inclusivity, but it is an opportunity that if seized, would demonstrate a commitment to addressing the issue and moving forward as a navy and as a nation.