2 February 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter on 2 February 2024 Image: US Navy Australia’s view of the Indo-Pacific generally stops at Sri Lanka and the southern tip of India. But this regional conceptualisation leaves out the western region of the Indian Ocean. This may perhaps stem from a realist’s recognition of capability and capacity constraints – but equally, as the recent campaign of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has demonstrated, security in the western Indian Ocean has an impact on Australia. The plight of stranded sheep and cattle that had been bound for export to the Middle East is only one obvious example. The maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean are diverse and complex. From the dramatic impact of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing to the consequences of rising sea levels, maritime terrorism, and piracy. However, two common threads are evident – the need for enhanced maritime domain awareness, and the limited capabilities to respond to the threats when detected. While Australia may have a capacity issue in engaging in maritime security in the western Indian Ocean region, there are options to leverage existing projects and relationships to improve maritime domain awareness.. The Quad has already set out an ambition for an Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) project, which was announced at the 2022 leaders’ meeting in Tokyo. This initiative provides a vehicle for greater Australian engagement in assisting with maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean. An additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping” operating without the use of location transponders. The stated purpose of IPMDA is to create a “technology and training initiative to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region and to bring increased transparency to its critical waterways”. It amounts to sharing data as a public good. As the Quad traces its roots back to the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief support in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, IPMDA makes sense as an initiative for the grouping with the potential to assist maritime security in the region. A risk to IPMDA is the seemingly limited progress of the project in the western Indian Ocean region, where it could make a real difference to maritime security. There has been limited official detail on the ambitious project to provide near real-time data in the maritime domain through what appears to be the resourcing of commercial arrangements through public-private partnerships. At the last Quad leaders' meeting, on the sidelines of the 2023 G7 summit in Hiroshima, it was highlighted that IPMDA was in its initial phase, with pilots occurring in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Quad partners have not officially released where the IPMDA pilots are occurring but it is likely to be in the Information Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram India, the Singapore Information Fusion Centre, and alongside the Forum Fisheries Agency in Solomon Islands. It has not been rolled out to the western Indian Ocean, where there appears to be little awareness of the IPMDA project. The initial focus of IPMDA is the delivery of satellite-based radio frequency data. This satellite capability allows for the detection and classification of ships by data emitted by radar or communications equipment. This additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping”, that is ships operating without the use of location transponders known as the Automatic identification System, or AIS. Monitoring radio frequency data is a technology that advanced militaries have commonly used, but one that has been off limits to smaller nations due to its cost. The ability to integrate this data into existing maritime monitoring systems such as the US-funded Seavision, which is commonly used in the western Indian Ocean, would prove a significant asset. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has awarded a contract to the company Hawkeye 360 to provide satellite radio frequency data and training to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. Australia’s investment has been further supported by a United States US$12.2 million contract to Hawkeye to provide further data analytics and training in the Pacific in Southeast Asia. For the next phase of the project, Australia should support a roll out of IPMDA through the provision of radio frequency satellite data to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Operations Coordination Centre in the Seychelles. This would significantly enhance the monitoring capacity in the western Indian Ocean region, which in turn enhances Australia’s maritime security as an Indian Ocean coastal state.

Jennifer Parker | 9 February 2024 *Originally published in The Strategist 9 February 2024 Image: HMAS Voyager (II) crew 1962, Australian War Memorial Tomorrow marks the 60th anniversary of the loss of the Royal Australian Navy destroyer, HMAS Voyager (II), which sank 20 nautical miles south-east of Jervis Bay. Of the 314 crew of Voyager, 82 were lost that night in Australia’s worst peacetime military disaster. Many more lives were altered forever. We are a maritime nation and yet our maritime history is often forgotten. We must remember the loss of Voyager on the night of Saturday 10 February, 1964. The destroyer was escorting HMAS Melbourne (II), Australia’s last aircraft carrier, as it carried out flying operations. Both ships had recently emerged from refits. Voyager was the ‘plane guard’, positioned 1000-2000 yards off Melbourne’s port quarter to recover the crew of any aircraft that might ditch. Following a series of manoeuvres, Voyager ended up out of position on Melbourne’s starboard bow and was required to resume her station. How and why Voyager ended up in this position remains unclear 60 years on although there are many theories. In truth, we will never know as most of the bridge team were lost that night. Presumably attempting to resume her station, Voyager was seen to alter to starboard away from the carrier, and then back to port towards it. The 3,600 tonne Voyager crossed the bow of the 20,000 tonne Melbourne. There was little time to react and despite attempts to avoid the collision in the final seconds, the two ships collided at 20:56. Melbourne’s bow struck Voyager aft of her bridge, severing the ship. Voyager’s bow passed down the port side of Melbourne, sinking within 10 minutes of the collision. A recovery operation was immediately launched by Melbourne, which was joined by several vessels from HMAS Creswell, in Jervis Bay. Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night. Midshipman Kerry Francis Marien survived the collision but left the relative safety of his life raft and was last seen swimming towards the rapidly sinking bow of Voyager to search for survivors struggling in the water. Chief Petty Officer Jonathan ‘Buck’ Rogers was trapped in the forward section of the bow. Realising he was too big to get through the small escape hatches, Buck took charge of trying to help the 50 sailors trapped with him to escape. And when escape was no longer possible, he was heard leading those trapped there in prayers and hymns. There are many stories of heroism from that night, of the brave men of the Royal Australian Navy rising to the occasion to save the lives of shipmates and friends. Stories that we know, and stories we will never know. In the years that followed the loss of Voyager, the national conversation was dominated by the controversy. The incident was followed by two royal commissions and many theories and books on how and why such a horrific peacetime loss of life could occur. It is of course important to understand why Voyager was lost and where accountability lies. Whilst we should never lose sight of the many hard lessons learnt, on the 60th anniversary we should focus our thoughts on the brave sailors who died and those who survived but whose lives were never the same. The sea is a perilous place, it does not recognise a distinction between wartime and peacetime. Every time our naval ships set sail, they put themselves at the mercy of this unforgiving environment. For centuries the oceans have rallied against those who seek to tame it, and operating in this environment will always be dangerous. Preparation in this domain for the possibility of conflict requires the women and men of our Navy to practise the operations and procedures that they will rely on in wartime. There is always risk, and they embrace it daily. When we think of our military heroes we talk of those on the Kokoda track and the trials of Gallipoli and the Western front. They all rightfully deserve a place in the collective memory of our nation and remind us of what war really means, especially in this time of global tensions that permeate all aspects of international and national security. On the anniversary of the Voyager’s loss we must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country. They too are our heroes, and they died in the service of our nation.

6 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 6 February 2024 Image: Defence Images The federal government has compared our circumstances to those in the lead-up to World War II. Australians are faced with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and tensions in the South China Sea and north-east Asia that may spill over into conflict. Amidst these generation-defining global challenges, the Australian Defence Force is struggling to upgrade and crew its capabilities. It needs a bigger budget and it needs more people. But, more importantly, it needs to convince the public why they should care about these issues. Protecting Australia’s strategic interests and our national way of life requires not only a capable Defence Force, but also a strong defence debate and a public that is brought along for the journey. Despite the critical importance of an informed debate, and an informed Australian public, risk aversion has largely removed the ADF from this debate. That’s different from our AUKUS partners in the United Kingdom and the United States. Not only is it rare to see senior defence leaders speak candidly about the challenges we face in an unscripted way, but the conversation is largely stifled at all levels. Defence members seeking to publish or comment on defence-related issues are largely undermined by defence policies, or a rigid interpretation of these policies. A direct comparison between the defence-related websites and publications in the United States and Australia shows American officers and enlisted personnel routinely engage in debates about the future of their nation’s defence. In Australia, this is rare. The removal of ADF personnel from the national defence conversation is partially a product of the increasing restrictions placed on them by successive governments of both parties over the past few decades. But it’s also the product of self-censorship and risk aversion within the organisation. The paralysis created by the concern with being perceived to have said the wrong thing, being perceived to have spoken before the government, or offered an opinion at odds to the government has shut down debate. The apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as it having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. A key principle of Australian society is that the ADF is subordinate to the government of the day. It is, of course, essential that defence is seen in this light and is viewed as apolitical. The current Chief of Defence Force clearly takes this seriously, by removing himself and fellow senior officers from the background of a 2019 interview with the then minister for defence, as Christopher Pyne took a series of questions on political issues. A symbolic, but important, action. But the apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as Defence and its members having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. In 2015 another former defence minister, Kevin Andrews, commissioned a report on Australian attitudes to defence by an expert panel external to the department and the ADF. A key finding was that “enhanced public awareness was needed on defence roles and missions, how it performs these tasks and the underlying policy rationale”. The panel found the Department of Defence needed to be less risk-averse in its approach to communications and agreed to work with the department to address these issues. Since 2015, subsequent defence policies including the centralisation of communications management and the rigid implementation of that policy have further stifled defence communications – not only Department of Defence communications with the public, but also defence debates on capabilities, policies and ideas within its own ranks. In an interview in January the prime minister highlighted that defence spending was likely to be a focus of the 2024 budget, stating “you can’t defend Australia with a press release, you need assets”. While there is no denying the truth of this statement, it’s not a case of convincing the government or the Canberra elites that defence funding is necessary, it’s about convincing the Australian public that this should be a spending priority. The public does not want to hear this from the government, or from academia, but from Defence. This is what the 2015 panel of experts clearly told us. Despite cynicism about defence capability overspends, the Australian public is largely trusting of our women and men in uniform. Time and time again these are the uniforms they see when they experience personal disaster in fire and flood. The Department of Defence needs to be communicating with the public about what the threat is, and what we need to do to combat the threat. This isn’t only our senior leaders, but all levels of defence. Presumably there are senior leaders in the ADF who would welcome the ability to speak more candidly about the challenges. If this is true, maybe it’s time for the government to allow this. Absent from this conversation, the public’s education on defence is through the “gotcha” moments of Senate Estimates or the sensational headlines designed to gain clicks on the armed forces’ capability and workforce woes. In this environment, without engagement from Defence it will be difficult to convince the Australian public why defence matters, why they should be trusted with larger defence budgets and why they should send their children to join the Defence Force.

29 January 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 29 January 2024 Image: Department of Defence. The Government, and many others, have described the grim parallels between Australia’s present strategic circumstances and those leading up to World War II. As a maritime nation we must ask urgently how we find ourselves in a position where one of our 11 major surface combatants has effectively been removed from service due to workforce pressures. That’s exacerbated by suggestions that another two aging Anzac class frigates will be laid up because we don’t have crew for them. If it happens, 27% of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet will be mothballed. Much has been made of the challenges facing the Australian Defence Force, and the RAN in particular, in recruitment and retention, but the focus must be on a structure that can rapidly support a Navy capable of responding to the increased risk of conflict in our region. Navy’s workforce issues are well known and are not a new constraint on its operations. The 2023 defence strategic review (DSR) acknowledged that the Navy faced the biggest workforce challenges of the three services. Government and Navy have spoken extensively on recruitment and retention. Since the DSR, a new ADF 3-star position has been established to centralise the response to workforce issues and bonuses aplenty have been announced to address retention rates. Conversations around RAN workforce issues immediately focus on recruitment and retention. Whilst this is an issue for an RAN with a commitment to grow, it is not the main issue—in some circumstances it’s a distraction from structural changes that are required. With wars in Europe and the Middle East, we cannot spend time wishing for the navy we would like to have. We must immediately structure the navy we have for the high-end conflict it may soon face. In doing that, dividends may well be achieved in recruitment and retention as a greater sense of purpose is achieved in naval personnel as mariners and war fighters. It’s by no means a solid metric but, anecdotally, USS Carney’s engagements in the Red Sea were followed rapidly by 15 re-enlistments on the vessel after its capable team intercepted a barrage of missiles. Bonuses alone don’t fix retention but a sense of purpose goes a long way. The 2020 defence strategic update (DSU) clearly articulated that the Department of Defence could no longer rely on the concept of 10 years strategic warning time of a major conflict in our region. This assessment drove the force structure plan (FSP) that sought to reshape ADF capability. The FSP was followed by the 2022 announcement of a target increasing the Defence workforce (the uniformed services and the public service) by 30% by 2040. The intention is to increase the permanent Navy to 20,000 by 2040. The problem with the Defence workforce growth announcement is that it was just about growth. The message that we may not have 10 years warning time of a possible major conflict did not prompt a fundamental rethink of the Navy’s personnel structure or the tasks it’s required to deliver. The workforce will need to grow to support the transition to larger crews for nuclear-powered submarines with a 130% increase in crewing requirements between the Collins’ class and Virginia class boats—and any further growth in surface combatant force crewing numbers. But the issues tying up the Anzacs are not, as they appear, fundamentally about navy numbers. So, what are these numbers? Detail is often scant on the RAN workforce, but the 2022-23 Defence Annual Report is instructive. At the end of the last financial year the RAN consisted of 14,958 permanent and 4, 607 reserve personnel. The permanent navy had contracted by 213 in 12 months and 543 in 24 months. However, it has grown by 752 since the 2019-2020 annual report and the current retraction may well be a response to the higher than usual growth during the Covid period as separation rates dropped to an abnormal 6.5% at 30 June 2020, and 7.4% at 30 June 2021. Not only has the RAN grown from its pre-pandemic numbers, but this is also part of a wider growth story over the last 20 years following the catastrophic cuts in the 1990s. In 2012-13 the permanent navy had 13,760 personnel, and in 2003 it was 12,847. The RAN has grown 16% over 20 years. Organisationally, it’s generally thought that 10% is a healthy separation rate. The last annual report gave the navy’s rolling separation rate as 9.2%, slightly down from the 9.7% in the previous report but substantially lower than the just under 12% rate in 2003. It was close to the five-year average of 9.1% until the impact of Covid in 2019-2020. Unfortunately, recruitment details are no longer made available in the annual report but it can be taken on face value, given the RAN’s contraction in the last two years, that recruitment is lower than it would like. This isn’t to say that recruitment and retention isn’t an issue for an organisation that needs to grow, it is. But it’s not why the Navy cannot presently crew its ships. Information on separation rates in critical seagoing categories is not readily accessible to the public, so this may be part of the challenge. Given that the RAN is growing when five, 10 and 20 year trends are considered but likely not at the rate it needs too, it must urgently prioritise structural reform. Assessing how to reform a navy structured around peacetime needs for the increasing risk of conflict in the region is difficult and complex. But there are areas it could quickly consider. Specific elements of structural reform requiring urgent consideration include examining the tasks assigned to the Navy and how at sea logistics and constabulary roles may be adequately resourced. This requires bold changes and bold decision-making as I wrote in my 2023 ASPI report An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN. It’s time to consider the allocation of at sea logistics to a fleet auxiliary, designing and crewing auxiliary vessels to execute these roles with fewer crew. It’s important to consider the Navy’s ability to execute all that is expected of it in a conflict. Passing constabulary roles to a coast guard would provide an important element of layered Defence, but would also free up the RAN for war fighting. The DSR highlighted the need to review the structure of the ADF reserves and recommendations are due in 2025. Given our strategic circumstances, that’s unacceptably late. Immediate consideration needs to be given to recruiting personnel directly into the naval reserves, and to requiring reservists to keep their skills current. The 2022-23 Defence Annual Report stated that the Navy had 4,607 permanent reserves. Mobilised reserves in the event of crisis or conflict allows the government to surge our maritime fighting capability. But short of crisis or conflict, using reserves in peacetime would bolster the RAN by allowing the permanent structure to focus on supporting and delivering a seagoing capability. Presently, unlike army reservists, civilians cannot join the naval reserves unless they are in a specialised capacities such as doctors, legal officers, media officers, psychologists etc. The current restrictions on joining the RAN reserves limit a whole spectrum of society which could support Australia’s maritime defence. The RAN needs to adopt a cultural approach of treating its personnel as mariners and war fighters first. In an organisation struggling to crew its small number of major surface combatants there needs to be a reckoning on what roles within the RAN and ADF the Navy must focus its efforts on, and what can be supported by other means. The United States Navy Chief of Navy Operations (CNO) recently released her priorities as focusing on ‘warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation that supports them’. The RAN needs to follow suit, shedding its structure, where possible, of non-seagoing categories and outsourcing certain roles to other services or the public service. Getting our ships to sea must be the priority. This is a brief precis of some of the structural changes the Navy must reckon with to be fit to fight in an era of geopolitical tension. The situation is much more complicated than this space will allow, but the RAN must move past workforce discussions focused only on recruitment and retention. Yes recruitment is an issue, retention overall is healthy. The Navy must restructure to support a focus on its seagoing units, but also consider the tasks it undertakes and question whether these may be better undertaken by a fleet auxiliary or coast guard. Time is no longer on our side, and in an era of global tensions it is not acceptable for a navy of nearly 15,000 personnel to be tying up ships.

January 16, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published in the Australian 16 January 2023 Image: A RAF Typhoon aircraft returns to berth at RAF Akrortiri following a strike mission on Yemen's Houthi rebels. Getty Images. Foreign Minister Penny Wong is visiting the Middle East this week. Presumably by accident, rather than by design, Wong’s visit coincides with the one-month anniversary of the establishment of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and comes days after Australia supported the US and British-led strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. While finding a solution to ending the conflict in Gaza must be the immediate priority for Middle East security, avoiding further flashpoints in the Middle East must also be on Wong’s agenda. The consistent and reckless Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping since November is one of these flashpoints. Two months ago, the Houthi militia began an unrestricted campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Despite the Houthis’ desire to link this campaign against seafarers to the conflict in Gaza, they have targeted ships linked to more than 50 countries, continuing to target seafarers from across the globe, despite international condemnation. The Red Sea is of course a vital economic trade route, but what is happening in the Red Sea, and the international response, also sends an important message to those who may wish to threaten maritime security and freedom of navigation across the globe, including in the South China Sea. And they will be watching, not only how a minor player in maritime affairs such as the Houthis can have such a dramatic impact on global trade, but also what capabilities the US and its allies and partners respond with. This includes Australia’s subdued response. Personnel and joint statements are important but, in the end, they cannot defend merchant ships or protect seafarers. The US establishment of the allied coalition’s Operation Prosperity Guardian in December in response to Houthi attempts to blockade the Red Sea was an important development, a defensive operation aimed at protecting merchant shipping transiting this critical waterway. The original operation press release flagged 10 participants, which now reportedly has grown to more than 20. Most recently, Singapore has agreed to support the operation with personnel. A key challenge of Operation Prosperity Guardian is the lack of assets to protect shipping, with most participants agreeing only to send personnel support. Notable exceptions to this are Greece and Denmark, which have committed to sending ships, although the timeframe for this is unclear. Sri Lanka also has recently agreed to support the operation and committed to sending a ship to the region, and although what that ship will do and where it will operate given Sri Lankan Navy capabilities is unclear, the sentiment is important. Australia declined to send a ship to support the operation, choosing to support the headquarters with additional personnel instead. Australia was a founding member of the Combined Maritime Forces in 2001. It was also one of the few countries that joined the call to establish the International Maritime Security Construct in response to Iranian attacks on and seizures of merchant shipping during the 2019-20 Gulf crisis, sending HMAS Toowoomba to protect merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in 2020. Given this history, Australia’s decision not to send a ship is sending a message. Defence of shipping and convoy operations are ship-intensive operations; all the goodwill in the world will not protect a merchant ship from an incoming missile. Australia must be careful to avoid the perception that its lack of commitment of a ship to this operation is not interpreted as a lack of capability. That’s a dangerous perception given obvious regional tensions continuing to manifest in the maritime domain, most notably the recent unsafe and unprofessional actions of a People’s Liberation Army naval destroyer towards HMAS Toowoomba in November, resulting in injuries to Australian sailors. With a paucity of ships and a ratcheting up of attacks by the Houthis, the mission in the Red Sea to protect merchant shipping could remain defensive for only so long. Defending one of the world’s busiest waterways was always going to be unsustainable without a transition to offensive action. Following a UN Security Council resolution condemning Houthi actions in the Red Sea, and noting the right of states to defend their vessels from attacks, the US and Britain undertook strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The US was at pains to highlight that these strikes were not part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, likely because not all members of that operation were supportive of offensive action. While Australia clearly was, the exact nature of the support Australia provided could only have been limited. One month on from its establishment, the future of Operation Prosperity Guardian is unclear. The lack of assets to protect shipping and challenges in destroying the Houthis’ capability, despite US and British resolve, make it difficult to assess when shipping through the Red Sea will return to normal levels. What is clear is that the maritime domain, and freedom of navigation within the maritime domain, will continue to be increasingly contested. Demonstrating not only the resolve but also the capability to respond to those who may wish to threaten these principles will be crucial to protecting Australia’s strategic interests.

January 12, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published as a Twitter thread here Image: Jennifer Parker and other Australian Defence Force personnel in Bahrain 2022. Authors image. What did Australia’s support to US and UK strikes against Houthi targets consist of? The Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles has said it consisted of personnel support to the operational headquarters. Australia’s history of operations in the Middle East gives some insights. The Royal Australian Navy has played a key role in maritime operations in the Middle East since almost continuously since 1990 when HMAS Adelaide II deployed to the Middle East Region under Operation Damask. Since its inception in 2001, Australia has supported the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain as a founding member. Australia supported the CMF with an almost continuous rotation of Ships since its inception until 2020 when HMAS Toowoomba completed the last RAN ship rotation in the Middle East Area of Operation under Operation MANITOU. Australia’s commitment to the CMF has also seen Australia command CMF Task Forces 9 times, the last of which was command of the Coalition Task Force 150, in which Australia executed counter-smuggling operations in the maritime domain. Australia has also had a longstanding footprint in the CMF Headquarters based in Bahrain, filling the planning, operations, communications, analysis and administration positions. In 2020 following the completion of HMAS Toowoomba’s deployment to the Middle East Area of Operations, Australia reduced its maritime element in Bahrain to 3-5, but retained the position of CMF Director of Operations which it has held for over 20 years. Following the request to support Operation Prosperity Guardian, under CMF CTF 153, Australia once again increased its footprint in Bahrain, now reported to be 11 personnel. Although it has not been publicly released what roles these additional personnel, Australia’s previous support to International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) gives some insight. During the 2019/2020 Gulf Crisis Australia joined IMSC to protect international shipping from Iranian harassment and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In addition to the support of HMAS Toowoomba, Australia’s support consisted of the Director Plans, the Deputy Director plans, air planners, communications planners and crucially maritime trade operators’ expertise. It is likely the additional Australian staff support consisted of these skill sets. Whilst the US has been clear to highlight strikes against Houthi targets were not carried out under CMF, Australian staff in CMF have always had a dual role, supporting not only CMF but also serving as Australia’s liaison to 5th Fleet / US Naval Force Central Command supporting operations as directed by the ADF Joint Headquarters (HQJOC). A role they may have played during the US / UK strikes on Houthi targets on 11 January 2024.

December 18 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian 18 December 2023 Image: Jennifer Parker, Combined Maritime Forces December 2022. Department of Defence Images. Over the past month, the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen has recommenced its attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea. Attacks and attempted attacks included the seizure of a British-owned, Japanese-operated merchant ship, reportedly linked to an Israeli businessman, and the militia says it will continue to attack merchant shipping transiting to Israel. That is a significant threat to global commerce given that more than 12 per cent of global trade transits through the Red Sea, as does more than 40 per cent of Europe’s trade with Asia. Australia has been asked to join a US-led maritime coalition to protect traffic through the Red Sea. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, Australia has very strong reasons to do so. The extent of Australia’s reliance on the international shipping network is often quickly set aside in discussions of what is, or is not, in the nation’s strategic interests. That has left us with an under-resourced Royal Australian Navy. That issue must be embraced if Australia wants to be able to protect itself in an increasingly contested world. The Red Sea attacks put at risk all shipping transiting through this area, not just those heading to Israel. Most recently, the Houthi militia has used uncrewed aerial vehicles and anti-ship cruise missiles against its targets. The Houthis have previously used less discriminate weapons, including floating mines, which generate a risk to all shipping in the area. The waters of the Red Sea are patrolled by ships from numerous countries, including those operating under the Combined Maritime Forces and the International Maritime Security Construct, multinational naval coalitions. Australia was a founding member of both. The Combined Maritime Forces is a 39-nation coalition formed in 2002 to combat non-state threats such as terrorism, and smuggling. The International Maritime Security Construct was established in 2019 in response to Iranian attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, and focuses on state-based maritime security threats in the Middle East. This week’s call from the US for Australia to provide a warship to help protect international merchant shipping in the Red Sea, again raised the question of why would we deploy a warship outside our region? Over decades, Australia has undertaken many military deployments in the Middle East. Each decision was made for its own strategic reasons. From the early 1990s until late 2020 Australia almost continuously deployed warships to the Middle East area of operations. They operated across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. These deployments were driven by strategic reasons that included supporting the alliance and generating skills and exposure for RAN personnel in a complex maritime environment. However, the predominant reason is that Middle East maritime security matters a great deal to Australian national security. Ensuring unencumbered shipping through the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean is one of Australia’s key maritime strategic interests. Much of Australia’s unrefined fuel comes from the Middle East, transits across the Indian Ocean into Southeast Asia, is refined and is carried to Australia. The fact that 91 per cent of Australia’s fuel is imported amounts to a significant maritime vulnerability. The European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner, behind China and Japan; given 98 per cent of Australia’s trade is by sea, much of this trade with the EU transits through the Red Sea. With the possibility of a regional conflict continuing to increase as a result of China’s aggressive posture towards nations in Southeast and Northeast Asia, calls for the government and the ADF to focus on our immediate region seem sound if taken at face value. But they underplay the importance of any interruption to maritime trade, and the lengthy sea lines of communication that service that trade, on Australia’s security and prosperity. To secure that trade, Australian warships will need to deploy to critical choke-points great distances away. A lack of understanding and acceptance of this reality, and the consequent need for a strong navy with very effective capabilities has contributed to a critical vulnerability to Australia. Australia should again send a warship to protect international shipping in the Red Sea, not because of any romantic obligations to the US alliance or to the international rules-based order – both of which are important – but to protect our maritime strategic interests. No longer can we afford to be blind to our dependence on the maritime domain and what that means for Australia’s security. We cannot draw a neat regional bubble around Australia and say that this is where we will operate our ships, blind to our dependence on those long sea lines of communication. The threat to international shipping in the Red Sea should serve as a wake-up call that Australia needs a clear maritime strategy, with articulated maritime strategic interests and a Royal Australian Navy with enough ships to defend them.

8 December 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 8 Dec 23 Image: Department of Defence. ‘This is Australia’s most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. And looking back to the lead-up to the Second World War provides important lessons about the need to invest in defence.’ Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, National Press Club address, 28 November 2023 Last month, Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy took to the stage at the National Press Club to address concerns that Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines under the AUKUS arrangement lacked a social licence. Defending the $368 billion acquisition, Conroy outlined the challenging strategic circumstances Australia now faces. The situation had deteriorated further since the release of the defence strategic review in April 2023, he noted, with war in the Middle East and increasingly unsafe actions of Chinese military aircraft and warships in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia. Despite the geographical realities that are driving Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, many argue that the government lacks public support for such a significant acquisition. That is borne out in the latest United States Studies Centre poll, which indicates that only 49% of Australians support acquiring these submarines. The eye-watering cost hasn’t won the plan many friends in a country experiencing a cost-of-living crisis. With this background firmly established, Conroy gave a commendable defence of the acquisition highlighting the tactical, operational and strategic realities that justify this bold capability direction. The address seemed on point and on the rails until journalist Kym Bergman asked about defence funding. When I asked Defence Minister Richard Marles the same question in September at the ASPI conference, he responded that ‘strategy without money is just hot air’. Bergman noted that ASPI’s budget analysis, The big squeeze, released on 29 May, said core funding for the Defence Department had been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands were being placed on it. ‘Between 2023–24 and 2025–26, defence funding drops from $154 billion to $152.5 billion,’ Bergman said. The minister rejected the assertion, saying: ‘ASPI were picking and choosing between what parts they counted and what parts they didn’t count. I urge you to look at the defence papers. Every year the defence funding goes up.’ His response highlighted the greatest single risk to Australia’s defence: the ‘squeezing’ of the defence budget. The issue that became readily apparent in that response is that the government is still not ready to admit that the defence budget is under extreme pressure at a time when Conroy had stated that investment is needed. Budgets are not a matter of interpretation, or perception; they are simply a matter of numbers and maths. As part of the process of making the numbers work, Defence is compensated for fluctuations in the exchange rate and is forecast to receive $4 billion in compensation over the next three years. This is, of course, not real money; it simply acknowledges the fact that Defence pays more for capabilities when the Australian dollar is low. When you remove the compensation for foreign exchange fluctuations, the real funding of Defence becomes clear. In the March 2022 budget forecast, Defence core funding was predicted to be $154.0 billion for the next three financial years. The budget delivered in May 2023 forecasts $156.5 billion for Defence over the same period. That’s an increase, yes—but it’s not a real increase. When you remove the $4 billion compensation for exchange rate fluctuations, Defence receives $152.5 billion dollars across the next three years. This is a reduction of $1.5 billion for the defence budget over the next three years compared with last year’s forecast. That was highlighted in ASPI’s defence budget brief and confirmed by Defence’s chief financial officer, Steven Groves, in Senate estimates on 30 May. This reduction in forecast defence spending is a matter of public record. The pain of the reduction in budget forecasts of Defence’s core funding is further exacerbated by the doubling of inflation eroding the purchasing power of the defence budget. All of this is happening as additional requirements from the DSR and AUKUS initiatives are squeezed into the budget. The government has forecast an increase in defence spending between 2027–28 and 2032–33 of $30.5 billion, with Treasury indicating a growth in defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 2.05% to 2.30% over the same time. But with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and with the chances of a miscalculation in the South China Sea increasing daily, we must ask ourselves as a nation whether we can wait until 2027–28 for defence funding relief. In May, my co-authors and I wrote in ASPI’s defence budget brief: ‘The strategic context for the 2023–24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023–24 defence budget (and forward estimates).’ This remains as accurate today as it was in May. Denying the simple fact that the defence budget is under pressure does little to assist the conversation about the stark strategic circumstances we find ourselves in. In the end, it’s just maths.

14 November 23 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Australia is often accused of ‘sea blindness’ and a lack of appreciation of the need for a strong navy to protect our vital maritime trade routes. It was reassuring that last week’s biennial Indo-Pacific exposition in Sydney delivered a confluence of ideas from defence personnel, industry and academics on the future of maritime capability in Australia and the region. Within the exposition was the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Conference, on the theme ‘Fleet 2035: Sea power and the future of maritime warfare’, where it was noted that the future structure of the surface combatant fleet remains unsettled despite an eight-month defence strategic review (DSR) process and five-month independent analysis of surface capability. The analysis was delivered to the government in late September and it was anticipated that decisions on the surface fleet’s structure would be made public this year. However, the government has indicated that the outcomes will not be known until early 2024. The 2016 defence white paper planned for recapitalisation of the RAN, but uncertainty remains about the viability of the choice of nine Hunter-class frigates and 12 Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. Debate has focused on whether either program can deliver as promised. The Hunter program was the subject of a highly critical Australian National Audit Office report, and while the first of the Arafura class was launched in 2021, it’s yet to be commissioned into operational service and that program has been listed as a project of concern. Perhaps gaining more traction is the debate over whether either program will deliver the capability required to meet Australia’s strategic circumstances. The DSR authors clearly believed that these vessels did not meet the need for an enhanced-lethality surface combatant fleet consistent with a larger number of smaller surface vessels. Given that the government is yet to answer the question of what the fleet should look like in 2035, some industry representatives took it upon themselves to do so. Defence companies put forward options to meet the DSR intent that the fleet should consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants. Among the new contenders were light frigates from TKMS and Gibbs & Cox, a subsidiary of Leidos. Both presented designs to address the DSR’s call for Tier 2 ships. TKMS, which produced the MEKO 200, the reference design for the RAN’s current Anzac-class frigate, delivered a design for a third-generation multi-purpose frigate, the A210. The 4,700-tonne design sought to answer the DSR’s call for enhanced lethality with 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, 16 cannisters for naval strike missiles (NSMs), a directed-energy weapon with power plant, a mission bay for uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), a towed-array sonar and plans to integrate Australia’s CEAFAR radar. Gibbs & Cox offered a 3,700-tonne (similar to the Anzac) design for an Australian light frigate based on the new Taiwanese light frigate. The design has a similar strike capability to the MEKO A210 with 32 VLS, 16 cannisters for NSM, capacity for a close-in weapons system (CIWS) and a hangar to embark the MH-60R helicopter. Although both are interesting propositions, it seems unlikely that the surface combatant fleet decision would embrace a new designer at this difficult stage. The current surface combatant plan already relies on extending each Anzac frigate by nine years which, given the state of the class highlighted in the 2019 ANAO report, seems unlikely. Any decision on the surface fleet will therefore need to ensure delivery of vessels in the early 2030s as currently planned, or perhaps earlier. There will be limited appetite to introduce further risk with a new ship designer. One exception is, perhaps, an AUKUS Pillar 3 covering shipbuilding, which could be a worthwhile consideration now the US is back in the frigates game. Seeking to address concerns that the Hunter frigate lacks firepower, BAE Systems Australia showcased a design for an evolved Hunter with the number of VLS increased from the 32 in the current design to 96, akin to the firepower of a US Arleigh Burke destroyer. It was suggested that could be increased to 128 should the 5-inch gun not be required. By any stretch that’s a dramatic increase for the Hunter design. Of course, this would come with a cost. The 2023 ANAO audit highlighted concerns about the weight of the Hunter design, so the addition of a further 64 or 96 VLS would appear to be challenging. To accommodate the extra weight, BAE has said the USV mission bay, towed array or other anti-submarine warfare systems would be removed from the evolved Hunter, but it would still have 85% commonality with the current Hunter class. The Hunters were always intended to be delivered in batches, and BAE says this change would have a negligible risk to the schedule if it’s delivered in batch II (ships 4–6). There are significant benefits in retaining the same shipbuilder/designer and commonality of systems, and the hull. While that could reduce the risk in delivering a more lethal fleet, questions would remain about the plan’s viability and cost. It’s unlikely that such an expansion of capability would be feasible within the current Hunter project costs, already predicted to be beyond $45 billion. Perhaps seeking to address all aspects of the surface fleet discussion, Navantia, which designed the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers, Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and Supply-class replenishment vessels, produced three designs. Consistent with the company’s previous offerings, they included both a corvette and a destroyer option. Navantia’s Tasman-class corvette is based on the Alpha 3000 design built for Saudi Arabia with the same tonnage as the Anzac class. It has increased firepower with 16 VLS, room for 16 NSM cannisters, a 57-millimetre main gun, CIWS, USV mission bay and the Australian CEAFAR radar. Navantia announced that it would lock in Australian shipbuilding partners by joining with CIVMEC and Austal to deliver six corvettes to the RAN. Seemingly in response to corvette critics—though the Tasman class is the size of an Anzac frigate—Navantia also unveiled a design for an Alpha 5000 frigate at 4,550 tonnes with 32 VLS. That’s about half the tonnage of a Hunter frigate but would have double the VLS capability of the Tasman-class corvette. Navantia’s final design was for a ‘Flight III’ destroyer to address the RAN’s Tier 1 requirements. Based on the Spanish F110 design, the 10,200-tonne destroyer has 128 VLS cells in two 64-cell segments, a 127-millimetre main gun and two CIWS. It reportedly has drone-swarm and anti-drone-swarm launchers. With the surface combatant recommendations now in the government’s hands, it’s difficult to forecast which, if any, of the options on offer at Indo-Pacific 2023 might be selected. It’s clear that with the Anzacs nearing their expiry date there will be limited appetite to introduce further risk into the shipbuilding program. This must make the BAE and Navantia bids compelling, with existing relationships and commonality of systems key elements in de-risking the decision. Of course, there’s always the option of aligning with American shipbuilding programs now that the US is back in the frigate game, so perhaps an AUKUS Pillar 3 based on shipbuilding is worth considering.

30 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Strategist 30 October 2023. Link to original here Image: Department of Defence. As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation, and we must be able to defend our national interests. In my ASPI report, An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy, released today, I argue that the Royal Australian Navy lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and its significance for our prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. Some argue that the AUKUS agreement shows that capability is driving strategy. But to develop a coherent force structure, strategy must drive capability. It’s important that the RAN’s structure and capabilities are driven by a strategy that’s clear and responsive to the circumstances outlined in the 2023 defence strategic review. Many of our partners, including the US, the UK and India, have recognised that and published public maritime strategies, but Australia’s maritime strategy is less clear, and the term itself is conspicuously absent from public strategic documents. A maritime strategy isn’t simply another domain strategy: the defence of our national interests is inherently maritime in nature. To ensure maritime security, the RAN relies on a backbone of 11–12 major surface combatants. The major surface-combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. All have capabilities in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The structure has remained relatively constant for more than 50 years, despite recommendations from multiple reviews that the fleet should have 16–20 ships. While the methodology behind recommendations for an expanded fleet isn’t clear, the context is relevant. Reviews in the 1970s and 1980s were conducted during the Cold War when the possibility of a ‘hot war’ was real. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, many policymakers believed that the era of state-on-state conflict was over. However, in the past 20 years, the power balance in the Indo-Pacific region has changed dramatically, and since 2022 Europe has faced the possibility of a major war. By 2020, China’s military modernisation and its coercive and aggressive behaviour in the region, along with dramatic advances in technology, prompted the Australian government to abandon the assumption that it would have 10 years’ warning of a major conflict to strengthen the Australian Defence Force. But this significant change in strategic thinking, reinforced by the 2023 review, hasn’t brought relevant changes to the RAN’s structure, specifically to the major surface-combatant fleet. A review has been undertaken but its results aren’t yet public. While Australia’s planned acquisition of eight nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS to replace our six conventional submarines is important, it doesn’t represent a major structural change or significant expansion of the RAN. The program will significantly increase the capabilities of the RAN’s submarines, but not the overall capability of the fleet designed over 50 years ago. In my report, I examine whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in Australia’s strategic circumstances, articulated in the 2023 review, also requires a structural change in and an expansion of the RAN. I argue that both a larger and balanced surface-combatant fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure are needed. The review should consider bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. The report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet. As the government examines the recently completed surface fleet review, I make eight recommendations for its consideration. I argue that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of 10 years’ warning time. The problem has become more acute given the strategic competition and the capability and size of potential adversaries, particularly China, as recognised in the 2023 review. I agree with past reviewers’ recommendations that 16–20 major surface combatants are needed. The increased number must provide a range of operational effects in a balanced fleet. In this missile era, the planned number of ASW-oriented, multi-purpose Hunter-class frigates should be reduced. I argue that having nine would result in even an expanded fleet being biased towards ASW, with limited ability to field an adequate number of missiles per tonne across the fleet. That would have impact on its ASuW and AAW capabilities. The scope and length of the report don’t permit consideration of Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise or the industry policy of continuous naval shipbuilding, although both must be considered in the expansion of the surface-combatant fleet. I don’t suggest what additional vessels should be acquired, but options include increasing the number of Hobart-class destroyers, modifying the Hunter class, or aligning with the US future frigate (Constellation class) or future destroyer program (DDG(X)). These possibilities all come with their own benefits and unique challenges. The surface-combatant fleet can’t be viewed independently of broader maritime capabilities, including sealift, mine warfare and civil maritime trade operations, all of which will need to be enveloped in a clear and coherent maritime strategy. Although those capabilities aren’t considered in this report, their interrelated nature highlights why maritime strategy should be driving maritime capability. Australia’s security and prosperity are intimately linked to the maritime domain, and yet our defence strategy—current and past—doesn’t clearly articulate a maritime strategy. Articulation, production and understanding of Australia’s maritime strategy are essential to deter conflict in the region, and an expanded fleet is required in case deterrence fails. There’s bipartisan understanding and acceptance that our strategic circumstances will continue to change. That requires structural change of the RAN, not only acquiring a small number of nuclear-powered submarines—with opportunity and substantial risk—but bolstering the surface combatants which are the backbone of any force for achieving sea control and power projection. This will be challenging and will require sweeping reviews of the wider RAN structure to crew and support that capability, hence the suggested consideration of a coastguard, a naval auxiliary or task groups at different readiness levels. This can’t be delayed. Tinkering around the edges of the ADF and RAN structures will provide neither the necessary deterrent effect nor the capability to defend Australia’s interests should deterrence fail. The dramatically reduced strategic warning time is itself a warning that we must act.

13 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Interpreter 13 October 2023. Link to original version. Australia “recommitted” two months ago. The Philippines is waiting, China is watching – and so is the region. Image: Ted Ajibe/AFP via Getty Images Enrique Manalo, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, made his feelings clear. “During our discussions,” he declared on Tuesday, standing alongside his Australian counterpart Penny Wong during a visit to Adelaide, “I emphasised that the West Philippines Sea, South China Sea remains of foremost regional concern”. “As maritime nations,” Manalo went on to say, “the Philippines and Australia share a commitment to preserving freedom of navigation and overflight and upholding the rule of law in our common waters”. It was a reminder, if one was needed, about the ongoing danger from China’s aggressive behaviour in these crucial waters. Since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. And perhaps it was also a subtle signal that Australia needs to quickly operationalise its commitment to joint patrols with the Philippines, despite the effect that might have on its improving relationship with China. In August, footage emerged of a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel blasting a Philippines vessel with a water cannon as it attempted to resupply troops stationed aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. Shortly afterwards, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles visited the Philippines and announced that Australia was “recommitted to planning bilateral joint patrols”. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reinforced this pledge to the Philippines in September when the two nations signed a strategic partnership. HMAS Toowoomba and HMAS Hobart will spend three months in South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment” But this week, Wong would not be drawn on the timing, only that “the intention remains, as the leaders announced, for a joint sail in the West Philippines [Sea], in an appropriate maritime location as yet to be announced.” However, since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. The Philippines recently removed a barrier installed by the CCG around Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and this month China further attempted to interfere with the Sierra Madre resupply mission. For Australia, delays in following through on its undertaking for joint patrols could impact on its regional credibility. Clearly aimed at deterring China’s aggression, the choice of the term “joint patrol” is significant in its symbolism. At its heart, a joint patrol is simply two countries agreeing to sail their ships together through an agreed location for a defined period, arguably with a degree of joint operational planning underpinning the arrangement. The terminology was clearly chosen in the context of the Australia–Philippines relationship to signal an operational element to the engagement beyond simple maritime exercises. It is in the operational nature of a “joint patrol” that the announcement conveys the strength of the two countries’ commitment. Conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But the operational aspect also has complexities for Australia. The security threat such patrols would be designed to combat is aggressive activity by China’s CCG and what has been dubbed its maritime militia. To be effective, these patrols would need to take place in contested areas subject to the recent tensions. If they are not undertaken in a contested area of significance then the pledge of joint patrols, and the operational support that is perceived to underpin them, will likely do little to influence China’s activities in the area. Areas in which Australia and the Philippines could undertake such patrols to achieve maximum effect include Reed Bank, which has promising energy fields, and Second Thomas Shoal, the site of the Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era vessel in poor condition that is likely to break apart. Both were subject to the 2016 Arbitral tribunal ruling that Reed Bank “is an entirely submerged formation that cannot give rise to maritime entitlements” and that Second Thomas Shoal is a “low-tide elevation and as such generate[s] no entitlement to maritime zones”. The significance being that they constitute part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, denying any legal claim to these features by China. Manalo also made the point following his talks with Wong “to thank Australia for its continuing support for the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea.” In recent weeks, HMAS Hobart and Toowoomba deployed for three months to South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment”. The two-ship task group is soon to be joined by HMAS Stuart. Although the Department of Defence website does not list the Philippines among the countries this task group will operate with, the vessels’ planned proximity to the contested areas begs the question of whether this presents an opportunity to act on Australia’s commitment to joint patrols. Obviously conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But if Australia does not act on its promise in a meaningful timeframe, the credibility of its pledges of support to regional partners will be undermined.

27 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 27 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced that decisions on the surface combatant fleet review will not be made public until 2024. This analysis was an outcome of the defence strategic review, which recommended that the government direct ‘an independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine’. As I have written, it’s difficult to understand how Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines changes the surface combatant fleet structure requirements. However, the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, including its combatants, has deep issues in an era of little to no strategic warning time of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The review is essential but its scope should extend far beyond the make-up of the surface combatant fleet. Because Australia is a maritime nation, many of our vulnerabilities manifest in that domain. It will be argued that this review of the backbone of the Australian Defence Force’s maritime operations is one of the most significant in recent years. So how did we get here? What are the key considerations? And what does the delayed decision mean? Many a naval officer or maritime strategist laments that Australia has long failed to understand and insure against its maritime vulnerabilities through investment in an adequately sized and armed RAN. The current surface combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. The Anzacs comprise over 70% of the surface combatants but they are rapidly ageing. HMAS Anzac was commissioned in 1996 and has been in service for nearly 30 years. It was to be withdrawn in 2024–25 but, with its sister ships, it’s now expected to be in service for an additional nine years because of delays in building its replacement, the Hunter-class frigates. Ageing frigates are expensive to sustain at the best of times, but it’s likely that the Anzacs are in an even worse state with sustainment having a significant impact on the navy’s capability budget. A damming 2019 performance audit of the frigates by the Australia National Audit Office found that: ‘The Anzac class has experienced degradation of the ships’ hulls and sub-systems, with successive reviews and performance information highlighting the link between lack of conformance to operating intent/requirement, reduced platform life and reduced sustainment efficiency.’ The frigates are intended to be upgraded through the transition capability assurance program, but they’ve had hard lives and there’s a question mark over whether all eight can be extended for an additional nine years. Not only must the review urgently address the state and age of the Anzacs, it must also grapple with the cost blowouts, delays, and limited missile capability of the replacement Hunter class. The second challenge is what to do with the navy’s Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). The RAN currently shares the burden of constabulary operations with the Australian Border Force. Many have advocated that duties such as fisheries and border protection patrols should be given to a coastguard, but in the near to medium term these constabulary operations will remain with the RAN. The OPV was designed to replace the much smaller Armidale-class patrol boat. The 2009 defence white paper stated that: The future Offshore Combatant Vessel will be able to undertake offshore and littoral warfighting roles, border protection tasks, long-range counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, support to special forces, and missions in support of security and stability in the immediate neighbourhood. This increased capability will also ensure that major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations [emphasis added]. If the OPV is purely to undertake constabulary tasks, then the size of the vessels and associated crewing burden is too large. If it’s intended to ‘ensure major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations’, then its armament and survivability are too low. The reality is that the review doesn’t need to look at the surface combatant fleet structure because of the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, but as the result of an ageing and inadequately structured surface combatant fleet. The first issue is what to do with the ageing Anzacs. There are clear challenges in sustaining them despite the planned upgrades. With the Hunter class due in the 2030s, it’s fair to question if all eight Anzacs can last that long given the ANAO’s assessment of their condition—and can the Hunter class be delivered on time and at a reasonable cost? Perhaps more significant is the question of whether the Hunter is adequate for our geopolitical circumstances. The ANAO audit likely hammered a nail into the coffin of the target number of nine Hunters, and the government’s decision to delay the release of the review until 2024 may indicate that this project will be reduced in size or abandoned. The first Hunter is scheduled for delivery in mid-2032. If the program is abandoned or reduced in number, and if all the Anzacs can’t be sustained until the early 2030s, how will the gap be filled? What replaces those nine planned frigates is crucial. The answers are not easy or readily apparent. But I would suspect the front runner may be the US Constellation-class frigate, which is based on the Italian Fincanteri FREMM design. When Australia opted for the Hunter class, the US had decommissioned its Oliver Hazard Perry frigates (also operated by Australia) and was seemingly out of the frigate game. However, the challenges associated with its littoral combat ship program resulted in the US Navy returning to frigates as an important capability—hence the Constellation program. The FREMM was an early contender for Australia’s future frigate before the Hunter was selected. The Constellation class has a 32-cell vertical launch system for missiles. The Hunter has been criticised for having the same number. But the US is considering adding Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Constellation. At 7,300 tonnes, the FREMM displaces 2,700 tonnes less than the Hunter design, with scope for capability growth. The argument that the RAN needs the firepower of more destroyers has been well made by numerous commentators. The delay in announcing the surface combatant decision may also mean that the Arafura project will be reduced or ceased. The challenge here is that the project is well into production. The first ship is due to be commissioned in 2024, the second vessel is being fitted out, and the keel has been laid for the fifth. Could they be produced with greater armament, or sold to regional navies? Both are possibilities. But that would raise the question of what would replace the OPVs on constabulary operations. The Armidale patrol boats are already being decommissioned. Perhaps the answer is the Cape-class patrol boat, which the RAN rushed into service following issues with the sustainability of the Armidales. An expansion of the Cape fleet would require half the workforce of the Arafuras. The Capes would be purely used on constabulary operations, rather than the 2009 white paper’s aspiration for OPVs to supplement the major surface combatants. And so, we wait. The review’s recommendation’s will be known next year and will likely be aligned with the release of the national defence strategy. There are significant decisions to grapple with, and it’s likely that none will come without requiring additional funding. As time creeps on in an era of no strategic warning time, and as capability reviews continue, the sobering thought is that the ADF and RAN must be prepared to fight tonight with the fleet they have now.