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26 May 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 9 June 2023 Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The defence strategic review highlighted the need for the Royal Australian Navy to have two levels of surface combatants to provide ‘increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. While the DSR doesn’t directly recommend changes to the structure of the surface combatant fleet, it says: ‘Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels.’ The requirement for more smaller vessels, combined with the need for strike and anti-submarine warfare, has fuelled public discussion on whether the RAN requires corvettes to deliver the range of effects the DSR describes. The discussion has intensified following the release of the Australian National Audit Office report on the Hunter-class frigate program, which confirms that the cost of the nine vessels has already increased by 50%, years before the first is to be delivered. In late 2022 there were reports of offers to the RAN of corvettes from TKMS and Navantia, which are delivering such vessels to Saudi Arabia, and Luerssen, which is overseeing the construction of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) for the RAN and has delivered K130 corvettes to the German navy. In considering corvettes for the RAN, it’s fair to ask what a corvette is, and what the navy needs them for. A corvette is not as simple as it would first appear. Although naval history buffs will likely baulk at the comment, there’s no strict definition of a corvette—and the RAN has a history of not sticking to strict definitions of types of ships. The hierarchy of ship types is generally determined by the size, weight, firepower and employment of each vessel. One might accordingly define the hierarchy from smallest to largest, with associated growth in firepower from a patrol boat to a corvette, then a frigate, then a destroyer, then a cruiser, and so on. The RAN’s fleet structure demonstrates that this hierarchy isn’t strict. The 10,000-tonne Hunter-class frigate is to be almost three times the displacement of the Anzac-class frigate at 3,600 tonnes. On the other hand, the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers are based on the design of the Spanish F-100 frigate and have a displacement of about 7,000 tonnes, which makes them more akin to a traditional frigate. A modern corvette can range anywhere between 500 tonnes and 3,000 tonnes, almost the size of an Anzac-class frigate. You can see the conundrum. Picking the term ‘corvette’ and attaching it to a particular naval task doesn’t help. Any discussion about the RAN’s force structure must focus on the effects it needs to deliver, balanced against its key constraints. The DSR recommends: ‘Australia’s immediate region encompassing the northeastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence.’ This highlights what the RAN has known for some time, that force generation no longer relies on producing one major surface combatant to deploy on a unique operation in a far-off place. The RAN fleet requires flexibility and persistence. Australia has the world’s third largest economic exclusion zone and achieving flexibility and persistence requires scale—a surface combatant fleet much greater than the 11 vessels now in service, or the 12 planned for the future fleet. In heralding the ‘missile age’ in modern warfare (although decades late), the DSR by implication also highlights that the littoral zones of Australia’s immediate region will likely be a contested environment. By implication, not only does the RAN need flexibility and persistence at scale, it also requires its platforms to have a minimum degree of air-defence capability. This puts the Arafura-class OPV in the firing line both literally and figuratively, noting its extremely limited armament. In addition to flexibility, persistence, scale and self-defence capability, the RAN also has challenges in the number of missiles it can put to sea from an offensive-capability perspective. This has been explored in the ASPI publication The Hunter frigate: an assessment and won’t be revisited here, except to say that it will need to be a key consideration of the fleet mix. The RAN must be able to get more missiles to sea than it can now. This uncomfortable fact has led to calls for more Hobart-class destroyers to be produced, and offers from Navantia to do so. While the acquisition of further destroyers, or ‘Tier 1’ capabilities, is not the subject of this article, it must be acknowledged that the ability to put missiles to sea in as many platforms as possible must be a key consideration for the RAN. Given the distances the RAN will be required to project across, a key ingredient of persistence and presence is speed. Another limitation of the Arafura OPVs is their maximum speed of 20 knots, slow for a modern naval vessel. The transition to a ‘focused force’ in light of the DSR must not lose sight of the reality that Australia’s maritime strategy still requires the RAN to deliver a constabulary function while the Australian Border Force fleet remains constrained. The rightful focus on warfighting capability for the RAN must not ignore the fact that, under the current construct, the RAN’s smaller vessels, be they patrol boats, OPVs or corvettes, will be required to undertake constabulary roles. The RAN couldn’t trade this role away without it having to be resourced elsewhere. While this all points to solutions requiring several new platforms, the RAN’s key constraints of workforce and strategic warning time must be taken into account. The DSR reinforces the finding in the 2020 defence strategic update that Australia can no longer rely on having 10 years’ warning of a major conflict. That means the fleet to support the DSR’s requirements—noting the limitations of the current fleet—must be acquired quickly to be strategically relevant. So, is it possible to modify the Arafuras to meet the capability the RAN requires, or should a new platform of a developed design be acquired quickly through some form of commercial off-the-shelf agreement? The DSR acknowledges that the RAN faces significant workforce constraints. Increasing the number of surface combatants will require a large increase in the number of personnel to crew them. That will come on top of the need to expand the submarine workforce to crew the nuclear-powered submarines coming under the AUKUS agreement. Each US Virginia-class boat will require three times more personnel than the RAN’s Collins-class boats. Consequently, the RAN is unlikely to be able to support significant growth in the requirements to crew surface combatants. Transitioning some of the roles assigned to the RAN’s fleet to uncrewed capabilities may be a future option, but it’s unlikely to resolve some of the key challenges faced by the RAN fleet in the near term. All this demonstrates that rather than focusing on a specific type or class of ship with dubious definitions such as a corvette, we should focus on the effects that need to be delivered. Flexibility, persistence, scale, self-defence, offensive-strike capabilities and constabulary operations must be weighed against the clear constraints, delivery timeframes and workforce constraints. Consideration of these elements will lead to some clear conclusions about what is in the art of the possible for the future fleet mix.

14 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 14 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Anthony Albanese/Twitter. In the build-up to the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, the sense of history was palpable. The original NATO construct of 12 members, formed in 1949, is now 31 and will soon be 32 with Sweden’s accession. The alliance has endured plenty of instability in its lifetime, through the Cold War, the Suez crisis, the encircling of West Berlin and much more. Russia’s unrelenting 17-month war in Ukraine, a clear eye on China’s coercive behaviour and internal disagreements about the organisation’s role in the Indo-Pacific gave a sense of urgency and occasion to the summit, including for Australia. The meeting was geared to tackle tough challenges, including Sweden’s and Ukraine’s bids for membership; security commitments to Ukraine, as a member or not; budgetary and preparedness challenges; future leadership, the Moscow–Beijing partnership; and Europe’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific. There were initial doubts about whether Anthony Albanese would attend the summit and considerable speculation about what support Australia might provide Ukraine. That conjecture was likely prolonged due to the government’s wish to save ‘announceables’ for the prime minister’s European trip—while the additions to Australia’s support may have been a consequence of public criticism of the assistance package announced last week. Most of the uncertainties heading into the summit, including Australia’s ongoing support for Ukraine, were resolved. So how did it all end? Well, Sweden is in and Jens Stoltenberg has been extended as the organisation’s secretary-general, consistent with a view that NATO is only getting started with its support for Ukraine, not showing the fatigue about which so many had been concerned. Predictably, though, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is disappointed. The NATO summit communiqué reaffirmed the Bucharest decision to admit Ukraine as a member, but it declined to outline a clear pathway to membership. That drove the Ukrainian leader to describe the decision as ‘unprecedented and absurd’. The summit communiqué stated: ‘We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.’ The precise nature of those conditions is not yet clear, but the writing was on the wall before the summit when key allies such as Germany and the US expressed reservations. In some respects, it was a missed opportunity. Mapping out a pathway for Ukrainian membership should be part of a deterrence strategy to prevent Russia from thinking it will succeed merely by prolonging the war. While Ukraine is understandably disappointed, Zelensky was happier with the assistance packages, including the gifts pledged by Albanese. Recent Australian support has been provided in three tranches. In late June came the announcement of $110 million worth of military vehicles, ammunition and humanitarian assistance. On the eve of the Vilnius summit, the government revealed that a Royal Australian Air Force E7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft would be deployed to Germany to help watch over the supply lines for lethal and humanitarian aid heading to Ukraine. That highly sophisticated aircraft is likely to be capable of much more. The third in the trio of announcements came on the last day of the summit, when Albanese met with Zelensky and promised a further 30 Bushmaster armoured personnel carriers to help protect Ukrainian troops advancing across a mine- and bomb-strewn landscape. While the package appears piecemeal and aimed at driving announcements, heart should be taken from the broader Australian public’s resolve for Ukraine and the government’s willingness to listen and increase its support. But with no end to the conflict in sight, the Australian government now has the opportunity to evolve the current stop–start approach and consider what a continued meaningful contribution to Ukraine looks like. That won’t be easy, with the Department of Defence under significant financial pressure and the government insisting on the costs of supporting Ukraine being absorbed within Defence’s existing budget. But it’s a better approach than the current one of inadequate assistance, followed by public criticism and then more government support. Let’s skip the first two parts. The one area of inconsistency centred on NATO’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s invitation to the summit as part of the Indo-Pacific four—with Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand—was significant. And, importantly, the NATO communiqué contained strong words on Beijing’s coercive policies and subversion of the international rules-based order. In a sign of the ongoing global shift within NATO, the EU and many member states, Indo-Pacific security warranted a mention: ‘The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.’ This is a direct response to Beijing’s military build-up and economic coercion. Yet the communiqué contained no mention of the plan, now in doubt, to open a NATO office in Japan. That outcome is likely to have followed French President Emmanuel Macron’s objection, which unfortunately seems to be based on attempts to mollify China and not on precedent, given the existence of offices in other regions such as Africa. Regrettably, this shows tensions within the organisation on how to engage on Indo-Pacific security. That’s even more disappointing given that the main holdout, France, is a Pacific power. In the face of this tension, it’s vital that Australia not be silent and continue to be a proactive advocate of the inseparability of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. The national interest demands a year-round strategy, not just annual visits.

1 May 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 1 May 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The 2023 defence strategic review (DSR) identifies itself as ‘the most substantial and ambitious approach to Defence reform recommended to any Australian government since the Second World War’. It maps out a pivot for the national defence strategy from the defence of Australia to the defence of Australian interests, or ‘national defence’. In the lead-up to the review’s release, defence commentators commonly formed the view that it would prioritise the maritime domain at the expense of more conventional land capabilities, likely recommending significant changes to the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet structure. The RAN’s surface combatants are three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and eight Anzac-class frigates supported by 12 patrol boats which are gradually being decommissioned. The 2016 defence white paper outlined the intent to replace the Anzacs with an anti-submarine warfare frigate, the Hunter class. The nine Hunters were to be delivered in the mid-2020s but the first is now expected in the early 2030s. That white paper also announced the intended acquisition of 12 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to replace the Armidale class on ‘enhanced border protection and patrol missions’. The number was later increased in the 2020 force structure plan (FSP) to 20. The 2016 white paper and the 2020 FSP arguably articulated the largest recapitalisation of the RAN since World War II. Despite that, commentators have warned that the make-up and planned number of vessels will not be enough for the RAN to effectively protect Australia’s maritime interests, including extensive sea lines of communication and undersea cables. The FSP detailed the importance of broadening and updating the RAN’s undersea warfare capabilities through further investment in persistent undersea surveillance and enhancement of mine warfare capabilities through the acquisition of up to eight additional vessels, potentially based on the OPV. It also committed to the expansion of the RAN’s amphibious and sea-lift capability through the acquisition of two multi-role vessels to replace HMAS Choules, among other changes. Although the FSP did not fundamentally change the fleet’s intended structure beyond what was laid out in the 2016 white paper, it did seek to address the full spectrum of effects the RAN may be called upon to deliver. There was some expectation that the DSR would recommend acquiring additional destroyers and replacing the OPVs with corvette-sized vessels. The DSR did neither, but it recommended a review of the RAN’s force structure, saying: ‘Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade.’ The DSR articulates a need to raise the fleet’s lethality and identifies a requirement for ‘Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants to provide increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. It says these roles will take an ‘optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants consistent with a larger number of smaller surface vessels’. Despite identifying these investment priorities, the DSR team (at least in the unclassified version of its report) avoided recommending specific capabilities as it did for the land and air domains. Instead, it called for an independent analysis of the RAN’s surface combatants to ‘ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally armed nuclear submarines’. This review will be headed by retired US Admiral William H. Hilarides, chair of the government’s naval shipbuilding advisory panel. The assertion that acquiring nuclear submarines warrants a rethink of the surface combatant fleet structure seems tenuous. I may be torpedoed by a submariner for stating this, but effectively nuclear-powered submarines deliver the same effects as conventional submarines, just better. Reading between the lines, DSR planners may have come to the belief that acquiring nuclear submarines somehow negates the need for nine anti-submarine-warfare frigates. The maritime domain investment priorities outlined by the DSR tend to indicate that the team had a fleet force structure in mind, but they avoided articulating it, probably because of concerns raised by either the RAN or the shipbuilding industry. A likely reason is the challenge the RAN is facing maintaining its workforce. Despite the 22 March defence workforce growth announcement, it’s likely that the RAN would be unable to crew an expanded fleet without significant structural changes to its workforce. The DSR says the navy ‘faces the most significant workforce challenges of the three services’. That concern is not new. The Anzac frigates were plagued by crew shortages that saw HMAS Perth out of operation for four years from 2017 to 2020 and the navy had difficulty sustaining crews through much of the life of the Collins submarines. Workforce issues would not have been the only concerns delaying the DSR’s recommendation on RAN force structure—with challenges including available design and shipbuilding capacity clearly front of mind—but the maths would indicate that crewing is a factor. It’s difficult to see how any increase in the number of surface combatants would not exacerbate the workforce shortfalls. A corvette crew is between 90 and 120, two to three times the size of an OPV crew. This might be offset by reducing the number of Hunter-class frigates, which have a crew of about 180, but it’s unlikely that a smaller vessel could provide the anti-submarine-warfare capability recommended in the DSR. The Hunter design has limited strike capacity compared to other vessels of its size and the OPV is not currently designed to provide any greater defensive or offensive capabilities than are required for constabulary operations. It appears evident from the DSR’s investment priorities that the current and planned surface combatant structure will not meet the DSRs ‘national defence’ projection requirements. The structure of the surface fleet remains a quandary, and a surprising one for the DSR team to delay solving given the urgency of the strategic situation it describes. It’s also notable that the relatively short section on the maritime domain limited its commentary on investment priorities to consideration of the surface combatant force and to reaffirming the justification for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines. The limited detail on maritime priorities stands in contrast to previous white papers, and to the FSP. This narrower focus on the maritime domain does not provide any commentary on capability considerations for the RAN regarding the integration of sea-lift, aviation, uncrewed capabilities or undersea capabilities beyond submarines and frigates and defensive and offensive mining. It is unclear whether this was because the DSR team supported the decisions in the FSP and believed these capabilities to be on track to be delivered in an appropriate timeframe and therefore they did not warrant reconsideration, or because their relative importance has diminished. Despite the conspicuous absence of recommendations on these capabilities in the DSR, it’s important that Admiral Hilarides considers them. While I believe the view that the fleet structure needs to be reviewed to complement the submarines seems tenuous, the new review will need to consider the RAN’s concept of operations, the overall effects the RAN will need to achieve in support of ‘national defence’ and how all its capabilities will come together to achieve that. This is likely to have a significant impact on the required structure of the RAN’s surface fleet.

17 February 2023 | Jennifer Parker Photo Credit: Broken Hill RSL, Broken Hill Sea Scouts Mentoring has been an incredible personal growth journey for me, and I've learned so much along the way that has helped me become a better mentor. Reflecting on my 21-year career with the Royal Australian Navy, I can say with certainty that one of the most fulfilling aspects of my journey has been the opportunity to mentor those following in my footsteps. With some time off following a busy deployment, I took the opportunity to reflect on what makes mentoring so rewarding for me and to share my thoughts on some of the key considerations for being an effective mentor. Mentoring has been an incredible personal growth journey for me, and I've learned so much along the way that has helped me become a better mentor. From listening actively and encouraging self-reflection, to creating a safe and non-judgmental environment, these lessons have made a significant impact on my mentorship style. Formal v Informal Mentoring In the end, the best approach to mentoring depends on the individual's needs and goals. Mentoring can take many forms, but often it is broken down into concepts of formal and informal mentoring. Formal mentoring is all about structure and is generally part of a development program. This type of mentoring involves a specific mentor-mentee match, set goals, and expectations. Informal mentoring, on the other hand, is a more relaxed approach and can happen organically through relationships formed at work or in your personal network. In the beginning of my career, I was convinced that mentoring relationships needed to develop naturally, and I saw little value in formal mentoring programs. But after participating as a mentor in a formal program, I've come to realise the growth and development opportunities they offer. Formal mentoring has its strengths, like a clear framework for the relationship, and often access to resources and support from the development program, and the chance to be paired with a mentor who has specific expertise or experience. However, it also has its challenges like a potentially less personal relationship, strict expectations that may not fit your mentee's needs, and in some cases limited flexibility to switch up the mentor-mentee relationship if it's not working. Conversely, informal mentoring provides more flexibility and a more personal relationship, but may not come with the resources and support found in formal programs. It's important to keep in mind that informal mentoring may not have the same level of accountability and structure as formal mentoring. In the end, the best approach to mentoring depends on the individual's needs and goals. Both formal and informal mentoring can provide valuable experiences and benefits, so it's all about finding what works best for the mentee / mentor relationship. Mentoring Tips After many years of mentoring in a fast-paced environment, I've learned a few key things that may seem obvious, but they're important enough to be worth mentioning. Here are my thoughts on the most crucial considerations for effective mentoring. First off, active listening is key. When you're mentoring someone, it's not just about giving advice. It's about truly understanding what the person needs, what their challenges are, and what they hope to achieve. By listening actively, you can provide guidance that's specifically tailored to their situation. Next, empathy is crucial. When you put yourself in the mentee's shoes and understand their experiences, emotions, and perspectives, it builds trust and a strong mentor-mentee relationship. It also creates a safe and non-judgmental space for them to open up and be themselves. Setting clear expectations is also important. From the get-go, make sure you both agree on what the mentorship will look like, including how often you'll meet and what type of support will be provided. This keeps both of you on the same page and helps the mentorship stay productive. Finally, mentorship is a two-way street. While the mentor provides guidance and support, the mentee also has a big role to play in their own growth and development. Encourage them to take ownership, set goals, and hold themselves accountable. Setting Goals with your Mentee When it comes to goal setting in a formal mentoring setting, it's important to approach it in a way that supports your mentee without coming across as condescending or rigid. Setting goals is crucial for providing direction, motivation, and a way to track progress, but it can sometimes be a tricky task. Here are some tips to guide your mentee through the goal setting process and help them set meaningful and attainable goals. Start with the big picture: Encourage your mentee to think about their overall aspirations and what they want to achieve in the long term. This will provide a foundation for setting more specific and short-term goals. Break down the big picture: Once your mentee has a clear sense of their long-term aspirations, help them break it down into smaller, more manageable goals. For example, if their long-term goal is to take on a specific position or role, short-term goals could include completing relevant training or taking on additional responsibilities at work. Encourage goal-setting in areas of strength and interest: Help your mentee identify their strengths and areas of interest and encourage them to set goals in these areas. This will increase their motivation and likelihood of success. Celebrate progress: Celebrating progress and small victories along the way is essential for keeping your mentee motivated and engaged. Recognise their achievements, no matter how small, and help them see the progress they are making towards their long-term goals. Be supportive: Finally, be there to support your mentee throughout the goal-setting process and as they work towards their goals. Encourage them, provide guidance, and offer a sounding board as needed. Challenging your Mentees Biases Many of us have limiting beliefs and patterns of thought that can hold us back and prevent us from achieving our full potential. As a mentor, it's also important to be aware of the impact that your mentee's pre-existing thinking can have on their goals and overall growth. Many of us have limiting beliefs and patterns of thought that can hold us back and prevent us from achieving our full potential. For example, a mentee may have a belief that they're not capable of achieving a certain level of success, or that their goals are unrealistic. These beliefs can be deeply ingrained and difficult to change, but as a mentor, you can help your mentee challenge and overcome them. Encourage them to question their limiting beliefs, reframe negative thought patterns, and focus on what they can control and do to achieve their goals. Another challenge related to pre-existing thinking is a lack of self-awareness. Some mentees may not be aware of their own biases and limitations, and these can impact their ability to achieve their goals. Encourage your mentee to take a step back, reflect on their thinking and behavior, and seek out opportunities for personal and professional growth. Challenging thinking in a Supportive Fashion Challenging a mentee's thinking in a supportive fashion can be a delicate balance, but it's an important part of the mentorship process. Here are a few tips for effectively challenging thinking in a supportive way: Ask questions and encourage self-reflection: Encourage your mentee to think critically about their thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors. Ask questions that help them see their thoughts from different perspectives and challenge their limiting beliefs. Provide alternative perspectives: Share your own experiences, perspectives, and knowledge to help your mentee expand their thinking and challenge their beliefs. This can help them see things in a new light and gain a more comprehensive understanding of a situation. Use positive language: When challenging a mentee's thinking, it's important to use positive and supportive language. Avoid using negative or critical language, and instead focus on helping your mentee see the opportunities for growth and improvement. Create a safe and non-judgmental environment: Ensure that your mentee feels comfortable and safe when discussing their thoughts and beliefs. A supportive and non-judgmental environment will encourage open and honest conversation and help your mentee feel more confident and secure in challenging their own thinking Knowing when it’s time for your Mentee to move on As a mentor, it's important to recognise this change and be there to support your mentee as they move forward. As a mentor, it's important to recognise when it's time for your mentee to move on and take the next steps on their own. This can be a difficult transition for both you and your mentee, but it's also a natural part of the mentorship process and a sign of growth and success. One indicator that your mentee is ready to move on is when they have achieved their goals and are ready for new challenges. In this case, it's time to celebrate their achievements, reflect on what they've learned, and help them identify their next steps. By providing a supportive and encouraging environment, you'll be helping them take the next steps towards further growth and success. Another indicator that it's time to move on is when your mentee has outgrown the mentorship relationship. This can happen when they have gained the skills, knowledge, and confidence they need to succeed on their own. As a mentor, it's important to recognise this change and be there to support your mentee as they move forward. By embracing the mentorship opportunities available to us, we have the ability to make a positive impact in the lives of others and ultimately, leave a lasting legacy. Mentoring is a truly enriching experience that brings forth a multitude of benefits for both the mentor and mentee. It provides a platform to offer guidance, encouragement, and support to those in your organisation, while also serving as an opportunity for personal growth and self-discovery. Effective mentoring can impact an individual's career trajectory, foster a positive work culture, and ultimately contribute to the success of the organisation. By embracing the mentorship opportunities available to us, we have the ability to make a positive impact in the lives of others and ultimately, leave a lasting legacy.

25 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 25 October 2023 Defence Minister Richard Marles with Philippine National Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro jnr (centre left) , Australian ambassador to the Philippines Hae Kyong Yu, and soldiers during military drills in the Philippines in August.AP All this comes as questions are being raised in the US about the viability of the AUKUS submarine deal, which Mr Albanese must be hoping to quell. It is within this context that America’s ally, the Philippines, has again come under pressure through China’s increasingly aggressive tactics within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). And Australia should be unequivocal in its statement that China’s aggressive actions are unacceptable. With Australia’s US ally stretched from Europe to the Middle East, it’s time for Australia to step up and lead in its own backyard. Like clockwork, on Sunday the Chinese Coast Guard again attempted to blockade a resupply vessel en route to the deteriorating Philippine Navy vessel, BRP Sierra Madre, that is beached on Second Thomas Shoal. The dangerous manoeuvring of a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, increasingly a staple of maritime operations in the South China Sea, resulted in a collision with the contracted resupply vessel. During the same mission, a Chinese maritime militia vessel rammed a Philippines Coast Guard patrol vessel. While thankfully there do not appear to be any injuries, this increasingly dangerous cat-and-mouse game on the high seas is undermining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Both are central to Australia’s own maritime security. China’s aggressive actions within the Philippine EEZ are not new, but the escalating nature of the aggression should be a cause for concern for Australia. In February, a Chinese Coast Guard ship reportedly shone a military grade laser a number of times into the bridge of a Philippine resupply vessel. In August, the Sierra Madre resupply mission again featured in global news with images of a Chinese vessel water cannoning the small Philippine vessel. Guardrails start with being clear on where you stand and Australia must clearly state its view about what is happening in our own backyard. While there are many disputed maritime claims across the region, what sets incidents in areas like Second Thomas Shoal apart is the feature’s undeniable standing in international law. The shoal sits 105 nautical miles west of the Philippines island of Palawan and more than 500 nautical miles from China. It is one of the features subject to the 2016 permanent court of arbitration tribunal ruling which found it to be a low tide elevation within the Philippines EEZ which China had no legal territorial claim to. Following the August incident, subsequent visits to the Philippines from Defence Minister Richard Marles in August and Mr Albanese in September signalled a strengthening of ties between the two countries through the signing of a strategic partnership and announcement that joint maritime patrols would take place. The strong messaging from the August and September visits is in danger of being undermined. The promised joint patrols appear yet to manifest, or at least they have not been publicly signalled, and the Australian Government has avoided making clear unequivocal statements about China’s bullying of the Philippines within its own exclusive economic zone. As Mr Albanese visits the US signalling the strength of the relationship and hoping to move the needle on the fledging AUKUS arrangement, Australia should be clear and unequivocal that China’s actions towards the Philippines near Second Thomas Shoal are unacceptable. It can achieve this by following through with its planned joint patrols with the Philippines and making a clear statement on the weekend’s events. In June, Mr Albanese spoke passionately at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore about the need for guardrails. Well, guardrails start with being clear on where you stand and Australia must clearly state its view about what is happening in our own backyard. In a time of global crisis from the Middle East to Europe, it’s time for Australia as a regional power in the Indo-Pacific to take the lead and be unequivocal about China’s bullying of the Philippines.