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13 October 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Interpreter 13 October 2023. Link to original version. Australia “recommitted” two months ago. The Philippines is waiting, China is watching – and so is the region. Image: Ted Ajibe/AFP via Getty Images Enrique Manalo, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, made his feelings clear. “During our discussions,” he declared on Tuesday, standing alongside his Australian counterpart Penny Wong during a visit to Adelaide, “I emphasised that the West Philippines Sea, South China Sea remains of foremost regional concern”. “As maritime nations,” Manalo went on to say, “the Philippines and Australia share a commitment to preserving freedom of navigation and overflight and upholding the rule of law in our common waters”. It was a reminder, if one was needed, about the ongoing danger from China’s aggressive behaviour in these crucial waters. Since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. And perhaps it was also a subtle signal that Australia needs to quickly operationalise its commitment to joint patrols with the Philippines, despite the effect that might have on its improving relationship with China. In August, footage emerged of a Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel blasting a Philippines vessel with a water cannon as it attempted to resupply troops stationed aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal. Shortly afterwards, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles visited the Philippines and announced that Australia was “recommitted to planning bilateral joint patrols”. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reinforced this pledge to the Philippines in September when the two nations signed a strategic partnership. HMAS Toowoomba and HMAS Hobart will spend three months in South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment” But this week, Wong would not be drawn on the timing, only that “the intention remains, as the leaders announced, for a joint sail in the West Philippines [Sea], in an appropriate maritime location as yet to be announced.” However, since August, tensions between the Philippines and China have continued to increase. The Philippines recently removed a barrier installed by the CCG around Scarborough Shoal, which lies within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and this month China further attempted to interfere with the Sierra Madre resupply mission. For Australia, delays in following through on its undertaking for joint patrols could impact on its regional credibility. Clearly aimed at deterring China’s aggression, the choice of the term “joint patrol” is significant in its symbolism. At its heart, a joint patrol is simply two countries agreeing to sail their ships together through an agreed location for a defined period, arguably with a degree of joint operational planning underpinning the arrangement. The terminology was clearly chosen in the context of the Australia–Philippines relationship to signal an operational element to the engagement beyond simple maritime exercises. It is in the operational nature of a “joint patrol” that the announcement conveys the strength of the two countries’ commitment. Conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But the operational aspect also has complexities for Australia. The security threat such patrols would be designed to combat is aggressive activity by China’s CCG and what has been dubbed its maritime militia. To be effective, these patrols would need to take place in contested areas subject to the recent tensions. If they are not undertaken in a contested area of significance then the pledge of joint patrols, and the operational support that is perceived to underpin them, will likely do little to influence China’s activities in the area. Areas in which Australia and the Philippines could undertake such patrols to achieve maximum effect include Reed Bank, which has promising energy fields, and Second Thomas Shoal, the site of the Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era vessel in poor condition that is likely to break apart. Both were subject to the 2016 Arbitral tribunal ruling that Reed Bank “is an entirely submerged formation that cannot give rise to maritime entitlements” and that Second Thomas Shoal is a “low-tide elevation and as such generate[s] no entitlement to maritime zones”. The significance being that they constitute part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, denying any legal claim to these features by China. Manalo also made the point following his talks with Wong “to thank Australia for its continuing support for the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea.” In recent weeks, HMAS Hobart and Toowoomba deployed for three months to South-East and North-East Asia on a “regional presence deployment”. The two-ship task group is soon to be joined by HMAS Stuart. Although the Department of Defence website does not list the Philippines among the countries this task group will operate with, the vessels’ planned proximity to the contested areas begs the question of whether this presents an opportunity to act on Australia’s commitment to joint patrols. Obviously conducting joint patrols with the Philippines presents a difficult policy decision for Australia as it seeks to smooth ties with China in the lead-up to a potential visit to Beijing by Anthony Albanese. But if Australia does not act on its promise in a meaningful timeframe, the credibility of its pledges of support to regional partners will be undermined.

27 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 27 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. Defence Minister Richard Marles has announced that decisions on the surface combatant fleet review will not be made public until 2024. This analysis was an outcome of the defence strategic review, which recommended that the government direct ‘an independent analysis of Navy’s surface combatant fleet capability to ensure the fleet’s size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine’. As I have written, it’s difficult to understand how Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines changes the surface combatant fleet structure requirements. However, the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, including its combatants, has deep issues in an era of little to no strategic warning time of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The review is essential but its scope should extend far beyond the make-up of the surface combatant fleet. Because Australia is a maritime nation, many of our vulnerabilities manifest in that domain. It will be argued that this review of the backbone of the Australian Defence Force’s maritime operations is one of the most significant in recent years. So how did we get here? What are the key considerations? And what does the delayed decision mean? Many a naval officer or maritime strategist laments that Australia has long failed to understand and insure against its maritime vulnerabilities through investment in an adequately sized and armed RAN. The current surface combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. The Anzacs comprise over 70% of the surface combatants but they are rapidly ageing. HMAS Anzac was commissioned in 1996 and has been in service for nearly 30 years. It was to be withdrawn in 2024–25 but, with its sister ships, it’s now expected to be in service for an additional nine years because of delays in building its replacement, the Hunter-class frigates. Ageing frigates are expensive to sustain at the best of times, but it’s likely that the Anzacs are in an even worse state with sustainment having a significant impact on the navy’s capability budget. A damming 2019 performance audit of the frigates by the Australia National Audit Office found that: ‘The Anzac class has experienced degradation of the ships’ hulls and sub-systems, with successive reviews and performance information highlighting the link between lack of conformance to operating intent/requirement, reduced platform life and reduced sustainment efficiency.’ The frigates are intended to be upgraded through the transition capability assurance program, but they’ve had hard lives and there’s a question mark over whether all eight can be extended for an additional nine years. Not only must the review urgently address the state and age of the Anzacs, it must also grapple with the cost blowouts, delays, and limited missile capability of the replacement Hunter class. The second challenge is what to do with the navy’s Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). The RAN currently shares the burden of constabulary operations with the Australian Border Force. Many have advocated that duties such as fisheries and border protection patrols should be given to a coastguard, but in the near to medium term these constabulary operations will remain with the RAN. The OPV was designed to replace the much smaller Armidale-class patrol boat. The 2009 defence white paper stated that: The future Offshore Combatant Vessel will be able to undertake offshore and littoral warfighting roles, border protection tasks, long-range counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, support to special forces, and missions in support of security and stability in the immediate neighbourhood. This increased capability will also ensure that major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations [emphasis added]. If the OPV is purely to undertake constabulary tasks, then the size of the vessels and associated crewing burden is too large. If it’s intended to ‘ensure major surface combatants are free for more demanding operations’, then its armament and survivability are too low. The reality is that the review doesn’t need to look at the surface combatant fleet structure because of the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, but as the result of an ageing and inadequately structured surface combatant fleet. The first issue is what to do with the ageing Anzacs. There are clear challenges in sustaining them despite the planned upgrades. With the Hunter class due in the 2030s, it’s fair to question if all eight Anzacs can last that long given the ANAO’s assessment of their condition—and can the Hunter class be delivered on time and at a reasonable cost? Perhaps more significant is the question of whether the Hunter is adequate for our geopolitical circumstances. The ANAO audit likely hammered a nail into the coffin of the target number of nine Hunters, and the government’s decision to delay the release of the review until 2024 may indicate that this project will be reduced in size or abandoned. The first Hunter is scheduled for delivery in mid-2032. If the program is abandoned or reduced in number, and if all the Anzacs can’t be sustained until the early 2030s, how will the gap be filled? What replaces those nine planned frigates is crucial. The answers are not easy or readily apparent. But I would suspect the front runner may be the US Constellation-class frigate, which is based on the Italian Fincanteri FREMM design. When Australia opted for the Hunter class, the US had decommissioned its Oliver Hazard Perry frigates (also operated by Australia) and was seemingly out of the frigate game. However, the challenges associated with its littoral combat ship program resulted in the US Navy returning to frigates as an important capability—hence the Constellation program. The FREMM was an early contender for Australia’s future frigate before the Hunter was selected. The Constellation class has a 32-cell vertical launch system for missiles. The Hunter has been criticised for having the same number. But the US is considering adding Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Constellation. At 7,300 tonnes, the FREMM displaces 2,700 tonnes less than the Hunter design, with scope for capability growth. The argument that the RAN needs the firepower of more destroyers has been well made by numerous commentators. The delay in announcing the surface combatant decision may also mean that the Arafura project will be reduced or ceased. The challenge here is that the project is well into production. The first ship is due to be commissioned in 2024, the second vessel is being fitted out, and the keel has been laid for the fifth. Could they be produced with greater armament, or sold to regional navies? Both are possibilities. But that would raise the question of what would replace the OPVs on constabulary operations. The Armidale patrol boats are already being decommissioned. Perhaps the answer is the Cape-class patrol boat, which the RAN rushed into service following issues with the sustainability of the Armidales. An expansion of the Cape fleet would require half the workforce of the Arafuras. The Capes would be purely used on constabulary operations, rather than the 2009 white paper’s aspiration for OPVs to supplement the major surface combatants. And so, we wait. The review’s recommendation’s will be known next year and will likely be aligned with the release of the national defence strategy. There are significant decisions to grapple with, and it’s likely that none will come without requiring additional funding. As time creeps on in an era of no strategic warning time, and as capability reviews continue, the sobering thought is that the ADF and RAN must be prepared to fight tonight with the fleet they have now.

13 September 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 13 September 2023. Link to original version. Image: M. Evison/Wikimedia Commons. On 14 December 1944, the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary freighting tanker Bishopdale was in the Philippines in San Pedro Bay refuelling Australian and Allied forces when it was attacked by a Japanese kamikaze aircraft. Able Seaman Gunner Stuart Savage opened fire but, despite the efforts of the defensively equipped merchant ship’s gunnery team, the dive bomber hit the forward mast and then struck the bridge, causing significant damage and fatally wounding Savage and two of his shipmates. The story of the Bishopdale and the fleet auxiliary is little known, but perhaps it’s time to reinvigorate the construct to support the future Royal Australian Navy. Australia hopes for peace, but it cannot be blind to the need to prepare for the possibility of conflict. The 2023 defence strategic review stated: [F]or the first time in 80 years, we must go back to fundamentals, to take a first-principles approach as to how we manage and seek to avoid the highest level of strategic risk we now face as a nation: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest. That’s a stark warning that a major conflict could commence in our region with little to no time for preparation. In ASPI’s 2023–24 defence budget brief, I identified gathering the necessary workforce as the greatest risk to the Australian Defence Force’s future planning. That sentiment is highlighted in the DSR, which acknowledges the workforce issues and notes that the RAN ‘faces the most significant challenges of the three services’. Defence’s 2023–24 budget gave the size of the RAN in 2022–23 as 15,253 personnel with a goal of 16,980 by 2025–26. However, the navy was already 495 personnel lower than forecast in the 2022–23 budget. Despite the best recruitment and retention aspirations, it is unlikely that the ADF and the RAN will reach the workforce growth target set in March 2022. Yet the future RAN will need more submariners to support the growth in crews required by the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines and the potential growth required in surface vessel crews pending the outcome of the surface combatant fleet review due in late September. It’s clear that structural reform will be an essential part of preparing the ADF and the RAN for the risk of conflict outlined in the DSR and the establishment of a civilian-crewed fleet auxiliary could be a key part of this. The dramatic reduction in Australia’s merchant fleet over the past decade means that this alone won’t solve the RAN’s personnel challenges but, among other structural reforms, it may assist. Both the UK and US operate naval fleet auxiliaries consisting of logistics and sea-lift vessels crewed by civilian mariners. The RAN’s auxiliary vessels, which include the supply ships HMAS Supply and Stalwart and the landing ship dock HMAS Choules, are crewed by uniformed naval members but could be converted to civilian crewing. In fact, when the Choules was purchased from the UK, it served with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary as RFA Largs Bay and was therefore operated by a civilian crew. The crew of the Choules is 158, but as the Largs Bay the core crew would have been 60 to 70, half the number the RAN uses to operate the same vessel. While the core crew of an RFA Wave-class tanker used to replenish the Royal Navy fleet is approximately 80, the complement of the RAN replenishment vessels, the Supply class, is approximately 170. Of course, they are different classes of vessels so it’s not an easy comparison, but the broader point is that civilian fleet auxiliary vessels generally much leaner crewed than RAN auxiliary vessels. The re-establishment of a fleet auxiliary could also provide synergies with the increasing number of Australian Defence Vessels operated by the Department of Defence, including the Pacific support vessel ADV Reliant launched in 2022. Additional benefits could include a reduced training pipeline for auxiliary crews, opportunities for expansion of the RAN reserve force, bolstering of the RAN’s relationship with Australia’s merchant industry and of the merchant industry’s skills, the ability to scale up in a time of crisis or conflict, and commonality across the ADV fleet. The generation of a new fleet auxiliary wouldn’t be straightforward, but it’s exactly the kind of bold structural change the RAN will need to consider to crew the fleet of the future. The structure of the ADF and the RAN remain relatively unchanged despite the clear risks outlined in the DSR. In an era of reduced strategic warning time, bold decisions are necessary and risk must be accepted to gain strategic and operational advantage. Re-establishing the Royal Australian Fleet Auxiliary is an option worth considering.

16 August 2023 | J Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 16 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The structure of the Royal Australian Navy since its inception has been determined by trading off capability, cost and workforce. Long lamented by naval historians and practitioners alike has been the view that Australia’s maritime strategy, or lack thereof, has been shaped by a continentalist conception of the nation, culturally and strategically. When the average Australian thinks of the military and its sacrifices, they think of Gallipoli or the battles on the Western Front. They don’t tend to think of the loss of HMAS Perth in 1942 with 400 crew in the Sunda Strait some 2,500 kilometres from Darwin, or of the loss HMAS Sydney in 1941 with 645 crew 290 kilometres west-southwest of Carnarvon. This sea blindness has arguably shaped investment in the RAN and its structure. But it shouldn’t be overlooked or misunderstood that failing to adequately resource the navy could result in the loss of an Anzac-class or a Hobart-class surface combatant—and its crew—within hours of a conflict commencing in the region. That is what ‘no strategic warning time’ means. So, where are we today? The world has evolved. We increasingly see foreign warships operating aggressively in our region. A war is raging in Europe. Successive Australian defence white papers in the 2000s and the 2020 defence strategic update and force structure plan all recognise the real possibility of conflict. All highlight the strategic importance of the maritime environment to Australia and our increasing reliance on seaborne trade, which equates to about 40% of GDP. That figure grossly undersells the relevance of maritime trade—91% of our oil is imported and we rely on it to keep the country going. Our economy also relies on undersea cables for communications and transactions, including within our banking systems. And yet, despite our reliance on the maritime environment and the deterioration of regional stability, the answer to most questions about the RAN’s surface fleet structure for over 50 years has been 11–12 surface combatants. There was a notable deviation in the 1987 white paper’s recommendation for 16–17 surface combatants, but that was never followed through. The only dramatic changes have been the replacement of the Kanimbla-class amphibious transport ships with the Canberra-class landing helicopter docks and the retirement of Australia’s aircraft-carrier aspirations. The 2023 defence strategic review recommends a strategy for Australia’s defence of deterrence by denial, but what does that mean for a maritime strategy? How does the Australian Defence Force determine what it means for traditional concepts of sea control, sea denial and power projection? The answer is not entirely clear. There are some clues in remarks by government ministers, and if they are interpreted correctly and in context they are alarming. In the wake of the AUKUS partners’ announcement of Australia’s pathway to acquiring nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines, Defence Minister Richard Marles said they were a ‘capability which would give any adversary pause for thought about disrupting the trading routes to Australia and the way in which we connect to the world’. He also said: ‘The way you need to think about what submarines do is really less about patrolling that massive coastline, which you would need a lot of submarines to do. It’s about the question mark that you place in an adversary’s mind.’ While that may be true, the moment deterrence fails (and there’s no guarantee it won’t) we still must be able to protect Australia’s seaborne trade—or, as the late James Goldrick more accurately pointed out, Australia’s seaborne supply. That requires, at least in part, the execution of localised sea control and power projection. While submarines can assist with that function, they can’t achieve the required tasking. Australia’s maritime strategy must include elements of maritime and naval tasking (which are not entirely the same thing) to achieve power projection and elements of sea control along our sea lines of communication. This includes the Coral Sea, the Java Sea where both HMAS Perth and HMAS Canberra were lost in World War II, and even the western India Ocean. Getting there, and providing persistence, will require a reach greater than the 6,000-nautical-mile range of a stereotypical corvette. As highlighted in the recent call for an overarching strategy addressing maritime security, ensuring maritime security requires the execution of a large spectrum of maritime tasks of which protection of trade is only one. But it’s an important one that requires a significant blue-water capability. While the dual constraints of cost and workforce will of course prohibit a Mahanian view of ‘total command of the sea’, a realistic approach is needed to achieve localised sea control and power projection to secure Australia’s seaborne supply. In articulating its maritime domain force structure priorities, the 2023 review states that the navy ‘must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade’. It then highlights that, as a consequence, immediate investment priorities for the maritime domain include ‘the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels’. There arises the challenge. Be it a consequence of insufficient armament, endurance, flight deck capabilities, speed—the list of comparative metrics goes on—Tier 2 surface combatants (however that designation may be defined) will not be able to meet this tasking. Nor will they be able to complete a number of other tasks required in Australia’s implied maritime strategy. They will, however, be able to complete many other maritime security tasks currently performed by the patrol boat force. I tend to agree with Rowan Moffitt’s assertion that the 1986 Dibb review intended the Anzac-class frigates to be a Tier 2 capability. The patrol boat’s planned replacement, the offshore patrol vessel, is underarmed and slow for the current context, and Peter Dean makes a valid point that replacing the OPV with a corvette may be beneficial. But the core of the challenge is that the surface combatant fleet needs to be expanded beyond ‘the answer is always 12’. How that is to be done is a different question to whether Australia should acquire corvettes or not. Based on the three-to-one ratio often used to indicate force availability, 12 surface combatants, of which four are likely to be available for operations at any time, can’t provide the degree of localised sea control and power projection required to protect Australia’s sea lines of communication. This doesn’t mean that the real cost and workforce constraints aren’t important. They are. It does mean that Australia and the ADF must find a way to mitigate these issues. That will require a separate, dedicated discussion. The ADF must receive more funding if the government intends to meet the challenges set out in the defence strategic review, as discussed in ASPI’s 2023–24 budget brief. This will enable the expansion of the RAN’s surface fleet, among other priorities. And we must think differently about the navy’s workforce challenges. The discussion about recruitment and retention, while important, won’t address the structural changes required to crew a fleet designed to protect Australia’s national interests. The answer to this vexed question may include a coastguard, a naval auxiliary, a system of readiness levels, a rehash of the reserves—the list goes on. The point is that the answer to the problem of how many surface combatants we need is not perpetually 11–12, and difficult choices will need to be made to ensure the required structure is identified, funded and crewed.

10 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 10 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. US President Theodore Roosevelt once said, ‘A good navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace’. Those poignant words were uttered in 1902 but they have a distinct relevance to the era in which we find ourselves now. In 2007, the Royal Australian Navy’s guided missile frigate HMAS Adelaide executed manoeuvres in the northwest Indian Ocean alongside two aircraft carriers, INS Viraat and USS Kittyhawk. While naval exercises are a common part of an Australian ship’s program, this exercise was particularly important. The Adelaide’s manoeuvres alongside ships from India and the US represented Australia’s inaugural participation in Exercise Malabar. Australia’s recent defence strategic review clearly outlined a strategy for deterrence by denial. There’s a genuine debate to be had on whether this concept is scalable to an appropriate maritime strategy for Australia. That was eloquently canvassed by pre-eminent Australian maritime strategist, the late James Goldrick, in a 2021 piece titled ‘Sea denial is not enough: an Australian and Indian perspective’, coauthored with Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande. Their argument is compelling and makes it clear that sea denial is unlikely to be a sufficient maritime strategy for Australia. But the Royal Australian Navy does play a crucial role in this nation’s deterrence strategy. Effective deterrence is often considered to be underpinned by the three Cs—communication, capability and credibility. Maritime tasks are generally grouped into three broad areas, military, constabulary and diplomatic. Naval exercises such as Malabar, which gets underway off Australia tomorrow, represent an important element of the naval diplomacy task, one that remains a consistent obligation of navies the world over, whatever the geostrategic context or technological advances. Within this context of deterrence communication, capability and credibility, naval diplomacy comes to the fore in Exercise Malabar. Malabar originated as a bilateral exercise involving just the US and India in 1992. Conducted at irregular intervals, it had a renewed focus following the US entry into the global war on terror, after which it became a regular exercise. Following the inaugural Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, Exercise Malabar moved to the Bay of Bengal and incorporated Singapore, Japan and Australia. Building on its participation in the multilateral Indian-led Exercise Milan, the RAN’s engagement in Malabar in 2007 signalled an increasing maritime focus between the two Indian Ocean neighbours. The 2007 iteration of Malabar sparked objections from China regarding the location and growth of the exercise. In 2008, the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, stopped Australia’s participation in the exercise following a meeting with the Chinese foreign minister. Australia’s withdrawal from this key aspect of the Quad clearly struck a nerve with India. Australia spent many years trying to rejoin the exercise, but those efforts were reportedly regularly rebuffed by India. In 2015, while on a visit to India, the then defence minister, Kevin Andrews, reiterated Australia’s willingness to rejoin the exercise. But no invitation was forthcoming. Japan joined the exercise in 2015, and in 2018 Tokyo expressed support for Australia’s inclusion, but to no avail. The consistent rejection of Australia’s efforts to rejoin Malabar came despite the establishment in 2015 of a bilateral exercise between Australia and India, AUSINDEX, and India’s inclusion in the Australian-led major multilateral Exercise Kakadu. In the week in which Exercise Malabar is due to commence its first ever iteration of the exercise located in Australia – the history of this exercise is important. It’s more than just another naval exercise. Australia’s withdrawal from the exercise, and India’s subsequent reluctance to allow it to rejoin, were clearly linked to China’s perception of both the exercise and the Quad. In 2020, Australia rejoined the exercise during a significant period of economic coercion from China and has been an annual participant in the three iterations since. Significantly, the 2020 exercise was executed in the Bay of Bengal—where it was held just before China’s original objection. It has since been held in the Philippine Sea, the East China Sea, and now off the coast of Australia. Both the location and the very fact that Australia is participating are important. Despite the tumultuous history of Australia’s involvement in Malabar, this communicates a clear message that the Quad countries have the capability and, through the regularity and complexity of the exercise, the credibility to work together. This is essential to the defence strategic review’s deterrence strategy. Naval diplomacy and a credible RAN underpin this. Investing in our defence force, and particularly our navy, as Theodore Roosevelt remarked so long ago, is the surest way to guarantee a peaceful region.

7 August 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 7 August 2023. Link to original version. Image: Royal Australian Navy. On the night of 31 May 1942, my grandfather was a young boy hiding under the kitchen table as Sydney went into a panic. The Pacific War, a distant thought to many Sydneysiders, had come home. The accommodation ferry HMAS Kuttabul had been torpedoed in Sydney Harbour by a Japanese submarine. And 21 lives—19 Australian and 2 British—had joined the statistics of the mounting war dead. Australia intimately knows the risk that adversary submarines left unchecked can pose. Fast-forward to 2023, and the Indo-Pacific has been in the midst of a submarine arms race for more than 10 years. In 2019, 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operated in the Indo-Pacific region. That statistic alone makes it clear that the Australian Defence Force requires an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Long the poor cousin of the spheres of maritime warfare, ASW has entered the general consciousness of Australian defence analysts as an important component of undersea warfare. The AUKUS announcement brought it to the fore with the decision that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines with the assistance of the US and the UK. Nuclear-powered submarines perform a multitude of tasks, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; long-range strike; covert insertion of special forces; minelaying; and anti-submarine warfare. In many ways, submarines are the most versatile maritime platforms in a modern navy’s order of battle. That’s a point not lost on Australia, as it works to avoid a capability gap between the retirement of its ageing Collins-class submarines and the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. It’s also not lost on a number of countries in the region. For example, it’s expected that China’s current order of battle of 66 submarines will grow to 76 by 2030. It is in this context that the defence strategic review states that the immediate investment priorities in the maritime domain include a fleet consisting of ‘Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants in order to provide for increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. ASW also gets a hit out as a priority in the air domain, with the DSR stating that the air force must be able to maintain ASW as a domain priority. All of this indicates that the revised ‘focused force’, as directed by the DSR, will include an enhanced ASW capability. In some ways that has already been borne out, with the news that the Royal Australian Navy will acquire an expeditionary version of the US Navy’s surveillance towed array sensor system (SURTASS- E), a containerised towed array with a passive and low-frequency activity capable of being deployed on a multitude of commercial vessels. Given the speed and vulnerability of commercial vessels, this is a strategic capability that is appropriate to deploy in the vicinity of key chokepoints or known submarine transit lanes such as the Luzon Strait. However, it is not a tactical capability to be deployed and pre-positioned in the hunt to locate a submarine. It is on this hunt that a system of systems is required to locate and then continue to track a threatening submarine. Such a system of systems will need to be underpinned by an effective theatre ASW concept with a strong backbone of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). So, what is the system of systems required to locate and track a submarine? As every ASW practitioner knows, the best way to combat a submarine is to destroy it while it’s alongside a wharf. However, significant practicalities get in the way of this—not least that, unless it’s during a declared conflict, this is an ardent breach of international law. So, short of striking a submarine alongside the wharf, effective ASW requires the ability to track a submarine from when it dives throughout its transit. This requires an enmeshing of satellite capabilities, strategic towed arrays, seabed arrays, tactical towed arrays, maritime patrol aircraft, ASW helicopters, submarines and information sharing with like-minded partners. That is the system. Of course, connecting these dots requires effective communication and picture compilation. But the key point is that every element of this system is needed. It is in this light that the DSR’s recommendation that a surface combatant fleet review is needed to ‘ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines’ raises some concerns. As highlighted in my recent article ‘National defence and the navy’, the assertion that acquiring nuclear-powered submarines warrants a rethink of the surface combatant fleet structure seems tenuous. Nuclear submarines provide the same effects as conventional submarines; they just do it faster and with greater endurance—two elements that are important given Australia’s geographical location. However, to assume that the existence of nuclear-powered submarines from the 2030s in the RAN’s order of battle changes the foundational structure of the fleet, if in fact that is the assumption, is concerning. A structural review may be needed for many reasons, including the continuing cost blowouts of the Hunter-class frigates, the vulnerability of the lightly armed planned Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels and the RAN’s limited maritime strike capability. Conventional submarines can have an average dived speed of 16–17 knots on a sprint, more than likely reduced to 10 knots on patrol, give or take a few knots. While the numbers may differ, the point is that employment of conventional submarines in an ASW role requires specific positioning to place them in a position to intercept a threatening submarine. It’s a kind of one-shot thing. Nuclear-powered submarines, with an average dived speed of 30 knots, are not so constrained by a requirement for perfect positioning to be effective. However, even with the advantage of speed, under the rule of three, even if nuclear-powered submarines are the best submarine hunters, a fleet of eight (once fully acquired in the 2040s) will give the RAN the ability to have two to three operational at any one time—assuming that three will be in refit and two or three will be at various stages of force generation, leaving two or three for operational deployments. Deployments will need to span the full spectrum of submarine taskings. With over 75% of the world’s non-US submarines operating in our region, the numbers speak for themselves. Even if submarines are the best submarine hunters, the proposition that eight nuclear-powered submarines could meet the ADF’s required tactical ASW capability is a fallacy. We will need much more than that. This is partially mitigated by the Air Force’s fleet of 12 P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft, but only partially. Effective ASW is achieved through a system-of-systems approach. And in that system of systems, the RAN requires strategically placed seabed arrays and a tactical towed array system similar to that offered by the Hunter-class frigate (although this isn’t unique to the Hunter). A view that nuclear-powered submarines replace this need denies the maths and the practicalities of the situation. For too long the RAN has been without this capability, and with a luxury of distance has been able to underestimate the ASW threat. That luxury is no longer available. In considering the fleet structure under the surface combatant fleet review, the ADF must not be captured by the view that nuclear-powered submarines can, by themselves, effectively address the ASW challenges in the region. It must remember that effective ASW requires more than just one exquisite capability. It requires a system of systems underpinned by concepts and C4ISR. In that system of systems, the RAN needs an effective tactical towed array system. Whatever the future of the Hunter class, the surface combatant fleet review must not be blinded by the notion that to deliver an effective ASW capability for the ADF all we need is eight nuclear-powered submarines.

31 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 31 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The lead-up to Saturday’s meeting between Australia’s defence and foreign affairs ministers and their US counterparts was low key, as were the expectations. But optics and substance are not always perfectly matched with AUSMIN meetings, and of course it’s never entirely clear what goes on behind closed doors. On a close read, there’s an underlying theme in the four principals’ joint communiqué to which the Australian public should be alive, and that is one of preparedness. It is a difficult conversation, clearly, and one that is easier to avoid in the short term. But the agreements in the communiqué focus squarely on the theme—even if the term itself isn’t used—that we need to be prepared should strategic competition escalate to crisis or conflict. As part of this theme of preparedness, the importance of the US–Australia force posture initiatives were re-enforced. Signed in 2014, the five initiatives under the force posture agreement all received a mention, with new areas of coordination highlighted. A sixth element was added under space coordination. The communiqué highlighted an intent to ‘operationalise the alliance’, a theme that threaded through the majority of the defence cooperation areas announced. But operationalise to what end? Clearly, the aim is to be prepared for what might occur in our region. A key element of the focus on ‘operationalising the alliance’ was the agreement to rotate US Navy maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft through Australia to enhance regional maritime domain awareness. The US aircraft in question will be the P-8 Poseidon, a capable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and anti-submarine-warfare platform of which Australia operates 12. While US P-8s already operate in the region from Okinawa and Guam, this move not only provides depth in operations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, but also allows for increased interoperability, or arguably interchangeability, with the Royal Australian Air Force fleet. Under the enhanced air cooperation program, there were also mentions of the already agreed upgrades of RAAF bases Darwin and Tindal. And there were commitments to scope additional upgrades to two bare bases—RAAF Base Scherger in Queensland, approximately 470 kilometres south of Cape York, and RAAF Base Curtin in Western Australia, approximately 200 kilometres from Broome. This agreement is consistent with the messaging of the Australian government in both the 2020 force structure plan and the recent defence strategic review. Given that the government almost certainly had work planned for these bases, the mention in the AUSMIN communiqué is telling in itself. There is always a decision at AUSMIN on what parts of the discussions to include in the public-facing document and what to keep behind closed doors. In some ways, every aspect of the communiqué should be considered through this lens. The continued focus on joint US–Australian efforts to upgrade bare bases is sending a public message that in a crisis or conflict US assets will operate from dispersed bases in northern Australia to mitigate the risk that Chinese military capabilities pose to US bases on Okinawa and Guam. And on the theme of preparedness, an underlying message is that, while not inevitable, the likelihood of a crisis or conflict is not remote. The theme of operationalising the alliance was also evident in the discussion of both the land and logistics elements of the force posture initiatives. The intent to rotate US Army watercraft through Australia appears new, and is timely given the defence strategic review’s focus on accelerating Australian Army littoral capability. The rationale behind this decision isn’t entirely evident; however, there are obvious benefits in mitigating the capability gap until the Australian Army acquires or upgrades its capabilities in this space. On the land domain front, there was also agreement to conduct a ‘proof of principle’ prepositioning of US Army stores in Bandiana, Victoria. The defence-related themes also explored areas of collaboration on integrated air and missile defence, guided weapons and explosive ordnance, and intelligence. The relationship with Japan warranted a strong mention that indicated a desire to increase trilateral cooperation on exercises and training-related activities, including activities directly related to the RAAF F-35 joint strike fighter. There was a lot in the joint communiqué for defence and foreign policy pundits to be intrigued by. But the document isn’t just important to those with a specific interest in defence and foreign policy. It contains an important message for all Australians that deserves attention. The likelihood of a crisis or conflict in our region is not remote, and our preparedness to confront this fact deserves attention.

25 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 25 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. AUSMIN 2023 will occur against the backdrop of the largest ever iteration of Exercise Talisman Sabre in Australia’s north. Talisman Sabre, a bilateral exercise between the US and Australia, has long been a symbol of interoperability between the two nations. However, in recent years, it has assumed a larger role, demonstrating how the alliance partners can work with other regional and extra-regional nations. In the most uncertain global strategic circumstances we have faced since World War II, it reveals the vital roles hard-power capability plays in diplomatic statecraft, in regional stability and as the underpinning of deterrence. All these facets—from statecraft and stability to diplomacy and deterrence—have been enhanced by the addition of 11 partner nations in the 2023 iteration of the exercise. Talisman Sabre featured prominently in the December 2022 joint AUSMIN statement, which announced the intent to include a number of Pacific nations in the exercise, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga. The symbolism is clear, and significant, but it will yet again be necessary for AUSMIN, and the joint communiqué, to signal substantial progress on the defence side as well as on the foreign policy objectives of cooperation. This, of course, doesn’t mean that the talks in themselves are not highly beneficial for the defence relationship between the two staunch allies. Yet with one authoritarian regime waging war in Europe and another carrying out a coercive form of grey-zone aggression in the Indo-Pacific, AUSMIN needs to be crystal clear that continued and increased investment in defence both bilaterally and with partners is not about military proliferation or the creation of instability but is necessary for regional stability—or as President Ronald Reagan said, a strategy of ‘peace through strength’. Understandably, most of the discussion on threats faced by the Australia–US alliance and our partners will occur in the classified, closed-door sessions,. But the 2022 communiqué set a high bar in terms of bringing the public along the, at times, tension-filled journey of international security. Among other things, it provided a clear focus on force posture initiatives, including bomber taskforce rotations, sustainment and maintenance. Given the significance of the AUKUS optimal submarine pathway decision earlier this year, the announceables at this AUSMIN are unlikely to be groundbreaking—and are more likely to be reserved for the visit of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to Washington later this year. That in itself isn’t a problem; the constant desire for big new announcements should be avoided. Instead, from a public-facing standpoint, the principals will likely focus on practical initiatives to consolidate the 2022 AUSMIN themes of force posture initiatives and logistics. Details on key force posture initiatives including US bomber rotations and infrastructure commitments to northern Australian bare bases such as Tindal are much needed. As a key element of deterrence, it is important to demonstrate that these discussions will bear fruit for operational outcomes. The urgency of the strategic competition between the US and China—importantly, in which Australia, along with others, is a participant—set out in the defence strategic review must be underpinned by practical progress on the initiatives outlined in AUSMIN 2022. This is also relevant to Australia’s flailing guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise (GWEO), an initiative with strategic importance for both the US and Australia, and on which AUSMIN 2023 should deliver some much-needed progress on US support. From a messaging standpoint, this weekend’s meeting will likely provide a forum for Defence Minister Richard Marles and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to again condemn a number of the unsafe practices of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea. However, the language around this is likely to attempt to strike a fine balance as both countries seek to court more stable ties with the People’s Republic of China. Still, it remains AUSMIN’s duty to hold aggressive actions in breach of international rules to account. A softening of language around international rules at a time when Moscow is flagrantly breaching them would only incentivise Beijing to continue its malicious behavior. In this context, and following Albanese’s trip to Vilnius, there will be further joint messaging on Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. A key here will be to not limit such messaging to Europe, but to continue the cooperation seen at NATO which clearly outlined that security in the Euro-Atlantic is connected to the Indo-Pacific. It is on the Ukraine question that there’s potential for more closed-door discussion. The US is likely to pressure Australia to consider doing more to support Ukraine; and, on the question of doing more, it would be interesting to see if the US raises a behind-closed-doors discussion on Australian defence funding, both for Ukraine and in general. That’s a delicate subject, of course, but it is certain not to have gone unnoticed by our major allies that the rhetoric of the recent defence strategic review has not been supported by additional funding in what would likely be deemed a strategically relevant timeframe. Following the major announcements of the past few years, there will hopefully be behind-closed-doors discussions to ensure that these announcements translate into practical outcomes. Concrete effort between the two countries on GWEO and the wider barriers of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations and export controls are needed. The US will likely need to provide some assurances on the recent rhetoric in Congress about support for the transfer of Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia in the 2030s, shoring up AUKUS arrangements in a bipartisan fashion. All in all, the timing of the last AUSMIN just seven months ago and Albanese’s expected visit to Washington raise the potential that much of the concrete discussion will be kept behind closed doors. But as with international security, strategic balance is key, and so it will still be vital for defence to feature prominently—in private and in public—in this year’s meeting. The Talisman Sabre backdrop sets the perfect scene to send the message that AUSMIN 2023 has a heavy defence and security focus.

9 June 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 9 June 2023. Link to original version. Image: US Navy. There’s a growing trend for naval forces to acquire uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) because of the potential advantages they offer, such as reduced risk and the ability to provide a persistent presence. In a medium-sized navy facing significant strategic challenges such as the Royal Australian Navy, it will be tempting for the upcoming surface combatant fleet review to promote the rapid acquisition of USVs to achieve the required national security effects at a lower cost per unit than their crewed counterparts and with shorter delivery times. This direction is being pursued by navies globally and represents, to some degree, an important trend in planning for future maritime operations. However, before large-scale acquisition, naval forces must consider the unique operational challenges associated with USVs, such as their legal status, speed, vulnerability to interference by potential adversaries, sustainment and maintenance. A comprehensive understanding of their intended concept of operations (CONOPS) that accounts for protection, maintenance, sustainment and ideal design criteria is necessary to exploit the benefits of USVs and avoid costly acquisition decisions based on a lack of understanding of how they can be employed effectively. The CONOPS would also allow for a detailed understanding of what the different classes of USVs offer and how they should be employed. History has shown that being at the forefront of integrating new capabilities can provide a key military edge. In the past 18 months there have been significant developments in this area, such as the US Navy’s establishment of Task Force 59, which is focused on the delivery of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, and its recent attainment of full operational capability. The US Navy’s Ghost Fleet Overlord program also deployed a fleet of USVs from San Diego to Hawaii to participate in RIMPAC 2022. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy demonstrated a missile firing during NATO wargames in mid-2021 using its MADFOX (Maritime Demonstrator for Operational eXperimentation) vessel. In 2022, it acquired and began testing an mine countermeasures USV. Closer to home, the RAN will acquire five Bluebottle USVs and is working with Austal on the patrol boat autonomy trial. The former HMAS Maitland will be renamed Sentinel and refurbished to allow for autonomous and remote operations. The RAN has also acquired and tested a maritime tactical systems catamaran, demonstrating a clear desire to expand its USV capabilities. The successful integration of uncrewed aerial vehicles into almost all modern militaries indicates the potential benefits of fully integrating USVs. However, unique factors associated with surface capabilities present operational challenges that need to be fully considered through the development CONOPS before any large-scale acquisition. USV capabilities span a vast array of sizes and functions, ranging from small ISR or oceanographic capabilities to large corvette-sized vessels for defensive and offensive operations. The reduction or elimination of crewing, the likely cost savings, and the ability to transit vast distances and provide a persistent presence while reducing the need to expose crewed capabilities to major threats are important benefits. However, the development of an effective CONOPS before any large-scale acquisition will highlight the challenges that must be worked through to provide an asymmetric advantage. The legal status of USVs is a grey area and is subject to debate, and so that must be a consideration in developing a CONOPS that covers where USVs will be deployed, how potential adversaries may react to their deployment, and the spectrum of options open to the operational commander once an adversary does react. Clarity in the international standing of USV capabilities would provide commanders with an indication of how adversarial actors might interact with those capabilities. In contrast, uncertainty or a lack of clarity creates potential flashpoints for escalation. In introducing any new capability, an operational commander must consider whether its introduction would fundamentally change the calculus for escalation. This raises the question of a threshold test when introducing emerging disruptive technologies into a theatre of operations. What is the threshold for interference with the vehicle by adversary forces that would generate a reaction? What reaction would it generate? In the 2022 example of Iranian interference with US sail drones, the interference didn’t appear to provoke a kinetic reaction, nor did the 2016 Chinese interference with a US wave glider; however, they could arguably be viewed as propaganda victories for both countries. Does this mean that militaries are unlikely to seek kinetic resolution with respect to interference with USV capabilities? If so, does this encourage adversaries to interfere knowing that it’s likely to be below the threshold at which a costly response is initiated? This may in turn make USVs more likely to be targeted than crewed capabilities, which may become costly and may well shape how they are operationally employed. In developing a CONOPS for USVs, it’s challenging to group them, given the vast array of military capabilities available. However, when compared to the operation of uncrewed aerial vehicles, speed is a key factor. Most USVs operate at a speed that makes them an easy target for interference by adversarial actors, unless they are afforded protection. This vulnerability has been evident in several cases, including the attempted Iranian seizure of the US sail drones and the 2016 Chinese seizure of a US oceanographic wave glider in the South China Sea. An effective CONOPS would account for this vulnerability and provide protection through their intended employment or help articulate a key design specification of a required minimum speed or, if they’re considered attritable, a specification for acquisition at a necessary scale. In the current era of competition, USV capabilities will remain an attractive target for physical or kinetic interference as their use proliferates. When developing a CONOPS, two key factors must be considered. If the capabilities are attritable, they need to be acquired and employed at low cost and at scale to avoid tying up additional assets to protect them. Employing crewed capabilities to provide protection or overwatch nullifies any benefits of the reduction in crew and cost. And if the USVs are not considered attritable, and if it isn’t prudent to provide a crewed capability to protect them, they must either have the ability to protect themselves (which, at present, is a legal and technological quagmire) or be employed in areas where friendly forces have air and sea control. That would likely make them more effective for fleet logistics and sustainment roles rather than ISR and offensive operations during conflict. Such issues clearly need to be considered through the development of an effective CONOPS prior to acquisition. Although one of the great advantages of USVs is their ability to loiter, this poses a question of how to sustain them in position, and whether they need to be maintained in position or brought home. If maintenance is done in position, how do you sustain and protect the maintainers? Do they stay on the vessels, or does this change the design? Is a ‘mothership’ capability needed, and how do you protect that vessel? How do you refuel USVs and how many do you need to employ them effectively? The development of a comprehensive and effective CONOPS for USVs must take into account these and other factors unique to surface capabilities. By addressing these challenges up front, military leaders can ensure the successful integration of USVs into their operations, providing a valuable asset in modern naval warfare.

26 May 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 9 June 2023 Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The defence strategic review highlighted the need for the Royal Australian Navy to have two levels of surface combatants to provide ‘increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. While the DSR doesn’t directly recommend changes to the structure of the surface combatant fleet, it says: ‘Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels.’ The requirement for more smaller vessels, combined with the need for strike and anti-submarine warfare, has fuelled public discussion on whether the RAN requires corvettes to deliver the range of effects the DSR describes. The discussion has intensified following the release of the Australian National Audit Office report on the Hunter-class frigate program, which confirms that the cost of the nine vessels has already increased by 50%, years before the first is to be delivered. In late 2022 there were reports of offers to the RAN of corvettes from TKMS and Navantia, which are delivering such vessels to Saudi Arabia, and Luerssen, which is overseeing the construction of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) for the RAN and has delivered K130 corvettes to the German navy. In considering corvettes for the RAN, it’s fair to ask what a corvette is, and what the navy needs them for. A corvette is not as simple as it would first appear. Although naval history buffs will likely baulk at the comment, there’s no strict definition of a corvette—and the RAN has a history of not sticking to strict definitions of types of ships. The hierarchy of ship types is generally determined by the size, weight, firepower and employment of each vessel. One might accordingly define the hierarchy from smallest to largest, with associated growth in firepower from a patrol boat to a corvette, then a frigate, then a destroyer, then a cruiser, and so on. The RAN’s fleet structure demonstrates that this hierarchy isn’t strict. The 10,000-tonne Hunter-class frigate is to be almost three times the displacement of the Anzac-class frigate at 3,600 tonnes. On the other hand, the RAN’s Hobart-class destroyers are based on the design of the Spanish F-100 frigate and have a displacement of about 7,000 tonnes, which makes them more akin to a traditional frigate. A modern corvette can range anywhere between 500 tonnes and 3,000 tonnes, almost the size of an Anzac-class frigate. You can see the conundrum. Picking the term ‘corvette’ and attaching it to a particular naval task doesn’t help. Any discussion about the RAN’s force structure must focus on the effects it needs to deliver, balanced against its key constraints. The DSR recommends: ‘Australia’s immediate region encompassing the northeastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of military interest for Australia’s National Defence.’ This highlights what the RAN has known for some time, that force generation no longer relies on producing one major surface combatant to deploy on a unique operation in a far-off place. The RAN fleet requires flexibility and persistence. Australia has the world’s third largest economic exclusion zone and achieving flexibility and persistence requires scale—a surface combatant fleet much greater than the 11 vessels now in service, or the 12 planned for the future fleet. In heralding the ‘missile age’ in modern warfare (although decades late), the DSR by implication also highlights that the littoral zones of Australia’s immediate region will likely be a contested environment. By implication, not only does the RAN need flexibility and persistence at scale, it also requires its platforms to have a minimum degree of air-defence capability. This puts the Arafura-class OPV in the firing line both literally and figuratively, noting its extremely limited armament. In addition to flexibility, persistence, scale and self-defence capability, the RAN also has challenges in the number of missiles it can put to sea from an offensive-capability perspective. This has been explored in the ASPI publication The Hunter frigate: an assessment and won’t be revisited here, except to say that it will need to be a key consideration of the fleet mix. The RAN must be able to get more missiles to sea than it can now. This uncomfortable fact has led to calls for more Hobart-class destroyers to be produced, and offers from Navantia to do so. While the acquisition of further destroyers, or ‘Tier 1’ capabilities, is not the subject of this article, it must be acknowledged that the ability to put missiles to sea in as many platforms as possible must be a key consideration for the RAN. Given the distances the RAN will be required to project across, a key ingredient of persistence and presence is speed. Another limitation of the Arafura OPVs is their maximum speed of 20 knots, slow for a modern naval vessel. The transition to a ‘focused force’ in light of the DSR must not lose sight of the reality that Australia’s maritime strategy still requires the RAN to deliver a constabulary function while the Australian Border Force fleet remains constrained. The rightful focus on warfighting capability for the RAN must not ignore the fact that, under the current construct, the RAN’s smaller vessels, be they patrol boats, OPVs or corvettes, will be required to undertake constabulary roles. The RAN couldn’t trade this role away without it having to be resourced elsewhere. While this all points to solutions requiring several new platforms, the RAN’s key constraints of workforce and strategic warning time must be taken into account. The DSR reinforces the finding in the 2020 defence strategic update that Australia can no longer rely on having 10 years’ warning of a major conflict. That means the fleet to support the DSR’s requirements—noting the limitations of the current fleet—must be acquired quickly to be strategically relevant. So, is it possible to modify the Arafuras to meet the capability the RAN requires, or should a new platform of a developed design be acquired quickly through some form of commercial off-the-shelf agreement? The DSR acknowledges that the RAN faces significant workforce constraints. Increasing the number of surface combatants will require a large increase in the number of personnel to crew them. That will come on top of the need to expand the submarine workforce to crew the nuclear-powered submarines coming under the AUKUS agreement. Each US Virginia-class boat will require three times more personnel than the RAN’s Collins-class boats. Consequently, the RAN is unlikely to be able to support significant growth in the requirements to crew surface combatants. Transitioning some of the roles assigned to the RAN’s fleet to uncrewed capabilities may be a future option, but it’s unlikely to resolve some of the key challenges faced by the RAN fleet in the near term. All this demonstrates that rather than focusing on a specific type or class of ship with dubious definitions such as a corvette, we should focus on the effects that need to be delivered. Flexibility, persistence, scale, self-defence, offensive-strike capabilities and constabulary operations must be weighed against the clear constraints, delivery timeframes and workforce constraints. Consideration of these elements will lead to some clear conclusions about what is in the art of the possible for the future fleet mix.

14 July 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 14 July 2023. Link to original version. Image: Anthony Albanese/Twitter. In the build-up to the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, the sense of history was palpable. The original NATO construct of 12 members, formed in 1949, is now 31 and will soon be 32 with Sweden’s accession. The alliance has endured plenty of instability in its lifetime, through the Cold War, the Suez crisis, the encircling of West Berlin and much more. Russia’s unrelenting 17-month war in Ukraine, a clear eye on China’s coercive behaviour and internal disagreements about the organisation’s role in the Indo-Pacific gave a sense of urgency and occasion to the summit, including for Australia. The meeting was geared to tackle tough challenges, including Sweden’s and Ukraine’s bids for membership; security commitments to Ukraine, as a member or not; budgetary and preparedness challenges; future leadership, the Moscow–Beijing partnership; and Europe’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific. There were initial doubts about whether Anthony Albanese would attend the summit and considerable speculation about what support Australia might provide Ukraine. That conjecture was likely prolonged due to the government’s wish to save ‘announceables’ for the prime minister’s European trip—while the additions to Australia’s support may have been a consequence of public criticism of the assistance package announced last week. Most of the uncertainties heading into the summit, including Australia’s ongoing support for Ukraine, were resolved. So how did it all end? Well, Sweden is in and Jens Stoltenberg has been extended as the organisation’s secretary-general, consistent with a view that NATO is only getting started with its support for Ukraine, not showing the fatigue about which so many had been concerned. Predictably, though, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is disappointed. The NATO summit communiqué reaffirmed the Bucharest decision to admit Ukraine as a member, but it declined to outline a clear pathway to membership. That drove the Ukrainian leader to describe the decision as ‘unprecedented and absurd’. The summit communiqué stated: ‘We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.’ The precise nature of those conditions is not yet clear, but the writing was on the wall before the summit when key allies such as Germany and the US expressed reservations. In some respects, it was a missed opportunity. Mapping out a pathway for Ukrainian membership should be part of a deterrence strategy to prevent Russia from thinking it will succeed merely by prolonging the war. While Ukraine is understandably disappointed, Zelensky was happier with the assistance packages, including the gifts pledged by Albanese. Recent Australian support has been provided in three tranches. In late June came the announcement of $110 million worth of military vehicles, ammunition and humanitarian assistance. On the eve of the Vilnius summit, the government revealed that a Royal Australian Air Force E7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft would be deployed to Germany to help watch over the supply lines for lethal and humanitarian aid heading to Ukraine. That highly sophisticated aircraft is likely to be capable of much more. The third in the trio of announcements came on the last day of the summit, when Albanese met with Zelensky and promised a further 30 Bushmaster armoured personnel carriers to help protect Ukrainian troops advancing across a mine- and bomb-strewn landscape. While the package appears piecemeal and aimed at driving announcements, heart should be taken from the broader Australian public’s resolve for Ukraine and the government’s willingness to listen and increase its support. But with no end to the conflict in sight, the Australian government now has the opportunity to evolve the current stop–start approach and consider what a continued meaningful contribution to Ukraine looks like. That won’t be easy, with the Department of Defence under significant financial pressure and the government insisting on the costs of supporting Ukraine being absorbed within Defence’s existing budget. But it’s a better approach than the current one of inadequate assistance, followed by public criticism and then more government support. Let’s skip the first two parts. The one area of inconsistency centred on NATO’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s invitation to the summit as part of the Indo-Pacific four—with Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand—was significant. And, importantly, the NATO communiqué contained strong words on Beijing’s coercive policies and subversion of the international rules-based order. In a sign of the ongoing global shift within NATO, the EU and many member states, Indo-Pacific security warranted a mention: ‘The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.’ This is a direct response to Beijing’s military build-up and economic coercion. Yet the communiqué contained no mention of the plan, now in doubt, to open a NATO office in Japan. That outcome is likely to have followed French President Emmanuel Macron’s objection, which unfortunately seems to be based on attempts to mollify China and not on precedent, given the existence of offices in other regions such as Africa. Regrettably, this shows tensions within the organisation on how to engage on Indo-Pacific security. That’s even more disappointing given that the main holdout, France, is a Pacific power. In the face of this tension, it’s vital that Australia not be silent and continue to be a proactive advocate of the inseparability of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. The national interest demands a year-round strategy, not just annual visits.

1 May 2023 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 1 May 2023. Link to original version. Image: Department of Defence. The 2023 defence strategic review (DSR) identifies itself as ‘the most substantial and ambitious approach to Defence reform recommended to any Australian government since the Second World War’. It maps out a pivot for the national defence strategy from the defence of Australia to the defence of Australian interests, or ‘national defence’. In the lead-up to the review’s release, defence commentators commonly formed the view that it would prioritise the maritime domain at the expense of more conventional land capabilities, likely recommending significant changes to the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet structure. The RAN’s surface combatants are three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers and eight Anzac-class frigates supported by 12 patrol boats which are gradually being decommissioned. The 2016 defence white paper outlined the intent to replace the Anzacs with an anti-submarine warfare frigate, the Hunter class. The nine Hunters were to be delivered in the mid-2020s but the first is now expected in the early 2030s. That white paper also announced the intended acquisition of 12 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to replace the Armidale class on ‘enhanced border protection and patrol missions’. The number was later increased in the 2020 force structure plan (FSP) to 20. The 2016 white paper and the 2020 FSP arguably articulated the largest recapitalisation of the RAN since World War II. Despite that, commentators have warned that the make-up and planned number of vessels will not be enough for the RAN to effectively protect Australia’s maritime interests, including extensive sea lines of communication and undersea cables. The FSP detailed the importance of broadening and updating the RAN’s undersea warfare capabilities through further investment in persistent undersea surveillance and enhancement of mine warfare capabilities through the acquisition of up to eight additional vessels, potentially based on the OPV. It also committed to the expansion of the RAN’s amphibious and sea-lift capability through the acquisition of two multi-role vessels to replace HMAS Choules, among other changes. Although the FSP did not fundamentally change the fleet’s intended structure beyond what was laid out in the 2016 white paper, it did seek to address the full spectrum of effects the RAN may be called upon to deliver. There was some expectation that the DSR would recommend acquiring additional destroyers and replacing the OPVs with corvette-sized vessels. The DSR did neither, but it recommended a review of the RAN’s force structure, saying: ‘Australia’s Navy must be optimised for operating in Australia’s immediate region and for the security of our sea lines of communication and maritime trade.’ The DSR articulates a need to raise the fleet’s lethality and identifies a requirement for ‘Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants to provide increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare’. It says these roles will take an ‘optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants consistent with a larger number of smaller surface vessels’. Despite identifying these investment priorities, the DSR team (at least in the unclassified version of its report) avoided recommending specific capabilities as it did for the land and air domains. Instead, it called for an independent analysis of the RAN’s surface combatants to ‘ensure its size, structure and composition complement the capabilities provided by the forthcoming conventionally armed nuclear submarines’. This review will be headed by retired US Admiral William H. Hilarides, chair of the government’s naval shipbuilding advisory panel. The assertion that acquiring nuclear submarines warrants a rethink of the surface combatant fleet structure seems tenuous. I may be torpedoed by a submariner for stating this, but effectively nuclear-powered submarines deliver the same effects as conventional submarines, just better. Reading between the lines, DSR planners may have come to the belief that acquiring nuclear submarines somehow negates the need for nine anti-submarine-warfare frigates. The maritime domain investment priorities outlined by the DSR tend to indicate that the team had a fleet force structure in mind, but they avoided articulating it, probably because of concerns raised by either the RAN or the shipbuilding industry. A likely reason is the challenge the RAN is facing maintaining its workforce. Despite the 22 March defence workforce growth announcement, it’s likely that the RAN would be unable to crew an expanded fleet without significant structural changes to its workforce. The DSR says the navy ‘faces the most significant workforce challenges of the three services’. That concern is not new. The Anzac frigates were plagued by crew shortages that saw HMAS Perth out of operation for four years from 2017 to 2020 and the navy had difficulty sustaining crews through much of the life of the Collins submarines. Workforce issues would not have been the only concerns delaying the DSR’s recommendation on RAN force structure—with challenges including available design and shipbuilding capacity clearly front of mind—but the maths would indicate that crewing is a factor. It’s difficult to see how any increase in the number of surface combatants would not exacerbate the workforce shortfalls. A corvette crew is between 90 and 120, two to three times the size of an OPV crew. This might be offset by reducing the number of Hunter-class frigates, which have a crew of about 180, but it’s unlikely that a smaller vessel could provide the anti-submarine-warfare capability recommended in the DSR. The Hunter design has limited strike capacity compared to other vessels of its size and the OPV is not currently designed to provide any greater defensive or offensive capabilities than are required for constabulary operations. It appears evident from the DSR’s investment priorities that the current and planned surface combatant structure will not meet the DSRs ‘national defence’ projection requirements. The structure of the surface fleet remains a quandary, and a surprising one for the DSR team to delay solving given the urgency of the strategic situation it describes. It’s also notable that the relatively short section on the maritime domain limited its commentary on investment priorities to consideration of the surface combatant force and to reaffirming the justification for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines. The limited detail on maritime priorities stands in contrast to previous white papers, and to the FSP. This narrower focus on the maritime domain does not provide any commentary on capability considerations for the RAN regarding the integration of sea-lift, aviation, uncrewed capabilities or undersea capabilities beyond submarines and frigates and defensive and offensive mining. It is unclear whether this was because the DSR team supported the decisions in the FSP and believed these capabilities to be on track to be delivered in an appropriate timeframe and therefore they did not warrant reconsideration, or because their relative importance has diminished. Despite the conspicuous absence of recommendations on these capabilities in the DSR, it’s important that Admiral Hilarides considers them. While I believe the view that the fleet structure needs to be reviewed to complement the submarines seems tenuous, the new review will need to consider the RAN’s concept of operations, the overall effects the RAN will need to achieve in support of ‘national defence’ and how all its capabilities will come together to achieve that. This is likely to have a significant impact on the required structure of the RAN’s surface fleet.