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8 December 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 8 Dec 23 Image: Department of Defence. ‘This is Australia’s most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. And looking back to the lead-up to the Second World War provides important lessons about the need to invest in defence.’ Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, National Press Club address, 28 November 2023 Last month, Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy took to the stage at the National Press Club to address concerns that Australia’s planned acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines under the AUKUS arrangement lacked a social licence. Defending the $368 billion acquisition, Conroy outlined the challenging strategic circumstances Australia now faces. The situation had deteriorated further since the release of the defence strategic review in April 2023, he noted, with war in the Middle East and increasingly unsafe actions of Chinese military aircraft and warships in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia. Despite the geographical realities that are driving Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, many argue that the government lacks public support for such a significant acquisition. That is borne out in the latest United States Studies Centre poll, which indicates that only 49% of Australians support acquiring these submarines. The eye-watering cost hasn’t won the plan many friends in a country experiencing a cost-of-living crisis. With this background firmly established, Conroy gave a commendable defence of the acquisition highlighting the tactical, operational and strategic realities that justify this bold capability direction. The address seemed on point and on the rails until journalist Kym Bergman asked about defence funding. When I asked Defence Minister Richard Marles the same question in September at the ASPI conference, he responded that ‘strategy without money is just hot air’. Bergman noted that ASPI’s budget analysis, The big squeeze, released on 29 May, said core funding for the Defence Department had been reduced at a time when unprecedented demands were being placed on it. ‘Between 2023–24 and 2025–26, defence funding drops from $154 billion to $152.5 billion,’ Bergman said. The minister rejected the assertion, saying: ‘ASPI were picking and choosing between what parts they counted and what parts they didn’t count. I urge you to look at the defence papers. Every year the defence funding goes up.’ His response highlighted the greatest single risk to Australia’s defence: the ‘squeezing’ of the defence budget. The issue that became readily apparent in that response is that the government is still not ready to admit that the defence budget is under extreme pressure at a time when Conroy had stated that investment is needed. Budgets are not a matter of interpretation, or perception; they are simply a matter of numbers and maths. As part of the process of making the numbers work, Defence is compensated for fluctuations in the exchange rate and is forecast to receive $4 billion in compensation over the next three years. This is, of course, not real money; it simply acknowledges the fact that Defence pays more for capabilities when the Australian dollar is low. When you remove the compensation for foreign exchange fluctuations, the real funding of Defence becomes clear. In the March 2022 budget forecast, Defence core funding was predicted to be $154.0 billion for the next three financial years. The budget delivered in May 2023 forecasts $156.5 billion for Defence over the same period. That’s an increase, yes—but it’s not a real increase. When you remove the $4 billion compensation for exchange rate fluctuations, Defence receives $152.5 billion dollars across the next three years. This is a reduction of $1.5 billion for the defence budget over the next three years compared with last year’s forecast. That was highlighted in ASPI’s defence budget brief and confirmed by Defence’s chief financial officer, Steven Groves, in Senate estimates on 30 May. This reduction in forecast defence spending is a matter of public record. The pain of the reduction in budget forecasts of Defence’s core funding is further exacerbated by the doubling of inflation eroding the purchasing power of the defence budget. All of this is happening as additional requirements from the DSR and AUKUS initiatives are squeezed into the budget. The government has forecast an increase in defence spending between 2027–28 and 2032–33 of $30.5 billion, with Treasury indicating a growth in defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 2.05% to 2.30% over the same time. But with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and with the chances of a miscalculation in the South China Sea increasing daily, we must ask ourselves as a nation whether we can wait until 2027–28 for defence funding relief. In May, my co-authors and I wrote in ASPI’s defence budget brief: ‘The strategic context for the 2023–24 defence budget is complex and extremely challenging. There’s currently a gap, and quite a significant one, between the rhetoric of the 2023 DSR and the 2023–24 defence budget (and forward estimates).’ This remains as accurate today as it was in May. Denying the simple fact that the defence budget is under pressure does little to assist the conversation about the stark strategic circumstances we find ourselves in. In the end, it’s just maths.

14 November 23 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Australia is often accused of ‘sea blindness’ and a lack of appreciation of the need for a strong navy to protect our vital maritime trade routes. It was reassuring that last week’s biennial Indo-Pacific exposition in Sydney delivered a confluence of ideas from defence personnel, industry and academics on the future of maritime capability in Australia and the region. Within the exposition was the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Conference, on the theme ‘Fleet 2035: Sea power and the future of maritime warfare’, where it was noted that the future structure of the surface combatant fleet remains unsettled despite an eight-month defence strategic review (DSR) process and five-month independent analysis of surface capability. The analysis was delivered to the government in late September and it was anticipated that decisions on the surface fleet’s structure would be made public this year. However, the government has indicated that the outcomes will not be known until early 2024. The 2016 defence white paper planned for recapitalisation of the RAN, but uncertainty remains about the viability of the choice of nine Hunter-class frigates and 12 Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels. Debate has focused on whether either program can deliver as promised. The Hunter program was the subject of a highly critical Australian National Audit Office report, and while the first of the Arafura class was launched in 2021, it’s yet to be commissioned into operational service and that program has been listed as a project of concern. Perhaps gaining more traction is the debate over whether either program will deliver the capability required to meet Australia’s strategic circumstances. The DSR authors clearly believed that these vessels did not meet the need for an enhanced-lethality surface combatant fleet consistent with a larger number of smaller surface vessels. Given that the government is yet to answer the question of what the fleet should look like in 2035, some industry representatives took it upon themselves to do so. Defence companies put forward options to meet the DSR intent that the fleet should consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants. Among the new contenders were light frigates from TKMS and Gibbs & Cox, a subsidiary of Leidos. Both presented designs to address the DSR’s call for Tier 2 ships. TKMS, which produced the MEKO 200, the reference design for the RAN’s current Anzac-class frigate, delivered a design for a third-generation multi-purpose frigate, the A210. The 4,700-tonne design sought to answer the DSR’s call for enhanced lethality with 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, 16 cannisters for naval strike missiles (NSMs), a directed-energy weapon with power plant, a mission bay for uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), a towed-array sonar and plans to integrate Australia’s CEAFAR radar. Gibbs & Cox offered a 3,700-tonne (similar to the Anzac) design for an Australian light frigate based on the new Taiwanese light frigate. The design has a similar strike capability to the MEKO A210 with 32 VLS, 16 cannisters for NSM, capacity for a close-in weapons system (CIWS) and a hangar to embark the MH-60R helicopter. Although both are interesting propositions, it seems unlikely that the surface combatant fleet decision would embrace a new designer at this difficult stage. The current surface combatant plan already relies on extending each Anzac frigate by nine years which, given the state of the class highlighted in the 2019 ANAO report, seems unlikely. Any decision on the surface fleet will therefore need to ensure delivery of vessels in the early 2030s as currently planned, or perhaps earlier. There will be limited appetite to introduce further risk with a new ship designer. One exception is, perhaps, an AUKUS Pillar 3 covering shipbuilding, which could be a worthwhile consideration now the US is back in the frigates game. Seeking to address concerns that the Hunter frigate lacks firepower, BAE Systems Australia showcased a design for an evolved Hunter with the number of VLS increased from the 32 in the current design to 96, akin to the firepower of a US Arleigh Burke destroyer. It was suggested that could be increased to 128 should the 5-inch gun not be required. By any stretch that’s a dramatic increase for the Hunter design. Of course, this would come with a cost. The 2023 ANAO audit highlighted concerns about the weight of the Hunter design, so the addition of a further 64 or 96 VLS would appear to be challenging. To accommodate the extra weight, BAE has said the USV mission bay, towed array or other anti-submarine warfare systems would be removed from the evolved Hunter, but it would still have 85% commonality with the current Hunter class. The Hunters were always intended to be delivered in batches, and BAE says this change would have a negligible risk to the schedule if it’s delivered in batch II (ships 4–6). There are significant benefits in retaining the same shipbuilder/designer and commonality of systems, and the hull. While that could reduce the risk in delivering a more lethal fleet, questions would remain about the plan’s viability and cost. It’s unlikely that such an expansion of capability would be feasible within the current Hunter project costs, already predicted to be beyond $45 billion. Perhaps seeking to address all aspects of the surface fleet discussion, Navantia, which designed the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers, Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and Supply-class replenishment vessels, produced three designs. Consistent with the company’s previous offerings, they included both a corvette and a destroyer option. Navantia’s Tasman-class corvette is based on the Alpha 3000 design built for Saudi Arabia with the same tonnage as the Anzac class. It has increased firepower with 16 VLS, room for 16 NSM cannisters, a 57-millimetre main gun, CIWS, USV mission bay and the Australian CEAFAR radar. Navantia announced that it would lock in Australian shipbuilding partners by joining with CIVMEC and Austal to deliver six corvettes to the RAN. Seemingly in response to corvette critics—though the Tasman class is the size of an Anzac frigate—Navantia also unveiled a design for an Alpha 5000 frigate at 4,550 tonnes with 32 VLS. That’s about half the tonnage of a Hunter frigate but would have double the VLS capability of the Tasman-class corvette. Navantia’s final design was for a ‘Flight III’ destroyer to address the RAN’s Tier 1 requirements. Based on the Spanish F110 design, the 10,200-tonne destroyer has 128 VLS cells in two 64-cell segments, a 127-millimetre main gun and two CIWS. It reportedly has drone-swarm and anti-drone-swarm launchers. With the surface combatant recommendations now in the government’s hands, it’s difficult to forecast which, if any, of the options on offer at Indo-Pacific 2023 might be selected. It’s clear that with the Anzacs nearing their expiry date there will be limited appetite to introduce further risk into the shipbuilding program. This must make the BAE and Navantia bids compelling, with existing relationships and commonality of systems key elements in de-risking the decision. Of course, there’s always the option of aligning with American shipbuilding programs now that the US is back in the frigate game, so perhaps an AUKUS Pillar 3 based on shipbuilding is worth considering.

30 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Strategist 30 October 2023. Link to original here Image: Department of Defence. As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment. In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation, and we must be able to defend our national interests. In my ASPI report, An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy, released today, I argue that the Royal Australian Navy lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests. This isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and its significance for our prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced. Some argue that the AUKUS agreement shows that capability is driving strategy. But to develop a coherent force structure, strategy must drive capability. It’s important that the RAN’s structure and capabilities are driven by a strategy that’s clear and responsive to the circumstances outlined in the 2023 defence strategic review. Many of our partners, including the US, the UK and India, have recognised that and published public maritime strategies, but Australia’s maritime strategy is less clear, and the term itself is conspicuously absent from public strategic documents. A maritime strategy isn’t simply another domain strategy: the defence of our national interests is inherently maritime in nature. To ensure maritime security, the RAN relies on a backbone of 11–12 major surface combatants. The major surface-combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. All have capabilities in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The structure has remained relatively constant for more than 50 years, despite recommendations from multiple reviews that the fleet should have 16–20 ships. While the methodology behind recommendations for an expanded fleet isn’t clear, the context is relevant. Reviews in the 1970s and 1980s were conducted during the Cold War when the possibility of a ‘hot war’ was real. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, many policymakers believed that the era of state-on-state conflict was over. However, in the past 20 years, the power balance in the Indo-Pacific region has changed dramatically, and since 2022 Europe has faced the possibility of a major war. By 2020, China’s military modernisation and its coercive and aggressive behaviour in the region, along with dramatic advances in technology, prompted the Australian government to abandon the assumption that it would have 10 years’ warning of a major conflict to strengthen the Australian Defence Force. But this significant change in strategic thinking, reinforced by the 2023 review, hasn’t brought relevant changes to the RAN’s structure, specifically to the major surface-combatant fleet. A review has been undertaken but its results aren’t yet public. While Australia’s planned acquisition of eight nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS to replace our six conventional submarines is important, it doesn’t represent a major structural change or significant expansion of the RAN. The program will significantly increase the capabilities of the RAN’s submarines, but not the overall capability of the fleet designed over 50 years ago. In my report, I examine whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in Australia’s strategic circumstances, articulated in the 2023 review, also requires a structural change in and an expansion of the RAN. I argue that both a larger and balanced surface-combatant fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure are needed. The review should consider bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet. The report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet. As the government examines the recently completed surface fleet review, I make eight recommendations for its consideration. I argue that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of 10 years’ warning time. The problem has become more acute given the strategic competition and the capability and size of potential adversaries, particularly China, as recognised in the 2023 review. I agree with past reviewers’ recommendations that 16–20 major surface combatants are needed. The increased number must provide a range of operational effects in a balanced fleet. In this missile era, the planned number of ASW-oriented, multi-purpose Hunter-class frigates should be reduced. I argue that having nine would result in even an expanded fleet being biased towards ASW, with limited ability to field an adequate number of missiles per tonne across the fleet. That would have impact on its ASuW and AAW capabilities. The scope and length of the report don’t permit consideration of Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise or the industry policy of continuous naval shipbuilding, although both must be considered in the expansion of the surface-combatant fleet. I don’t suggest what additional vessels should be acquired, but options include increasing the number of Hobart-class destroyers, modifying the Hunter class, or aligning with the US future frigate (Constellation class) or future destroyer program (DDG(X)). These possibilities all come with their own benefits and unique challenges. The surface-combatant fleet can’t be viewed independently of broader maritime capabilities, including sealift, mine warfare and civil maritime trade operations, all of which will need to be enveloped in a clear and coherent maritime strategy. Although those capabilities aren’t considered in this report, their interrelated nature highlights why maritime strategy should be driving maritime capability. Australia’s security and prosperity are intimately linked to the maritime domain, and yet our defence strategy—current and past—doesn’t clearly articulate a maritime strategy. Articulation, production and understanding of Australia’s maritime strategy are essential to deter conflict in the region, and an expanded fleet is required in case deterrence fails. There’s bipartisan understanding and acceptance that our strategic circumstances will continue to change. That requires structural change of the RAN, not only acquiring a small number of nuclear-powered submarines—with opportunity and substantial risk—but bolstering the surface combatants which are the backbone of any force for achieving sea control and power projection. This will be challenging and will require sweeping reviews of the wider RAN structure to crew and support that capability, hence the suggested consideration of a coastguard, a naval auxiliary or task groups at different readiness levels. This can’t be delayed. Tinkering around the edges of the ADF and RAN structures will provide neither the necessary deterrent effect nor the capability to defend Australia’s interests should deterrence fail. The dramatically reduced strategic warning time is itself a warning that we must act.

13 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Interpreter 13 October 2023. Link to original version. Australia “recommitted” two months ago. The Philippines is waiting, China is watching – and so is the region. Image: Ted Ajibe/AFP via Getty Images Enrique Manalo, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, made his feelings clear. “During our discussions,” he declared on Tuesday, standing alongside his Australian counterpart Penny Wong during a visit to Adelaide, “I emphasised that the West Philippines Sea, South China Sea remains of foremost regional concern”. “As maritime nations,” Manalo went on to say, “the Philippines and Australia share a commitment to preserving freedom of navigation and overflight and upholding the rule of law in our common waters”. It was a reminder, if one was needed, about the ongoing danger from China’s aggressive behaviour in these crucial waters. Since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. And perhaps it was also a subtle signal that Australia needs to quickly operationalise its commitment to joint patrols with the Philippines, despite the effect that might have on its improving relationship with China. In August, footage emerged of a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel blasting a Philippines vessel with a water cannon as it attempted to resupply troops stationed aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. Shortly afterwards, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles visited the Philippines and announced that Australia was “recommitted to planning bilateral joint patrols”. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reinforced this pledge to the Philippines in September when the two nations signed a strategic partnership. HMAS Toowoomba and HMAS Hobart will spend three months in South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment” But this week, Wong would not be drawn on the timing, only that “the intention remains, as the leaders announced, for a joint sail in the West Philippines [Sea], in an appropriate maritime location as yet to be announced.” However, since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. The Philippines recently removed a barrier installed by the CCG around Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and this month China further attempted to interfere with the Sierra Madre resupply mission. For Australia, delays in following through on its undertaking for joint patrols could impact on its regional credibility. Clearly aimed at deterring China’s aggression, the choice of the term “joint patrol” is significant in its symbolism. At its heart, a joint patrol is simply two countries agreeing to sail their ships together through an agreed location for a defined period, arguably with a degree of joint operational planning underpinning the arrangement. The terminology was clearly chosen in the context of the Australia–Philippines relationship to signal an operational element to the engagement beyond simple maritime exercises. It is in the operational nature of a “joint patrol” that the announcement conveys the strength of the two countries’ commitment. Conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But the operational aspect also has complexities for Australia. The security threat such patrols would be designed to combat is aggressive activity by China’s CCG and what has been dubbed its maritime militia. To be effective, these patrols would need to take place in contested areas subject to the recent tensions. If they are not undertaken in a contested area of significance then the pledge of joint patrols, and the operational support that is perceived to underpin them, will likely do little to influence China’s activities in the area. Areas in which Australia and the Philippines could undertake such patrols to achieve maximum effect include Reed Bank, which has promising energy fields, and Second Thomas Shoal, the site of the Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era vessel in poor condition that is likely to break apart. Both were subject to the 2016 Arbitral tribunal ruling that Reed Bank “is an entirely submerged formation that cannot give rise to maritime entitlements” and that Second Thomas Shoal is a “low-tide elevation and as such generate[s] no entitlement to maritime zones”. The significance being that they constitute part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, denying any legal claim to these features by China. Manalo also made the point following his talks with Wong “to thank Australia for its continuing support for the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea.” In recent weeks, HMAS Hobart and Toowoomba deployed for three months to South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment”. The two-ship task group is soon to be joined by HMAS Stuart. Although the Department of Defence website does not list the Philippines among the countries this task group will operate with, the vessels’ planned proximity to the contested areas begs the question of whether this presents an opportunity to act on Australia’s commitment to joint patrols. Obviously conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But if Australia does not act on its promise in a meaningful timeframe, the credibility of its pledges of support to regional partners will be undermined.

27 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 27 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced that decisions on the surface combatant fleet review will not be made public until 2024. This analysis was an outcome of the defence strategic review, which recommended that the government direct ‘an independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine’. As I have written, it’s difficult to understand how Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines changes the surface combatant fleet structure requirements. However, the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, including its combatants, has deep issues in an era of little to no strategic warning time of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The review is essential but its scope should extend far beyond the make-up of the surface combatant fleet. Because Australia is a maritime nation, many of our vulnerabilities manifest in that domain. It will be argued that this review of the backbone of the Australian Defence Force’s maritime operations is one of the most significant in recent years. So how did we get here? What are the key considerations? And what does the delayed decision mean? Many a naval officer or maritime strategist laments that Australia has long failed to understand and insure against its maritime vulnerabilities through investment in an adequately sized and armed RAN. The current surface combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. The Anzacs comprise over 70% of the surface combatants but they are rapidly ageing. HMAS Anzac was commissioned in 1996 and has been in service for nearly 30 years. It was to be withdrawn in 2024–25 but, with its sister ships, it’s now expected to be in service for an additional nine years because of delays in building its replacement, the Hunter-class frigates. Ageing frigates are expensive to sustain at the best of times, but it’s likely that the Anzacs are in an even worse state with sustainment having a significant impact on the navy’s capability budget. A damming 2019 performance audit of the frigates by the Australia National Audit Office found that: ‘The Anzac class has experienced degradation of the ships’ hulls and sub-systems, with successive reviews and performance information highlighting the link between lack of conformance to operating intent/requirement, reduced platform life and reduced sustainment efficiency.’ The frigates are intended to be upgraded through the transition capability assurance program, but they’ve had hard lives and there’s a question mark over whether all eight can be extended for an additional nine years. Not only must the review urgently address the state and age of the Anzacs, it must also grapple with the cost blowouts, delays, and limited missile capability of the replacement Hunter class. The second challenge is what to do with the navy’s Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). The RAN currently shares the burden of constabulary operations with the Australian Border Force. Many have advocated that duties such as fisheries and border protection patrols should be given to a coastguard, but in the near to medium term these constabulary operations will remain with the RAN. The OPV was designed to replace the much smaller Armidale-class patrol boat. The 2009 defence white paper stated that: The future Offshore Combatant Vessel will be able to undertake offshore and littoral warfighting roles, border protection tasks, long-range counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, support to special forces, and missions in support of security and stability in the immediate neighbourhood. This increased capability will also ensure that major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations [emphasis added]. If the OPV is purely to undertake constabulary tasks, then the size of the vessels and associated crewing burden is too large. If it’s intended to ‘ensure major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations’, then its armament and survivability are too low. The reality is that the review doesn’t need to look at the surface combatant fleet structure because of the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, but as the result of an ageing and inadequately structured surface combatant fleet. The first issue is what to do with the ageing Anzacs. There are clear challenges in sustaining them despite the planned upgrades. With the Hunter class due in the 2030s, it’s fair to question if all eight Anzacs can last that long given the ANAO’s assessment of their condition—and can the Hunter class be delivered on time and at a reasonable cost? Perhaps more significant is the question of whether the Hunter is adequate for our geopolitical circumstances. The ANAO audit likely hammered a nail into the coffin of the target number of nine Hunters, and the government’s decision to delay the release of the review until 2024 may indicate that this project will be reduced in size or abandoned. The first Hunter is scheduled for delivery in mid-2032. If the program is abandoned or reduced in number, and if all the Anzacs can’t be sustained until the early 2030s, how will the gap be filled? What replaces those nine planned frigates is crucial. The answers are not easy or readily apparent. But I would suspect the front runner may be the US Constellation-class frigate, which is based on the Italian Fincanteri FREMM design. When Australia opted for the Hunter class, the US had decommissioned its Oliver Hazard Perry frigates (also operated by Australia) and was seemingly out of the frigate game. However, the challenges associated with its littoral combat ship program resulted in the US Navy returning to frigates as an important capability—hence the Constellation program. The FREMM was an early contender for Australia’s future frigate before the Hunter was selected. The Constellation class has a 32-cell vertical launch system for missiles. The Hunter has been criticised for having the same number. But the US is considering adding Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Constellation. At 7,300 tonnes, the FREMM displaces 2,700 tonnes less than the Hunter design, with scope for capability growth. The argument that the RAN needs the firepower of more destroyers has been well made by numerous commentators. The delay in announcing the surface combatant decision may also mean that the Arafura project will be reduced or ceased. The challenge here is that the project is well into production. The first ship is due to be commissioned in 2024, the second vessel is being fitted out, and the keel has been laid for the fifth. Could they be produced with greater armament, or sold to regional navies? Both are possibilities. But that would raise the question of what would replace the OPVs on constabulary operations. The Armidale patrol boats are already being decommissioned. Perhaps the answer is the Cape-class patrol boat, which the RAN rushed into service following issues with the sustainability of the Armidales. An expansion of the Cape fleet would require half the workforce of the Arafuras. The Capes would be purely used on constabulary operations, rather than the 2009 white paper’s aspiration for OPVs to supplement the major surface combatants. And so, we wait. The review’s recommendation’s will be known next year and will likely be aligned with the release of the national defence strategy. There are significant decisions to grapple with, and it’s likely that none will come without requiring additional funding. As time creeps on in an era of no strategic warning time, and as capability reviews continue, the sobering thought is that the ADF and RAN must be prepared to fight tonight with the fleet they have now.

13 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 13 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: M. Evison/Wikimedia Commons. On 14 December 1944, the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary freighting tanker Bishopdale was in the Philippines in San Pedro Bay refuelling Australian and Allied forces when it was attacked by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Able Seaman Gunner Stuart Savage opened fire but, despite the efforts of the defensively equipped merchant ship’s gunnery team, the dive bomber hit the forward mast and then struck the bridge, causing significant damage and fatally wounding Savage and two of his shipmates. The story of the Bishopdale and the fleet auxiliary is little known, but perhaps it’s time to reinvigorate the construct to support the future Royal Australian Navy. Australia hopes for peace, but it cannot be blind to the need to prepare for the possibility of conflict. The 2023 defence strategic review stated: [F]or the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest. That’s a stark warning that a major conflict could commence in our region with little to no time for preparation. In ASPI’s 2023–24 defence budget brief, I identified gathering the necessary workforce as the greatest risk to the Australian Defence Force’s future planning. That sentiment is highlighted in the DSR, which acknowledges the workforce issues and notes that the RAN ‘faces the most significant challenges of the three services’. Defence’s 2023–24 budget gave the size of the RAN in 2022–23 as 15,253 personnel with a goal of 16,980 by 2025–26. However, the navy was already 495 personnel lower than forecast in the 2022–23 budget. Despite the best recruitment and retention aspirations, it is unlikely that the ADF and the RAN will reach the workforce growth target set in March 2022. Yet the future RAN will need more submariners to support the growth in crews required by the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines and the potential growth required in surface vessel crews pending the outcome of the surface combatant fleet review due in late September. It’s clear that structural reform will be an essential part of preparing the ADF and the RAN for the risk of conflict outlined in the DSR and the establishment of a civilian-crewed fleet auxiliary could be a key part of this. The dramatic reduction in Australia’s merchant fleet over the past decade means that this alone won’t solve the RAN’s personnel challenges but, among other structural reforms, it may assist. Both the UK and US operate naval fleet auxiliaries consisting of logistics and sea-lift vessels crewed by civilian mariners. The RAN’s auxiliary vessels, which include the supply ships HMAS Supply and Stalwart and the landing ship dock HMAS Choules, are crewed by uniformed naval members but could be converted to civilian crewing. In fact, when the Choules was purchased from the UK, it served with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as RFA Largs Bay and was therefore operated by a civilian crew. The crew of the Choules is 158, but as the Largs Bay the core crew would have been 60 to 70, half the number the RAN uses to operate the same vessel. While the core crew of an RFA Wave-class tanker used to replenish the Royal Navy fleet is approximately 80, the complement of the RAN replenishment vessels, the Supply class, is approximately 170. Of course, they are different classes of vessels so it’s not an easy comparison, but the broader point is that civilian fleet auxiliary vessels generally much leaner crewed than RAN auxiliary vessels. The re-establishment of a fleet auxiliary could also provide synergies with the increasing number of Australian Defence Vessels operated by the Department of Defence, including the Pacific support vessel ADV Reliant launched in 2022. Additional benefits could include a reduced training pipeline for auxiliary crews, opportunities for expansion of the RAN reserve force, bolstering of the RAN’s relationship with Australia’s merchant industry and of the merchant industry’s skills, the ability to scale up in a time of crisis or conflict, and commonality across the ADV fleet. The generation of a new fleet auxiliary wouldn’t be straightforward, but it’s exactly the kind of bold structural change the RAN will need to consider to crew the fleet of the future. The structure of the ADF and the RAN remain relatively unchanged despite the clear risks outlined in the DSR. In an era of reduced strategic warning time, bold decisions are necessary and risk must be accepted to gain strategic and operational advantage. Re-establishing the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary is an option worth considering.

16 August 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 16 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The structure of the Royal Australian Navy since its inception has been determined by trading off capability, cost and workforce. Long lamented by naval historians and practitioners alike has been the view that Australia’s maritime strategy, or lack thereof, has been shaped by a continentalist conception of the nation, culturally and strategically. When the average Australian thinks of the military and its sacrifices, they think of Gallipoli or the battles on the Western Front. They don’t tend to think of the loss of HMAS Perth in 1942 with 400 crew in the Sunda Strait some 2,500 kilometres from Darwin, or of the loss HMAS Sydney in 1941 with 645 crew 290 kilometres west-southwest of Carnarvon. This sea blindness has arguably shaped investment in the RAN and its structure. But it shouldn’t be overlooked or misunderstood that failing to adequately resource the navy could result in the loss of an Anzac-class or a Hobart-class surface combatant—and its crew—within hours of a conflict commencing in the region. That is what ‘no strategic warning time’ means. So, where are we today? The world has evolved. We increasingly see foreign warships operating aggressively in our region. A war is raging in Europe. Successive Australian defence white papers in the 2000s and the 2020 defence strategic update and force structure plan all recognise the real possibility of conflict. All highlight the strategic importance of the maritime environment to Australia and our increasing reliance on seaborne trade, which equates to about 40% of GDP. That figure grossly undersells the relevance of maritime trade—91% of our oil is imported and we rely on it to keep the country going. Our economy also relies on undersea cables for communications and transactions, including within our banking systems. And yet, despite our reliance on the maritime environment and the deterioration of regional stability, the answer to most questions about the RAN’s surface fleet structure for over 50 years has been 11–12 surface combatants. There was a notable deviation in the 1987 white paper’s recommendation for 16–17 surface combatants, but that was never followed through. The only dramatic changes have been the replacement of the Kanimbla-class amphibious transport ships with the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and the retirement of Australia’s aircraft-carrier aspirations. The 2023 defence strategic review recommends a strategy for Australia’s defence of deterrence by denial, but what does that mean for a maritime strategy? How does the Australian Defence Force determine what it means for traditional concepts of sea control, sea denial and power projection? The answer is not entirely clear. There are some clues in remarks by government ministers, and if they are interpreted correctly and in context they are alarming. In the wake of the AUKUS partners’ announcement of Australia’s pathway to acquiring nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines, Defence Minister Richard Marles said they were a ‘capability which would give any adversary pause for thought about disrupting the trading routes to Australia and the way in which we connect to the world’. He also said: ‘The way you need to think about what submarines do is really less about patrolling that massive coastline, which you would need a lot of submarines to do. It’s about the question mark that you place in an adversary’s mind.’ While that may be true, the moment deterrence fails (and there’s no guarantee it won’t) we still must be able to protect Australia’s seaborne trade—or, as the late James Goldrick more accurately pointed out, Australia’s seaborne supply. That requires, at least in part, the execution of localised sea control and power projection. While submarines can assist with that function, they can’t achieve the required tasking. Australia’s maritime strategy must include elements of maritime and naval tasking (which are not entirely the same thing) to achieve power projection and elements of sea control along our sea lines of communication. This includes the Coral Sea, the Java Sea where both HMAS Perth and HMAS Canberra were lost in World War II, and even the western India Ocean. Getting there, and providing persistence, will require a reach greater than the 6,000-nautical-mile range of a stereotypical corvette. As highlighted in the recent call for an overarching strategy addressing maritime security, ensuring maritime security requires the execution of a large spectrum of maritime tasks of which protection of trade is only one. But it’s an important one that requires a significant blue-water capability. While the dual constraints of cost and workforce will of course prohibit a Mahanian view of ‘total command of the sea’, a realistic approach is needed to achieve localised sea control and power projection to secure Australia’s seaborne supply. In articulating its maritime domain force structure priorities, the 2023 review states that the navy ‘must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade’. It then highlights that, as a consequence, immediate investment priorities for the maritime domain include ‘the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels’. There arises the challenge. Be it a consequence of insufficient armament, endurance, flight deck capabilities, speed—the list of comparative metrics goes on—Tier 2 surface combatants (however that designation may be defined) will not be able to meet this tasking. Nor will they be able to complete a number of other tasks required in Australia’s implied maritime strategy. They will, however, be able to complete many other maritime security tasks currently performed by the patrol boat force. I tend to agree with Rowan Moffitt’s assertion that the 1986 Dibb review intended the Anzac-class frigates to be a Tier 2 capability. The patrol boat’s planned replacement, the offshore patrol vessel, is underarmed and slow for the current context, and Peter Dean makes a valid point that replacing the OPV with a corvette may be beneficial. But the core of the challenge is that the surface combatant fleet needs to be expanded beyond ‘the answer is always 12’. How that is to be done is a different question to whether Australia should acquire corvettes or not. Based on the three-to-one ratio often used to indicate force availability, 12 surface combatants, of which four are likely to be available for operations at any time, can’t provide the degree of localised sea control and power projection required to protect Australia’s sea lines of communication. This doesn’t mean that the real cost and workforce constraints aren’t important. They are. It does mean that Australia and the ADF must find a way to mitigate these issues. That will require a separate, dedicated discussion. The ADF must receive more funding if the government intends to meet the challenges set out in the defence strategic review, as discussed in ASPI’s 2023–24 budget brief. This will enable the expansion of the RAN’s surface fleet, among other priorities. And we must think differently about the navy’s workforce challenges. The discussion about recruitment and retention, while important, won’t address the structural changes required to crew a fleet designed to protect Australia’s national interests. The answer to this vexed question may include a coastguard, a naval auxiliary, a system of readiness levels, a rehash of the reserves—the list goes on. The point is that the answer to the problem of how many surface combatants we need is not perpetually 11–12, and difficult choices will need to be made to ensure the required structure is identified, funded and crewed.

10 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 10 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. US President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ‘A good navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace’. Those poignant words were uttered in 1902 but they have a distinct relevance to the era in which we find ourselves now. In 2007, the Royal Australian Navy’s guided missile frigate HMAS Adelaide executed manoeuvres in the northwest Indian Ocean alongside two aircraft carriers, INS Viraat and USS Kittyhawk. While naval exercises are a common part of an Australian ship’s program, this exercise was particularly important. The Adelaide’s manoeuvres alongside ships from India and the US represented Australia’s inaugural participation in Exercise Malabar. Australia’s recent defence strategic review clearly outlined a strategy for deterrence by denial. There’s a genuine debate to be had on whether this concept is scalable to an appropriate maritime strategy for Australia. That was eloquently canvassed by pre-eminent Australian maritime strategist, the late James Goldrick, in a 2021 piece titled ‘Sea denial is not enough: an Australian and Indian perspective’, coauthored with Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande. Their argument is compelling and makes it clear that sea denial is unlikely to be a sufficient maritime strategy for Australia. But the Royal Australian Navy does play a crucial role in this nation’s deterrence strategy. Effective deterrence is often considered to be underpinned by the three Cs—communication, capability and credibility. Maritime tasks are generally grouped into three broad areas, military, constabulary and diplomatic. Naval exercises such as Malabar, which gets underway off Australia tomorrow, represent an important element of the naval diplomacy task, one that remains a consistent obligation of navies the world over, whatever the geostrategic context or technological advances. Within this context of deterrence communication, capability and credibility, naval diplomacy comes to the fore in Exercise Malabar. Malabar originated as a bilateral exercise involving just the US and India in 1992. Conducted at irregular intervals, it had a renewed focus following the US entry into the global war on terror, after which it became a regular exercise. Following the inaugural Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, Exercise Malabar moved to the Bay of Bengal and incorporated Singapore, Japan and Australia. Building on its participation in the multilateral Indian-led Exercise Milan, the RAN’s engagement in Malabar in 2007 signalled an increasing maritime focus between the two Indian Ocean neighbours. The 2007 iteration of Malabar sparked objections from China regarding the location and growth of the exercise. In 2008, the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, stopped Australia’s participation in the exercise following a meeting with the Chinese foreign minister. Australia’s withdrawal from this key aspect of the Quad clearly struck a nerve with India. Australia spent many years trying to rejoin the exercise, but those efforts were reportedly regularly rebuffed by India. In 2015, while on a visit to India, the then defence minister, Kevin Andrews, reiterated Australia’s willingness to rejoin the exercise. But no invitation was forthcoming. Japan joined the exercise in 2015, and in 2018 Tokyo expressed support for Australia’s inclusion, but to no avail. The consistent rejection of Australia’s efforts to rejoin Malabar came despite the establishment in 2015 of a bilateral exercise between Australia and India, AUSINDEX, and India’s inclusion in the Australian-led major multilateral Exercise Kakadu. In the week in which Exercise Malabar is due to commence its first ever iteration of the exercise located in Australia – the history of this exercise is important. It’s more than just another naval exercise. Australia’s withdrawal from the exercise, and India’s subsequent reluctance to allow it to rejoin, were clearly linked to China’s perception of both the exercise and the Quad. In 2020, Australia rejoined the exercise during a significant period of economic coercion from China and has been an annual participant in the three iterations since. Significantly, the 2020 exercise was executed in the Bay of Bengal—where it was held just before China’s original objection. It has since been held in the Philippine Sea, the East China Sea, and now off the coast of Australia. Both the location and the very fact that Australia is participating are important. Despite the tumultuous history of Australia’s involvement in Malabar, this communicates a clear message that the Quad countries have the capability and, through the regularity and complexity of the exercise, the credibility to work together. This is essential to the defence strategic review’s deterrence strategy. Naval diplomacy and a credible RAN underpin this. Investing in our defence force, and particularly our navy, as Theodore Roosevelt remarked so long ago, is the surest way to guarantee a peaceful region.

7 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 7 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Royal Australian Navy. On the night of 31 May 1942, my grandfather was a young boy hiding under the kitchen table as Sydney went into a panic. The Pacific War, a distant thought to many Sydneysiders, had come home. The accommodation ferry HMAS Kuttabul had been torpedoed in Sydney Harbour by a Japanese submarine. And 21 lives—19 Australian and 2 British—had joined the statistics of the mounting war dead. Australia intimately knows the risk that adversary submarines left unchecked can pose. Fast-forward to 2023, and the Indo-Pacific has been in the midst of a submarine arms race for more than 10 years. In 2019, 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operated in the Indo-Pacific region. That statistic alone makes it clear that the Australian Defence Force requires an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Long the poor cousin of the spheres of maritime warfare, ASW has entered the general consciousness of Australian defence analysts as an important component of undersea warfare. The AUKUS announcement brought it to the fore with the decision that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines with the assistance of the US and the UK. Nuclear-powered submarines perform a multitude of tasks, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; long-range strike; covert insertion of special forces; minelaying; and anti-submarine warfare. In many ways, submarines are the most versatile maritime platforms in a modern navy’s order of battle. That’s a point not lost on Australia, as it works to avoid a capability gap between the retirement of its ageing Collins-class submarines and the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. It’s also not lost on a number of countries in the region. For example, it’s expected that China’s current order of battle of 66 submarines will grow to 76 by 2030. It is in this context that the defence strategic review states that the immediate investment priorities in the maritime domain include a fleet consisting of ‘Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants in order to provide for increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. ASW also gets a hit out as a priority in the air domain, with the DSR stating that the air force must be able to maintain ASW as a domain priority. All of this indicates that the revised ‘focused force’, as directed by the DSR, will include an enhanced ASW capability. In some ways that has already been borne out, with the news that the Royal Australian Navy will acquire an expeditionary version of the US Navy’s surveillance towed array sensor system (SURTASS- E), a containerised towed array with a passive and low-frequency activity capable of being deployed on a multitude of commercial vessels. Given the speed and vulnerability of commercial vessels, this is a strategic capability that is appropriate to deploy in the vicinity of key chokepoints or known submarine transit lanes such as the Luzon Strait. However, it is not a tactical capability to be deployed and pre-positioned in the hunt to locate a submarine. It is on this hunt that a system of systems is required to locate and then continue to track a threatening submarine. Such a system of systems will need to be underpinned by an effective theatre ASW concept with a strong backbone of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). So, what is the system of systems required to locate and track a submarine? As every ASW practitioner knows, the best way to combat a submarine is to destroy it while it’s alongside a wharf. However, significant practicalities get in the way of this—not least that, unless it’s during a declared conflict, this is an ardent breach of international law. So, short of striking a submarine alongside the wharf, effective ASW requires the ability to track a submarine from when it dives throughout its transit. This requires an enmeshing of satellite capabilities, strategic towed arrays, seabed arrays, tactical towed arrays, maritime patrol aircraft, ASW helicopters, submarines and information sharing with like-minded partners. That is the system. Of course, connecting these dots requires effective communication and picture compilation. But the key point is that every element of this system is needed. It is in this light that the DSR’s recommendation that a surface combatant fleet review is needed to ‘ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines’ raises some concerns. As highlighted in my recent article ‘National defence and the navy’, the assertion that acquiring nuclear-powered submarines warrants a rethink of the surface combatant fleet structure seems tenuous. Nuclear submarines provide the same effects as conventional submarines; they just do it faster and with greater endurance—two elements that are important given Australia’s geographical location. However, to assume that the existence of nuclear-powered submarines from the 2030s in the RAN’s order of battle changes the foundational structure of the fleet, if in fact that is the assumption, is concerning. A structural review may be needed for many reasons, including the continuing cost blowouts of the Hunter-class frigates, the vulnerability of the lightly armed planned Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels and the RAN’s limited maritime strike capability. Conventional submarines can have an average dived speed of 16–17 knots on a sprint, more than likely reduced to 10 knots on patrol, give or take a few knots. While the numbers may differ, the point is that employment of conventional submarines in an ASW role requires specific positioning to place them in a position to intercept a threatening submarine. It’s a kind of one-shot thing. Nuclear-powered submarines, with an average dived speed of 30 knots, are not so constrained by a requirement for perfect positioning to be effective. However, even with the advantage of speed, under the rule of three, even if nuclear-powered submarines are the best submarine hunters, a fleet of eight (once fully acquired in the 2040s) will give the RAN the ability to have two to three operational at any one time—assuming that three will be in refit and two or three will be at various stages of force generation, leaving two or three for operational deployments. Deployments will need to span the full spectrum of submarine taskings. With over 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operating in our region, the numbers speak for themselves. Even if submarines are the best submarine hunters, the proposition that eight nuclear-powered submarines could meet the ADF’s required tactical ASW capability is a fallacy. We will need much more than that. This is partially mitigated by the Air Force’s fleet of 12 P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft, but only partially. Effective ASW is achieved through a system-of-systems approach. And in that system of systems, the RAN requires strategically placed seabed arrays and a tactical towed array system similar to that offered by the Hunter-class frigate (although this isn’t unique to the Hunter). A view that nuclear-powered submarines replace this need denies the maths and the practicalities of the situation. For too long the RAN has been without this capability, and with a luxury of distance has been able to underestimate the ASW threat. That luxury is no longer available. In considering the fleet structure under the surface combatant fleet review, the ADF must not be captured by the view that nuclear-powered submarines can, by themselves, effectively address the ASW challenges in the region. It must remember that effective ASW requires more than just one exquisite capability. It requires a system of systems underpinned by concepts and C4ISR. In that system of systems, the RAN needs an effective tactical towed array system. Whatever the future of the Hunter class, the surface combatant fleet review must not be blinded by the notion that to deliver an effective ASW capability for the ADF all we need is eight nuclear-powered submarines.

31 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 31 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The lead-up to Saturday’s meeting between Australia’s defence and foreign affairs ministers and their US counterparts was low key, as were the expectations. But optics and substance are not always perfectly matched with AUSMIN meetings, and of course it’s never entirely clear what goes on behind closed doors. On a close read, there’s an underlying theme in the four principals’ joint communiqué to which the Australian public should be alive, and that is one of preparedness. It is a difficult conversation, clearly, and one that is easier to avoid in the short term. But the agreements in the communiqué focus squarely on the theme—even if the term itself isn’t used—that we need to be prepared should strategic competition escalate to crisis or conflict. As part of this theme of preparedness, the importance of the US–Australia force posture initiatives were re-enforced. Signed in 2014, the five initiatives under the force posture agreement all received a mention, with new areas of coordination highlighted. A sixth element was added under space coordination. The communiqué highlighted an intent to ‘operationalise the alliance’, a theme that threaded through the majority of the defence cooperation areas announced. But operationalise to what end? Clearly, the aim is to be prepared for what might occur in our region. A key element of the focus on ‘operationalising the alliance’ was the agreement to rotate US Navy maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft through Australia to enhance regional maritime domain awareness. The US aircraft in question will be the P-8 Poseidon, a capable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-submarine-warfare platform of which Australia operates 12. While US P-8s already operate in the region from Okinawa and Guam, this move not only provides depth in operations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, but also allows for increased interoperability, or arguably interchangeability, with the Royal Australian Air Force fleet. Under the enhanced air cooperation program, there were also mentions of the already agreed upgrades of RAAF bases Darwin and Tindal. And there were commitments to scope additional upgrades to two bare bases—RAAF Base Scherger in Queensland, approximately 470 kilometres south of Cape York, and RAAF Base Curtin in Western Australia, approximately 200 kilometres from Broome. This agreement is consistent with the messaging of the Australian government in both the 2020 force structure plan and the recent defence strategic review. Given that the government almost certainly had work planned for these bases, the mention in the AUSMIN communiqué is telling in itself. There is always a decision at AUSMIN on what parts of the discussions to include in the public-facing document and what to keep behind closed doors. In some ways, every aspect of the communiqué should be considered through this lens. The continued focus on joint US–Australian efforts to upgrade bare bases is sending a public message that in a crisis or conflict US assets will operate from dispersed bases in northern Australia to mitigate the risk that Chinese military capabilities pose to US bases on Okinawa and Guam. And on the theme of preparedness, an underlying message is that, while not inevitable, the likelihood of a crisis or conflict is not remote. The theme of operationalising the alliance was also evident in the discussion of both the land and logistics elements of the force posture initiatives. The intent to rotate US Army watercraft through Australia appears new, and is timely given the defence strategic review’s focus on accelerating Australian Army littoral capability. The rationale behind this decision isn’t entirely evident; however, there are obvious benefits in mitigating the capability gap until the Australian Army acquires or upgrades its capabilities in this space. On the land domain front, there was also agreement to conduct a ‘proof of principle’ prepositioning of US Army stores in Bandiana, Victoria. The defence-related themes also explored areas of collaboration on integrated air and missile defence, guided weapons and explosive ordnance, and intelligence. The relationship with Japan warranted a strong mention that indicated a desire to increase trilateral cooperation on exercises and training-related activities, including activities directly related to the RAAF F-35 joint strike fighter. There was a lot in the joint communiqué for defence and foreign policy pundits to be intrigued by. But the document isn’t just important to those with a specific interest in defence and foreign policy. It contains an important message for all Australians that deserves attention. The likelihood of a crisis or conflict in our region is not remote, and our preparedness to confront this fact deserves attention.

25 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 25 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. AUSMIN 2023 will occur against the backdrop of the largest ever iteration of Exercise Talisman Sabre in Australia’s north. Talisman Sabre, a bilateral exercise between the US and Australia, has long been a symbol of interoperability between the two nations. However, in recent years, it has assumed a larger role, demonstrating how the alliance partners can work with other regional and extra-regional nations. In the most uncertain global strategic circumstances we have faced since World War II, it reveals the vital roles hard-power capability plays in diplomatic statecraft, in regional stability and as the underpinning of deterrence. All these facets—from statecraft and stability to diplomacy and deterrence—have been enhanced by the addition of 11 partner nations in the 2023 iteration of the exercise. Talisman Sabre featured prominently in the December 2022 joint AUSMIN statement, which announced the intent to include a number of Pacific nations in the exercise, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga. The symbolism is clear, and significant, but it will yet again be necessary for AUSMIN, and the joint communiqué, to signal substantial progress on the defence side as well as on the foreign policy objectives of cooperation. This, of course, doesn’t mean that the talks in themselves are not highly beneficial for the defence relationship between the two staunch allies. Yet with one authoritarian regime waging war in Europe and another carrying out a coercive form of grey-zone aggression in the Indo-Pacific, AUSMIN needs to be crystal clear that continued and increased investment in defence both bilaterally and with partners is not about military proliferation or the creation of instability but is necessary for regional stability—or as President Ronald Reagan said, a strategy of ‘peace through strength’. Understandably, most of the discussion on threats faced by the Australia–US alliance and our partners will occur in the classified, closed-door sessions,. But the 2022 communiqué set a high bar in terms of bringing the public along the, at times, tension-filled journey of international security. Among other things, it provided a clear focus on force posture initiatives, including bomber taskforce rotations, sustainment and maintenance. Given the significance of the AUKUS optimal submarine pathway decision earlier this year, the announceables at this AUSMIN are unlikely to be groundbreaking—and are more likely to be reserved for the visit of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Washington later this year. That in itself isn’t a problem; the constant desire for big new announcements should be avoided. Instead, from a public-facing standpoint, the principals will likely focus on practical initiatives to consolidate the 2022 AUSMIN themes of force posture initiatives and logistics. Details on key force posture initiatives including US bomber rotations and infrastructure commitments to northern Australian bare bases such as Tindal are much needed. As a key element of deterrence, it is important to demonstrate that these discussions will bear fruit for operational outcomes. The urgency of the strategic competition between the US and China—importantly, in which Australia, along with others, is a participant—set out in the defence strategic review must be underpinned by practical progress on the initiatives outlined in AUSMIN 2022. This is also relevant to Australia’s flailing guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise (GWEO), an initiative with strategic importance for both the US and Australia, and on which AUSMIN 2023 should deliver some much-needed progress on US support. From a messaging standpoint, this weekend’s meeting will likely provide a forum for Defence Minister Richard Marles and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to again condemn a number of the unsafe practices of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea. However, the language around this is likely to attempt to strike a fine balance as both countries seek to court more stable ties with the People’s Republic of China. Still, it remains AUSMIN’s duty to hold aggressive actions in breach of international rules to account. A softening of language around international rules at a time when Moscow is flagrantly breaching them would only incentivise Beijing to continue its malicious behavior. In this context, and following Albanese’s trip to Vilnius, there will be further joint messaging on Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. A key here will be to not limit such messaging to Europe, but to continue the cooperation seen at NATO which clearly outlined that security in the Euro-Atlantic is connected to the Indo-Pacific. It is on the Ukraine question that there’s potential for more closed-door discussion. The US is likely to pressure Australia to consider doing more to support Ukraine; and, on the question of doing more, it would be interesting to see if the US raises a behind-closed-doors discussion on Australian defence funding, both for Ukraine and in general. That’s a delicate subject, of course, but it is certain not to have gone unnoticed by our major allies that the rhetoric of the recent defence strategic review has not been supported by additional funding in what would likely be deemed a strategically relevant timeframe. Following the major announcements of the past few years, there will hopefully be behind-closed-doors discussions to ensure that these announcements translate into practical outcomes. Concrete effort between the two countries on GWEO and the wider barriers of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations and export controls are needed. The US will likely need to provide some assurances on the recent rhetoric in Congress about support for the transfer of Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia in the 2030s, shoring up AUKUS arrangements in a bipartisan fashion. All in all, the timing of the last AUSMIN just seven months ago and Albanese’s expected visit to Washington raise the potential that much of the concrete discussion will be kept behind closed doors. But as with international security, strategic balance is key, and so it will still be vital for defence to feature prominently—in private and in public—in this year’s meeting. The Talisman Sabre backdrop sets the perfect scene to send the message that AUSMIN 2023 has a heavy defence and security focus.

9 June 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 9 June 2023. Link to original version. Image: US Navy. There’s a growing trend for naval forces to acquire uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) because of the potential advantages they offer, such as reduced risk and the ability to provide a persistent presence. In a medium-sized navy facing significant strategic challenges such as the Royal Australian Navy, it will be tempting for the upcoming surface combatant fleet review to promote the rapid acquisition of USVs to achieve the required national security effects at a lower cost per unit than their crewed counterparts and with shorter delivery times. This direction is being pursued by navies globally and represents, to some degree, an important trend in planning for future maritime operations. However, before large-scale acquisition, naval forces must consider the unique operational challenges associated with USVs, such as their legal status, speed, vulnerability to interference by potential adversaries, sustainment and maintenance. A comprehensive understanding of their intended concept of operations (CONOPS) that accounts for protection, maintenance, sustainment and ideal design criteria is necessary to exploit the benefits of USVs and avoid costly acquisition decisions based on a lack of understanding of how they can be employed effectively. The CONOPS would also allow for a detailed understanding of what the different classes of USVs offer and how they should be employed. History has shown that being at the forefront of integrating new capabilities can provide a key military edge. In the past 18 months there have been significant developments in this area, such as the US Navy’s establishment of Task Force 59, which is focused on the delivery of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and its recent attainment of full operational capability. The US Navy’s Ghost Fleet Overlord program also deployed a fleet of USVs from San Diego to Hawaii to participate in RIMPAC 2022. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy demonstrated a missile firing during NATO wargames in mid-2021 using its MADFOX (Maritime Demonstrator for Operational eXperimentation) vessel. In 2022, it acquired and began testing an mine countermeasures USV. Closer to home, the RAN will acquire five Bluebottle USVs and is working with Austal on the patrol boat autonomy trial. The former HMAS Maitland will be renamed Sentinel and refurbished to allow for autonomous and remote operations. The RAN has also acquired and tested a maritime tactical systems catamaran, demonstrating a clear desire to expand its USV capabilities. The successful integration of uncrewed aerial vehicles into almost all modern militaries indicates the potential benefits of fully integrating USVs. However, unique factors associated with surface capabilities present operational challenges that need to be fully considered through the development CONOPS before any large-scale acquisition. USV capabilities span a vast array of sizes and functions, ranging from small ISR or oceanographic capabilities to large corvette-sized vessels for defensive and offensive operations. The reduction or elimination of crewing, the likely cost savings, and the ability to transit vast distances and provide a persistent presence while reducing the need to expose crewed capabilities to major threats are important benefits. However, the development of an effective CONOPS before any large-scale acquisition will highlight the challenges that must be worked through to provide an asymmetric advantage. The legal status of USVs is a grey area and is subject to debate, and so that must be a consideration in developing a CONOPS that covers where USVs will be deployed, how potential adversaries may react to their deployment, and the spectrum of options open to the operational commander once an adversary does react. Clarity in the international standing of USV capabilities would provide commanders with an indication of how adversarial actors might interact with those capabilities. In contrast, uncertainty or a lack of clarity creates potential flashpoints for escalation. In introducing any new capability, an operational commander must consider whether its introduction would fundamentally change the calculus for escalation. This raises the question of a threshold test when introducing emerging disruptive technologies into a theatre of operations. What is the threshold for interference with the vehicle by adversary forces that would generate a reaction? What reaction would it generate? In the 2022 example of Iranian interference with US sail drones, the interference didn’t appear to provoke a kinetic reaction, nor did the 2016 Chinese interference with a US wave glider; however, they could arguably be viewed as propaganda victories for both countries. Does this mean that militaries are unlikely to seek kinetic resolution with respect to interference with USV capabilities? If so, does this encourage adversaries to interfere knowing that it’s likely to be below the threshold at which a costly response is initiated? This may in turn make USVs more likely to be targeted than crewed capabilities, which may become costly and may well shape how they are operationally employed. In developing a CONOPS for USVs, it’s challenging to group them, given the vast array of military capabilities available. However, when compared to the operation of uncrewed aerial vehicles, speed is a key factor. Most USVs operate at a speed that makes them an easy target for interference by adversarial actors, unless they are afforded protection. This vulnerability has been evident in several cases, including the attempted Iranian seizure of the US sail drones and the 2016 Chinese seizure of a US oceanographic wave glider in the South China Sea. An effective CONOPS would account for this vulnerability and provide protection through their intended employment or help articulate a key design specification of a required minimum speed or, if they’re considered attritable, a specification for acquisition at a necessary scale. In the current era of competition, USV capabilities will remain an attractive target for physical or kinetic interference as their use proliferates. When developing a CONOPS, two key factors must be considered. If the capabilities are attritable, they need to be acquired and employed at low cost and at scale to avoid tying up additional assets to protect them. Employing crewed capabilities to provide protection or overwatch nullifies any benefits of the reduction in crew and cost. And if the USVs are not considered attritable, and if it isn’t prudent to provide a crewed capability to protect them, they must either have the ability to protect themselves (which, at present, is a legal and technological quagmire) or be employed in areas where friendly forces have air and sea control. That would likely make them more effective for fleet logistics and sustainment roles rather than ISR and offensive operations during conflict. Such issues clearly need to be considered through the development of an effective CONOPS prior to acquisition. Although one of the great advantages of USVs is their ability to loiter, this poses a question of how to sustain them in position, and whether they need to be maintained in position or brought home. If maintenance is done in position, how do you sustain and protect the maintainers? Do they stay on the vessels, or does this change the design? Is a ‘mothership’ capability needed, and how do you protect that vessel? How do you refuel USVs and how many do you need to employ them effectively? The development of a comprehensive and effective CONOPS for USVs must take into account these and other factors unique to surface capabilities. By addressing these challenges up front, military leaders can ensure the successful integration of USVs into their operations, providing a valuable asset in modern naval warfare.