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April 12, 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist on 12 April 2024 Image: Hunter-class frigate: BAE Systems. Almost a year ago, the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) set homework for the Department of Defence, including reprioritising the country’s rolling plan for military capability spending, the Integrated Investment Program (IIP). That update is now nearly due. But we should not assume that the government can address defence funding problems by shifting funds between projects in a spending plan that is already overburdened. There’s a widespread view in the public that Defence wastes money, a view reinforced in recent years by critical Australian National Audit Office reports detailing cost increases for many Australian Defence Force projects. The Hunter frigate program is a well-known example, with the Government citing the $20 billion cost increase as one reason for cutting the project from nine to six frigates. This leads to false assumptions that better fiscal responsibility and prioritisation will free up pots of gold within the IIP. It doesn’t help that the IIP is poorly understood and that Defence engages little in public discourse, whether to justify skyrocketing costs, debunk myths around capability acquisition or highlight its on-budget delivery of most projects. Created in response to a recommendation of the 2015 First Principles Review, the IIP outlines Defence’s funding lines for capability acquisition and sustainment for the coming 20 years. Only two public versions have been released, one in 2016 and one in the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP), leaving a public impression that the IIP remains fixed for long intervals. In fact, it is a classified living document, updated twice a year. The updates include reprioritisation. The DSR highlighted the deterioration of Australia’s strategic circumstances, including the ‘the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest’. Accordingly, it called for a highly integrated, enhanced-lethality ADF. To achieve this, parts of the ADF need to be reshaped, new capabilities must be acquired and some that already in planning need to be accelerated. The DSR gave some indication of those changes, but the vast majority have been left as homework for the department. The first instalment of the biennial National Defence Strategy (NDS), to be issued with the IIP update, will hopefully reveal more details. While many of the DSR’s recommendations were welcome, the handbrake on its success was the government’s position that the review’s changes of approximately $19 billion must be cost-neutral within the forward estimates—from 2023-24 to 2026-27. Although the recently announced replacement and expansion of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet is expected to come with a $1.7 billion uplift in the forward estimates, this doesn’t address the broader requirements of the DSR or NDS. Fiscal relief for the defence budget is not due until 2027-28, with an uplift of $30 billion to be provided from then until 2032-33. A cost-neutral DSR implied some combination of two things: some of the announcements were at least partly factored into the IIP already, and some projects in it would need to be cancelled or amended. Indeed, some cancellations and amendments were made public when the DSR was released, but many were not. The DSR made plain that the IIP was under significant pressure. Unfunded announcements had been pushed into it since the 2020 FSP without going through the prioritisation process. The 2016 white paper recommended that the IIP carry 20 percent overprogramming, meaning that for each year the programmed spending would be a fifth higher than available funding. That was based on the historical observation that there will always be some projects that slip. It’s a sound budgeting mechanism, but the DSR revealed that the IIP was actually carrying 24 percent overprogramming. And changes called for in the DSR have probably added to that. To address the funding pressure, the DSR recommended that ‘lower-priority projects’ should be stopped or suspended and that ‘funding should be released by the rebuild and reprioritisation of the IIP’. While reprioritisation within the IIP makes sense in our changing strategic circumstances, the problem is that it has been the go-to bucket of money for some time. The Defence funding envelope was set in the 2016 white paper, so almost every capability change since then has resulted in reshuffling of existing IIP funds. In the last couple of years, such initiatives as the Australian Signals Directorate’s uplift of $11.5 billion for the Redspice program and the $38 billion investment in Defence workforce growth have wreaked havoc on the IIP, resulting in the cancellation, reshaping or shaving of projects. The likely result is that, despite the DSR’s recommendation to generate additional capability funding through removing the IIP’s low-hanging fruit, it is unlikely that there is any low-hanging fruit left. Considering the IIP pressure described in the DSR and the need to fund such efforts as Redspice and Defence workforce growth, the overall acquisition and sustainment program is clearly at significant risk. Defence Minister Richard Marles has already signalled that the IIP to be released in coming weeks will show significant cuts to projects. While talk of reprioritisation and greater fiscal responsibility is easy to sell to a public that’s unfamiliar with the IIP, repeated pillaging of what has likely become a bare bones capability program is risky in a time where our strategic reviews say we should be strengthening preparedness. We must not imagine that there is a pot of gold at the end of the IIP rainbow. Defending the country simply demands a real uplift of funds, and Defence needs to explain publicly why this matters, otherwise we will be piling more risk onto the capability program at one of our greatest times of need in nearly 70 years.

24 March 2024 | Jennifer Parker and Peter Jones *Originally published by the Center For Maritime Strategy on 24 March 2024 Once again, as the current Houthi-attacks on merchant shipping in the confines of the Red Sea show, navies must be able to effectively operate in littoral waters. Late last year two former Royal Australian Navy officers Commander Jen Parker and Vice Admiral Peter Jones wrote an Occasional Paper for the Australian Naval Institute on the RAN’s experience in the littoral and what lessons can be drawn from it. Here is a précis of that paper. Image: HMAS Anzac Bombardment of the Al Faw Peninsula, 21 March 2003. Defence images. Littoral operations are invariably complex and are the most challenging for navies. The unique challenges of the littoral can constrain naval forces and increase their vulnerability to ever more lethal offensive capabilities such as land-based maritime strike, uncrewed surface vessels, uncrewed underwater vessels, and uncrewed aerial vehicles. Littoral operations not only demand a prominent level of Combined and Joint interoperability, but also stress the need for an integrated approach to operations. The development of missile and uncrewed technologies are not only increasing the complexity of littoral operations, but they are also extending the range of what would traditionally have been considered the littoral. This has been notable in the Ukrainian employment of explosive uncrewed surface vessels in the Black Sea against Russian vessels throughout 2023, where the ranges of the capabilities employed are extending the influence of the shore into the sea, and subsequently the range at which surface vessels can be held at risk by land based on land launched threats. Despite the technological developments expanding the complexity and range of the littorals, there is much to be learned from analysing historical experiences in littoral operations. Australia’s experiences in the littoral are extensive. They began with its first amphibious operation in German New Guinea in 1914. In World War II its ships operated on the Tobruk Ferry Run with the British Mediterranean Fleet and then with the US 7th Fleet in a series of amphibious operations in the western Pacific. The RAN also operated in the littoral in the Korean and Vietnam wars and more recently with the US 5th Fleet in the Middle East. These operations yielded five key lessons. The first is that naval forces must become attuned to the littoral environment they are operating in. One aspect of this is situational awareness. The littoral is complex. The number of contacts to detect, track and most importantly identify can be overwhelming. This is asset intensive to do. Likewise, learning the patterns of movement and trade takes time in theatre. Another aspect is environmental. Ships, aircraft, and their crews all take time to adjust to the prevalent weather conditions. The second factor falling out of that is that commanders must be prepared to adjust or even develop new doctrine and tactics for the specific operation. Some additional equipment may also be needed. Back home, Defence Departments must also expect this to occur and be agile enough to support the added demands of their deployed forces. Third, is the importance of weapons and sensors being developed with littoral operations in mind. As mentioned, due to the proximity of land, shallowness of water and reduced reaction times, the demands on systems and their operators is at its the most intense. Fourth, is the importance of force cohesion. Littoral operations often see a disparate mix of air, sea and land elements being brought to the fight. There is an imperative to work seamlessly together to maximise combat power. The insertion of liaison officers into the command organizations often acts as the oil to reduce friction. Regarding naval task groups, it is highly desirably to develop a cohesion and team ethos to gain a synergistic effect of its combined capabilities. The ultimate point is one that is often lost. It is the importance of unit training and professionalism. The internal organisation of ships can come under stress, and it is vital for a ship’s company to be well prepared and led. This of course harks back to the 1938 observation of Captain Francis Pridham RN who wrote, “A ship is either efficient, smart, clean and happy, or none of these things. They go hand in hand, or not at all.” A focus on these five factors provides the key ingredients for effective operations in the littoral.

March 13 2024 | Jennifer Parker Image: Department of Defence. Today marks 12 months since the release of the ‘optimal pathway’ Australia needed to follow to acquire a force of nuclear-powered and conventionally-armed attack submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS agreement with the United States and the UK. The milestone has been marked by claims that domestic budget wrangling in the United States is a profound threat to Australia’s submarine plan with the Biden administration proposing to fund only one Virginia class submarine in fiscal year 2025. Whilst Australia must be alert to US domestic issues that may affect AUKUS, including the looming presidential elections, to boil the agreement down to simple submarine numbers largely misses the point of the agreement and what’s been achieved so far. Although the provision of SSNs to Australia is about capability, it is also about signaling to China that deep-seated US relationships in the region matter and should cause Beijing to think twice about its aggressive activities. AUKUS is just one strand of this network, but it is important to US Indo-Pacific strategy. To renege on the transfer of SSNs to Australia would undermine US credibility and influence in a region with many Southeast Asian states already hedging their bets. There is, of course, an issue with the US submarine industrial base and much of the US wrangling on AUKUS is geared towards gaining more funding for its own industry. Australia is providing $4.5 billion to help the US step up construction. The US Navy currently plans to have a fleet of 355 surface ships and at least 66 SSNs. It currently has 50 SSNs and, as the Los Angeles class submarines are gradually decommissioned, this may dip to 46 in 2030. The US is now building, on average, 1.2 to 1.3 submarines per year. To build up its submarine fleet, it needs to increase that rate to an average two Virginia class submarines a year. This increases to 2.33 boats per year if the US is to provide three SSNs to Australia in the 2030s. Reaching and maintaining that rate will be further complicated by the need to prioritise the building of its seaborne nuclear-deterrent replacement, the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and addressing the increasing SSN maintenance backlog. But assuming that the US would automatically renege on the deal to sell Virginias to Australia in the 2030s because it may not meet its target of 66 attack submarines in 2053, fundamentally misunderstands the US strategy supporting AUKUS. The US submarine industrial base is a risk, but it is not the sole consideration. Putting US domestic issues aside, there’s much to like about what the AUKUS optimal submarine pathway has achieved in its first year. When the AUKUS plan was announced in September 2021, the lack of detail and consultation on Australia’s intent to acquire SSNs was apparent. Whilst the project has many critics, greater regional acceptance has been signaled by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s willingness to have Australian SSNs visit his country. When AUKUS was announced, the three partners undertook to outline a detailed plan for Australia to acquire SSNs within 18 months. A year ago the nuclear-powered submarine optimal pathway was announced and set out an effective ‘crawl, walk run’ approach. Phase 1 established submarine rotation force West (SRF-W) with US and UK submarines rotating through HMAS Stirling from 2027. This ‘crawl’ phase would allow Australia to develop the infrastructure, maintenance and stewardship capabilities and skillsets to support nuclear-powered submarines. Australia will acquire three to five Virginia class submarines in the 2030s. This ‘walk’ phase is intended to see Australia operate its capability at a smaller scale before proceeding to the ‘run’ phase and sharing the building of a new SSN with the UK. There’s no denying that this ambitious plan has high degrees of risk—including tumultuous US politics and its lagging submarine industrial base. If it all goes wrong, the age of Australia’s Collins class submarines would expose it to a capability gap. But despite a sparse flow of information, particularly for Australian defence industry, the AUKUS SSN optimal pathway appears to be on track. Having three countries reach agreement on the optimal pathway was no mean feat. Another significant achievement was the establishment of the Australian Submarine Agency. And Australia has focused heavily on training both its naval personnel and the wider defence industry workforce in submarine operations and maintenance. Australian officers are graduating from the US nuclear-powered submarine school, and maintainers are in Guam learning how to maintain SSNs. Perhaps the most significant achievement was US Congress passing the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) in December 2024 authorising the transfer of the three promised Virginias to Australia in the 2030s, the maintenance of US submarines in Australia by Australians, and the training of Australian contractors in US shipyards. It’s not all rosy. Defence agreements of this magnitude never are. The NDAA authorisation of the transfer of course came with caveats, including the requirement for the US president of the day to certify to Congress prior to any transfer that the ‘submarines would be used for joint security interests’ and ‘Australia is ready to support their operations and nuclear power procedures’. This endorsement is not a given. Australia will need to meet an ambitious infrastructure and governance plan to convince the US that it is able to safely operate and maintain the capability. The strategic importance of this agreement is much larger than the issue of the number of attack submarines in the US order of battle, and Australia should not be constantly distracted by US domestic debates over its submarine industrial base. Despite the plan’s risks, a lot has been achieved in 12 months.

9 March | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 9 March 2024 China intruded into this week’s ASEAN summit with fresh clashes at sea. It’s dangerous not to acknowledge the real source of the risk. Image: Filipino and Chinese crew members eyeball to eyeball in the South China Sea this week as their vessels collide at the Second Thomas Shoal. Getty A key step in preventing conflict is acknowledging the risk. Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating’s assertion this week that Senator Penny Wong’s speech highlighting the risk of a conflict was intended to be “rattling” for China is wide of the mark and dangerous. Although China’s behaviour in the region was not directly mentioned in the major keynotes or the leaders’ statement at the ASEAN-Australia special summit held in Melbourne this week, the topic was omnipresent. Reinforced by the images of Tuesday’s bullying behaviour from Chinese Coast Guard vessels towards vessels from the Philippines. A coincidental incident, or perhaps signalling from Beijing to the leaders attending the summit. Either way, China’s actions on the seas and in the skies above the South China Sea are undermining key principles of international law. Principles that have underwritten both Australia’s and the region’s recent peace and prosperity leading to what Senator Wong rightly characterised as the “most confronting circumstances in our region in decades” – a point Keating seems to gloss over in his erratic critique of Wong. A conflict in the region would be catastrophic. If Australia were to be involved, which may well be unavoidable, such a conflict would result in the significant loss of life of our servicewomen and men. It would also generate a fundamental shift in the average Australian’s way of life as Australia’s maritime trade is restricted. It is in this vein that conflict prevention was rightly a major theme of the Australian foreign minister’s keynote speech at this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit. Unsafe interactions How might conflict in the region arise? There are several flashpoints, but one of the most urgent is the growing number of incidents between ships and aircraft in the region, driven by displays of aggression and unprofessionalism from China’s military ships and aircraft. This was made plain in the 2023 release of Pentagon imagery documenting nearly 200 unsafe interactions between US and People’s Liberation Army Air Force pilots between September 2021 and October 2023. Australian ships and aircraft have also been subject to this behaviour. It was just under two years ago that a Chinese fighter jet deployed metal fragments in the form of chaff into the engines of an Australian maritime patrol aircraft. Less than six months ago a Chinese destroyer aggressively approached HMAS Toowoomba, injuring two of its sailors whilst Toowoomba conducted diving operations. These reckless actions could lead to a miscalculation. In the media surrounding this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos jr has been front and centre. On the topic of a conflict in the region, Marcos has been clear that a regional conflict could arise by accident, a miscalculation with significant unintended consequences. Marcos’ words in a television interview on Monday night were almost prescient, as on Tuesday imagery once again emerged of Chinese Coast Guard ships aggressively blockading Philippine vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Like clockwork, China again ramped up its aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea attempting to stop a contracted Philippine resupply vessel from reaching Second Thomas Shoal. The dangerous manoeuvres resulted in a minor collision between Chinese Coast Guard and Philippines’ Coast Guard vessels. Compounding the aggressive tactics, two Chinese Coast Guard Vessels directed water cannons onto the much smaller wooden resupply vessel, shattering the bridge windows and causing minor injuries to four crew members on board. Thankfully the injuries were minor, but what if they had been more serious? Could this have been the spark that ignites a regional conflict? ‘Preventive architecture’ So how do we avoid an accidental incident between ships or aircraft sparking an unintended regional conflict? Australia and ASEAN can do this by working to establish measures of incident avoidance and crisis management. As Senator Wong articulated we must work to establish a “preventive architecture to increase resilience and reduce the risk of conflict through misunderstanding or miscalculation”. Marcos made similar calls seeking a direct communications line with China to manage crises as they emerge. Confidence building and preventive mechanisms like those effectively employed between the United States and Russia during the Cold War are crucial to avoiding an accidental escalation. However, this work must be underpinned by the effective implementation of Australia’s deterrence strategy. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review highlighted the essential nature of statecraft to Australia’s strategy of deterrence. This week’s ASEAN summit was in many ways a good example of adept statecraft complementing Australia’s defence strategy, but to ensure effective deterrence we must go further. In responding to China’s continued aggression in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal, we must employ a similar escalation in diplomatic responses. This week’s incident – the overt aggression of two Chinese Coast Guard vessels water cannoning a wooden Philippines resupply vessel – calls for a higher level of response. Whilst there were many positive takeaways from this week’s ASEAN-Australia special summit, the timing of the Chinese Coast Guard incident, the lack of acknowledgement of the incident or reinforcement of the 2016 arbitral tribunal in the leaders’ statement, albeit largely expected, leaves a shadow over the summit. It is time for Senator Wong to directly address China’s actions this week. To reduce the risk of regional conflict arising because of a miscalculation between ships and aircraft, not only must we focus on increasing the risk reduction architecture in the region, but we must underwrite our strategy of deterrence by clearly articulating that China’s aggression towards the Philippines this week was unacceptable.

21 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 21 February Image: HMAS ANZAC, Royal Australian Navy It is a historic day when the government has finally agreed to support an enhanced surface combatant fleet capability for the Royal Australian Navy. Australia has a proud history of defending our nation, but our maritime history is often missing from this discourse, a strange omission for an island nation. In the announcement of the enhanced naval surface combatant fleet capability, Australia took a large step forward in acknowledging the realities of our geography and of our strategic circumstances. Following much conjecture, an eight-month Defence Strategic Review, a five-month independent analysis and four-month government deliberation, we finally know the planned future of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet. The RAN currently has 11 major surface combatants, eight Anzac class guided missile frigates and three Hobart class air warfare destroyers. While this is not the entirety of the RAN’s surface fleet, these surface combatants are the ships that provide the RAN’s defensive and offensive maritime capability, its frigates and destroyers. Until yesterday’s announcement, the ageing Anzac class ships had been scheduled to be replaced by nine vessels from the troubled Hunter class frigate program. A largely expected outcome of the review team’s recommendation has been to reduce the Hunter class frigate program from nine vessels to six. Although the detail is yet to follow, the timing of the build also appears to have been spread out with the final of the six being delivered in 2043. Although there has been significant criticism that the Hunter class is not a capable vessel, this criticism largely undersells the need to have towed sonar array capable anti-submarine warfare ships as part of a balanced naval force. Australia took a large step forward in acknowledging the realities of our geography and the realities of our strategic circumstances. The big change in yesterday’s announcement was the decision to acquire 11 multipurpose frigates, multipurpose meaning that they can operate across the full spectrum of naval warfare from combatting submarines, to surface ships, aircraft, missiles and likely uncrewed capabilities. Of course, the type of frigate this will actually be is unclear as Defence will undertake a competitive evaluation process, but the contenders have been narrowed down to options from Germany, Spain, the Republic of Korea and Japan. What we do know is that this will be a frigate anywhere between the size of a 3500-tonne Anzac class frigate, which is a light frigate by all intents and purposes, to something closer to 5000-6000 tonnes with at least twice the amount of missile capability of an Anzac class frigate. The size is important because a general-purpose frigate will need the capability to operate in a range of different warfare scenarios. The second surprise announcement, although perhaps it shouldn’t have been, was the decision to acquire six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSV), in concert with the United States. This is largely code for joining the current United States large uncrewed surface vessel program, one that the United States has been pushing as a solution to their dwindling naval fleet size. The proposed concept for these vessels is that they will be designed with significant missile capability and teamed with the Hobart class destroyers or Hunter class frigates to enhance the number of missiles that can be put to sea in a naval task group. Whilst this is not an existing capability, it is certainly a naval concept of operations that the United States has been toying with for some time. To many, it was likely intriguing that the Government stressed in yesterday’s announcement that this capability would be crewed, despite it being developed to be an uncrewed capability. The emphasis on crewing was likely to combat any concerns raised with the legal status of lethal autonomous vessels, which is yet to be resolved under international law. The LOSV capability is not expected to commence delivery until the mid-2030s, and there is a lot of water to pass under the bridge, so to speak, between now and then. Pending the evolution of the technology, international law, and the concept of employment it is highly likely that this capability will operate in our navy in an uncrewed fashion, despite yesterday’s announcements. The final capability change was the decision to reduce the size of the Arafura Offshore Patrol Vessel fleet from 12 to six. Another troubled naval shipbuilding program, it has never been clear where the Arafura sits in the navy’s concept of operations. Its crew size in the 40s makes it inefficient for constabulary operations and its lack of armament and survivability make it unable to be used in the event of crisis and conflict. This is not to mention, of course, that there are clear engineering issues with the vessel, with the first of class launched in 2021, but introduction into the navy’s fleet appearing to be delayed indefinitely. While it was too late to scrap this vessel, with two in the water and five in build, there is perhaps a missed opportunity to offer this vessel for sale to a regional partner to boost their maritime capabilities in countering China’s aggression in the South China Sea. For 50 years reviews of the surface combatant fleet have been calling for a larger navy to defend Australia’s extensive maritime interests. It is indeed a historic day that the government has agreed to support this capability, but there are significant challenges to be addressed, including the development of the workforce to build and crew these vessels. And it must be acknowledged that for the latter half of the 2020s we are accepting a significant risk, with a reduced and degraded surface fleet. Of course, we have been here before, when the 1987 white paper based on the 1986 Dibb review agreed to an increase of the naval surface combatant fleet. Hopefully, this time we stay the course. To defend Australia, we will need to. Although there is a long way to go, perhaps we are finally becoming a true maritime nation.

2 February 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Lowy Institute's The Interpreter on 2 February 2024 Image: US Navy Australia’s view of the Indo-Pacific generally stops at Sri Lanka and the southern tip of India. But this regional conceptualisation leaves out the western region of the Indian Ocean. This may perhaps stem from a realist’s recognition of capability and capacity constraints – but equally, as the recent campaign of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has demonstrated, security in the western Indian Ocean has an impact on Australia. The plight of stranded sheep and cattle that had been bound for export to the Middle East is only one obvious example. The maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean are diverse and complex. From the dramatic impact of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing to the consequences of rising sea levels, maritime terrorism, and piracy. However, two common threads are evident – the need for enhanced maritime domain awareness, and the limited capabilities to respond to the threats when detected. While Australia may have a capacity issue in engaging in maritime security in the western Indian Ocean region, there are options to leverage existing projects and relationships to improve maritime domain awareness.. The Quad has already set out an ambition for an Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) project, which was announced at the 2022 leaders’ meeting in Tokyo. This initiative provides a vehicle for greater Australian engagement in assisting with maritime security challenges in the western Indian Ocean. An additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping” operating without the use of location transponders. The stated purpose of IPMDA is to create a “technology and training initiative to enhance maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region and to bring increased transparency to its critical waterways”. It amounts to sharing data as a public good. As the Quad traces its roots back to the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief support in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, IPMDA makes sense as an initiative for the grouping with the potential to assist maritime security in the region. A risk to IPMDA is the seemingly limited progress of the project in the western Indian Ocean region, where it could make a real difference to maritime security. There has been limited official detail on the ambitious project to provide near real-time data in the maritime domain through what appears to be the resourcing of commercial arrangements through public-private partnerships. At the last Quad leaders' meeting, on the sidelines of the 2023 G7 summit in Hiroshima, it was highlighted that IPMDA was in its initial phase, with pilots occurring in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Quad partners have not officially released where the IPMDA pilots are occurring but it is likely to be in the Information Fusion Centre, Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram India, the Singapore Information Fusion Centre, and alongside the Forum Fisheries Agency in Solomon Islands. It has not been rolled out to the western Indian Ocean, where there appears to be little awareness of the IPMDA project. The initial focus of IPMDA is the delivery of satellite-based radio frequency data. This satellite capability allows for the detection and classification of ships by data emitted by radar or communications equipment. This additional data feed is particularly helpful in the detection of “dark shipping”, that is ships operating without the use of location transponders known as the Automatic identification System, or AIS. Monitoring radio frequency data is a technology that advanced militaries have commonly used, but one that has been off limits to smaller nations due to its cost. The ability to integrate this data into existing maritime monitoring systems such as the US-funded Seavision, which is commonly used in the western Indian Ocean, would prove a significant asset. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has awarded a contract to the company Hawkeye 360 to provide satellite radio frequency data and training to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. Australia’s investment has been further supported by a United States US$12.2 million contract to Hawkeye to provide further data analytics and training in the Pacific in Southeast Asia. For the next phase of the project, Australia should support a roll out of IPMDA through the provision of radio frequency satellite data to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Operations Coordination Centre in the Seychelles. This would significantly enhance the monitoring capacity in the western Indian Ocean region, which in turn enhances Australia’s maritime security as an Indian Ocean coastal state.

Jennifer Parker | 9 February 2024 *Originally published in The Strategist 9 February 2024 Image: HMAS Voyager (II) crew 1962, Australian War Memorial Tomorrow marks the 60th anniversary of the loss of the Royal Australian Navy destroyer, HMAS Voyager (II), which sank 20 nautical miles south-east of Jervis Bay. Of the 314 crew of Voyager, 82 were lost that night in Australia’s worst peacetime military disaster. Many more lives were altered forever. We are a maritime nation and yet our maritime history is often forgotten. We must remember the loss of Voyager on the night of Saturday 10 February, 1964. The destroyer was escorting HMAS Melbourne (II), Australia’s last aircraft carrier, as it carried out flying operations. Both ships had recently emerged from refits. Voyager was the ‘plane guard’, positioned 1000-2000 yards off Melbourne’s port quarter to recover the crew of any aircraft that might ditch. Following a series of manoeuvres, Voyager ended up out of position on Melbourne’s starboard bow and was required to resume her station. How and why Voyager ended up in this position remains unclear 60 years on although there are many theories. In truth, we will never know as most of the bridge team were lost that night. Presumably attempting to resume her station, Voyager was seen to alter to starboard away from the carrier, and then back to port towards it. The 3,600 tonne Voyager crossed the bow of the 20,000 tonne Melbourne. There was little time to react and despite attempts to avoid the collision in the final seconds, the two ships collided at 20:56. Melbourne’s bow struck Voyager aft of her bridge, severing the ship. Voyager’s bow passed down the port side of Melbourne, sinking within 10 minutes of the collision. A recovery operation was immediately launched by Melbourne, which was joined by several vessels from HMAS Creswell, in Jervis Bay. Many stories of heroism emerged from the hellish night. Midshipman Kerry Francis Marien survived the collision but left the relative safety of his life raft and was last seen swimming towards the rapidly sinking bow of Voyager to search for survivors struggling in the water. Chief Petty Officer Jonathan ‘Buck’ Rogers was trapped in the forward section of the bow. Realising he was too big to get through the small escape hatches, Buck took charge of trying to help the 50 sailors trapped with him to escape. And when escape was no longer possible, he was heard leading those trapped there in prayers and hymns. There are many stories of heroism from that night, of the brave men of the Royal Australian Navy rising to the occasion to save the lives of shipmates and friends. Stories that we know, and stories we will never know. In the years that followed the loss of Voyager, the national conversation was dominated by the controversy. The incident was followed by two royal commissions and many theories and books on how and why such a horrific peacetime loss of life could occur. It is of course important to understand why Voyager was lost and where accountability lies. Whilst we should never lose sight of the many hard lessons learnt, on the 60th anniversary we should focus our thoughts on the brave sailors who died and those who survived but whose lives were never the same. The sea is a perilous place, it does not recognise a distinction between wartime and peacetime. Every time our naval ships set sail, they put themselves at the mercy of this unforgiving environment. For centuries the oceans have rallied against those who seek to tame it, and operating in this environment will always be dangerous. Preparation in this domain for the possibility of conflict requires the women and men of our Navy to practise the operations and procedures that they will rely on in wartime. There is always risk, and they embrace it daily. When we think of our military heroes we talk of those on the Kokoda track and the trials of Gallipoli and the Western front. They all rightfully deserve a place in the collective memory of our nation and remind us of what war really means, especially in this time of global tensions that permeate all aspects of international and national security. On the anniversary of the Voyager’s loss we must also remember the brave men lost in peacetime as they trained to defend their country. They too are our heroes, and they died in the service of our nation.

6 February | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in the Australian Financial Review 6 February 2024 Image: Defence Images The federal government has compared our circumstances to those in the lead-up to World War II. Australians are faced with wars in Europe and the Middle East, and tensions in the South China Sea and north-east Asia that may spill over into conflict. Amidst these generation-defining global challenges, the Australian Defence Force is struggling to upgrade and crew its capabilities. It needs a bigger budget and it needs more people. But, more importantly, it needs to convince the public why they should care about these issues. Protecting Australia’s strategic interests and our national way of life requires not only a capable Defence Force, but also a strong defence debate and a public that is brought along for the journey. Despite the critical importance of an informed debate, and an informed Australian public, risk aversion has largely removed the ADF from this debate. That’s different from our AUKUS partners in the United Kingdom and the United States. Not only is it rare to see senior defence leaders speak candidly about the challenges we face in an unscripted way, but the conversation is largely stifled at all levels. Defence members seeking to publish or comment on defence-related issues are largely undermined by defence policies, or a rigid interpretation of these policies. A direct comparison between the defence-related websites and publications in the United States and Australia shows American officers and enlisted personnel routinely engage in debates about the future of their nation’s defence. In Australia, this is rare. The removal of ADF personnel from the national defence conversation is partially a product of the increasing restrictions placed on them by successive governments of both parties over the past few decades. But it’s also the product of self-censorship and risk aversion within the organisation. The paralysis created by the concern with being perceived to have said the wrong thing, being perceived to have spoken before the government, or offered an opinion at odds to the government has shut down debate. The apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as it having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. A key principle of Australian society is that the ADF is subordinate to the government of the day. It is, of course, essential that defence is seen in this light and is viewed as apolitical. The current Chief of Defence Force clearly takes this seriously, by removing himself and fellow senior officers from the background of a 2019 interview with the then minister for defence, as Christopher Pyne took a series of questions on political issues. A symbolic, but important, action. But the apolitical nature of the ADF should not be interpreted as Defence and its members having no voice on defence issues. It should, and it must. In 2015 another former defence minister, Kevin Andrews, commissioned a report on Australian attitudes to defence by an expert panel external to the department and the ADF. A key finding was that “enhanced public awareness was needed on defence roles and missions, how it performs these tasks and the underlying policy rationale”. The panel found the Department of Defence needed to be less risk-averse in its approach to communications and agreed to work with the department to address these issues. Since 2015, subsequent defence policies including the centralisation of communications management and the rigid implementation of that policy have further stifled defence communications – not only Department of Defence communications with the public, but also defence debates on capabilities, policies and ideas within its own ranks. In an interview in January the prime minister highlighted that defence spending was likely to be a focus of the 2024 budget, stating “you can’t defend Australia with a press release, you need assets”. While there is no denying the truth of this statement, it’s not a case of convincing the government or the Canberra elites that defence funding is necessary, it’s about convincing the Australian public that this should be a spending priority. The public does not want to hear this from the government, or from academia, but from Defence. This is what the 2015 panel of experts clearly told us. Despite cynicism about defence capability overspends, the Australian public is largely trusting of our women and men in uniform. Time and time again these are the uniforms they see when they experience personal disaster in fire and flood. The Department of Defence needs to be communicating with the public about what the threat is, and what we need to do to combat the threat. This isn’t only our senior leaders, but all levels of defence. Presumably there are senior leaders in the ADF who would welcome the ability to speak more candidly about the challenges. If this is true, maybe it’s time for the government to allow this. Absent from this conversation, the public’s education on defence is through the “gotcha” moments of Senate Estimates or the sensational headlines designed to gain clicks on the armed forces’ capability and workforce woes. In this environment, without engagement from Defence it will be difficult to convince the Australian public why defence matters, why they should be trusted with larger defence budgets and why they should send their children to join the Defence Force.

29 January 2024 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Strategist 29 January 2024 Image: Department of Defence. The Government, and many others, have described the grim parallels between Australia’s present strategic circumstances and those leading up to World War II. As a maritime nation we must ask urgently how we find ourselves in a position where one of our 11 major surface combatants has effectively been removed from service due to workforce pressures. That’s exacerbated by suggestions that another two aging Anzac class frigates will be laid up because we don’t have crew for them. If it happens, 27% of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatant fleet will be mothballed. Much has been made of the challenges facing the Australian Defence Force, and the RAN in particular, in recruitment and retention, but the focus must be on a structure that can rapidly support a Navy capable of responding to the increased risk of conflict in our region. Navy’s workforce issues are well known and are not a new constraint on its operations. The 2023 defence strategic review (DSR) acknowledged that the Navy faced the biggest workforce challenges of the three services. Government and Navy have spoken extensively on recruitment and retention. Since the DSR, a new ADF 3-star position has been established to centralise the response to workforce issues and bonuses aplenty have been announced to address retention rates. Conversations around RAN workforce issues immediately focus on recruitment and retention. Whilst this is an issue for an RAN with a commitment to grow, it is not the main issue—in some circumstances it’s a distraction from structural changes that are required. With wars in Europe and the Middle East, we cannot spend time wishing for the navy we would like to have. We must immediately structure the navy we have for the high-end conflict it may soon face. In doing that, dividends may well be achieved in recruitment and retention as a greater sense of purpose is achieved in naval personnel as mariners and war fighters. It’s by no means a solid metric but, anecdotally, USS Carney’s engagements in the Red Sea were followed rapidly by 15 re-enlistments on the vessel after its capable team intercepted a barrage of missiles. Bonuses alone don’t fix retention but a sense of purpose goes a long way. The 2020 defence strategic update (DSU) clearly articulated that the Department of Defence could no longer rely on the concept of 10 years strategic warning time of a major conflict in our region. This assessment drove the force structure plan (FSP) that sought to reshape ADF capability. The FSP was followed by the 2022 announcement of a target increasing the Defence workforce (the uniformed services and the public service) by 30% by 2040. The intention is to increase the permanent Navy to 20,000 by 2040. The problem with the Defence workforce growth announcement is that it was just about growth. The message that we may not have 10 years warning time of a possible major conflict did not prompt a fundamental rethink of the Navy’s personnel structure or the tasks it’s required to deliver. The workforce will need to grow to support the transition to larger crews for nuclear-powered submarines with a 130% increase in crewing requirements between the Collins’ class and Virginia class boats—and any further growth in surface combatant force crewing numbers. But the issues tying up the Anzacs are not, as they appear, fundamentally about navy numbers. So, what are these numbers? Detail is often scant on the RAN workforce, but the 2022-23 Defence Annual Report is instructive. At the end of the last financial year the RAN consisted of 14,958 permanent and 4, 607 reserve personnel. The permanent navy had contracted by 213 in 12 months and 543 in 24 months. However, it has grown by 752 since the 2019-2020 annual report and the current retraction may well be a response to the higher than usual growth during the Covid period as separation rates dropped to an abnormal 6.5% at 30 June 2020, and 7.4% at 30 June 2021. Not only has the RAN grown from its pre-pandemic numbers, but this is also part of a wider growth story over the last 20 years following the catastrophic cuts in the 1990s. In 2012-13 the permanent navy had 13,760 personnel, and in 2003 it was 12,847. The RAN has grown 16% over 20 years. Organisationally, it’s generally thought that 10% is a healthy separation rate. The last annual report gave the navy’s rolling separation rate as 9.2%, slightly down from the 9.7% in the previous report but substantially lower than the just under 12% rate in 2003. It was close to the five-year average of 9.1% until the impact of Covid in 2019-2020. Unfortunately, recruitment details are no longer made available in the annual report but it can be taken on face value, given the RAN’s contraction in the last two years, that recruitment is lower than it would like. This isn’t to say that recruitment and retention isn’t an issue for an organisation that needs to grow, it is. But it’s not why the Navy cannot presently crew its ships. Information on separation rates in critical seagoing categories is not readily accessible to the public, so this may be part of the challenge. Given that the RAN is growing when five, 10 and 20 year trends are considered but likely not at the rate it needs too, it must urgently prioritise structural reform. Assessing how to reform a navy structured around peacetime needs for the increasing risk of conflict in the region is difficult and complex. But there are areas it could quickly consider. Specific elements of structural reform requiring urgent consideration include examining the tasks assigned to the Navy and how at sea logistics and constabulary roles may be adequately resourced. This requires bold changes and bold decision-making as I wrote in my 2023 ASPI report An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the RAN. It’s time to consider the allocation of at sea logistics to a fleet auxiliary, designing and crewing auxiliary vessels to execute these roles with fewer crew. It’s important to consider the Navy’s ability to execute all that is expected of it in a conflict. Passing constabulary roles to a coast guard would provide an important element of layered Defence, but would also free up the RAN for war fighting. The DSR highlighted the need to review the structure of the ADF reserves and recommendations are due in 2025. Given our strategic circumstances, that’s unacceptably late. Immediate consideration needs to be given to recruiting personnel directly into the naval reserves, and to requiring reservists to keep their skills current. The 2022-23 Defence Annual Report stated that the Navy had 4,607 permanent reserves. Mobilised reserves in the event of crisis or conflict allows the government to surge our maritime fighting capability. But short of crisis or conflict, using reserves in peacetime would bolster the RAN by allowing the permanent structure to focus on supporting and delivering a seagoing capability. Presently, unlike army reservists, civilians cannot join the naval reserves unless they are in a specialised capacities such as doctors, legal officers, media officers, psychologists etc. The current restrictions on joining the RAN reserves limit a whole spectrum of society which could support Australia’s maritime defence. The RAN needs to adopt a cultural approach of treating its personnel as mariners and war fighters first. In an organisation struggling to crew its small number of major surface combatants there needs to be a reckoning on what roles within the RAN and ADF the Navy must focus its efforts on, and what can be supported by other means. The United States Navy Chief of Navy Operations (CNO) recently released her priorities as focusing on ‘warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation that supports them’. The RAN needs to follow suit, shedding its structure, where possible, of non-seagoing categories and outsourcing certain roles to other services or the public service. Getting our ships to sea must be the priority. This is a brief precis of some of the structural changes the Navy must reckon with to be fit to fight in an era of geopolitical tension. The situation is much more complicated than this space will allow, but the RAN must move past workforce discussions focused only on recruitment and retention. Yes recruitment is an issue, retention overall is healthy. The Navy must restructure to support a focus on its seagoing units, but also consider the tasks it undertakes and question whether these may be better undertaken by a fleet auxiliary or coast guard. Time is no longer on our side, and in an era of global tensions it is not acceptable for a navy of nearly 15,000 personnel to be tying up ships.

January 16, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published in the Australian 16 January 2023 Image: A RAF Typhoon aircraft returns to berth at RAF Akrortiri following a strike mission on Yemen's Houthi rebels. Getty Images. Foreign Minister Penny Wong is visiting the Middle East this week. Presumably by accident, rather than by design, Wong’s visit coincides with the one-month anniversary of the establishment of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and comes days after Australia supported the US and British-led strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. While finding a solution to ending the conflict in Gaza must be the immediate priority for Middle East security, avoiding further flashpoints in the Middle East must also be on Wong’s agenda. The consistent and reckless Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping since November is one of these flashpoints. Two months ago, the Houthi militia began an unrestricted campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Despite the Houthis’ desire to link this campaign against seafarers to the conflict in Gaza, they have targeted ships linked to more than 50 countries, continuing to target seafarers from across the globe, despite international condemnation. The Red Sea is of course a vital economic trade route, but what is happening in the Red Sea, and the international response, also sends an important message to those who may wish to threaten maritime security and freedom of navigation across the globe, including in the South China Sea. And they will be watching, not only how a minor player in maritime affairs such as the Houthis can have such a dramatic impact on global trade, but also what capabilities the US and its allies and partners respond with. This includes Australia’s subdued response. Personnel and joint statements are important but, in the end, they cannot defend merchant ships or protect seafarers. The US establishment of the allied coalition’s Operation Prosperity Guardian in December in response to Houthi attempts to blockade the Red Sea was an important development, a defensive operation aimed at protecting merchant shipping transiting this critical waterway. The original operation press release flagged 10 participants, which now reportedly has grown to more than 20. Most recently, Singapore has agreed to support the operation with personnel. A key challenge of Operation Prosperity Guardian is the lack of assets to protect shipping, with most participants agreeing only to send personnel support. Notable exceptions to this are Greece and Denmark, which have committed to sending ships, although the timeframe for this is unclear. Sri Lanka also has recently agreed to support the operation and committed to sending a ship to the region, and although what that ship will do and where it will operate given Sri Lankan Navy capabilities is unclear, the sentiment is important. Australia declined to send a ship to support the operation, choosing to support the headquarters with additional personnel instead. Australia was a founding member of the Combined Maritime Forces in 2001. It was also one of the few countries that joined the call to establish the International Maritime Security Construct in response to Iranian attacks on and seizures of merchant shipping during the 2019-20 Gulf crisis, sending HMAS Toowoomba to protect merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in 2020. Given this history, Australia’s decision not to send a ship is sending a message. Defence of shipping and convoy operations are ship-intensive operations; all the goodwill in the world will not protect a merchant ship from an incoming missile. Australia must be careful to avoid the perception that its lack of commitment of a ship to this operation is not interpreted as a lack of capability. That’s a dangerous perception given obvious regional tensions continuing to manifest in the maritime domain, most notably the recent unsafe and unprofessional actions of a People’s Liberation Army naval destroyer towards HMAS Toowoomba in November, resulting in injuries to Australian sailors. With a paucity of ships and a ratcheting up of attacks by the Houthis, the mission in the Red Sea to protect merchant shipping could remain defensive for only so long. Defending one of the world’s busiest waterways was always going to be unsustainable without a transition to offensive action. Following a UN Security Council resolution condemning Houthi actions in the Red Sea, and noting the right of states to defend their vessels from attacks, the US and Britain undertook strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. The US was at pains to highlight that these strikes were not part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, likely because not all members of that operation were supportive of offensive action. While Australia clearly was, the exact nature of the support Australia provided could only have been limited. One month on from its establishment, the future of Operation Prosperity Guardian is unclear. The lack of assets to protect shipping and challenges in destroying the Houthis’ capability, despite US and British resolve, make it difficult to assess when shipping through the Red Sea will return to normal levels. What is clear is that the maritime domain, and freedom of navigation within the maritime domain, will continue to be increasingly contested. Demonstrating not only the resolve but also the capability to respond to those who may wish to threaten these principles will be crucial to protecting Australia’s strategic interests.

January 12, 2023 | Jennifer Parker *originally published as a Twitter thread here Image: Jennifer Parker and other Australian Defence Force personnel in Bahrain 2022. Authors image. What did Australia’s support to US and UK strikes against Houthi targets consist of? The Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles has said it consisted of personnel support to the operational headquarters. Australia’s history of operations in the Middle East gives some insights. The Royal Australian Navy has played a key role in maritime operations in the Middle East since almost continuously since 1990 when HMAS Adelaide II deployed to the Middle East Region under Operation Damask. Since its inception in 2001, Australia has supported the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain as a founding member. Australia supported the CMF with an almost continuous rotation of Ships since its inception until 2020 when HMAS Toowoomba completed the last RAN ship rotation in the Middle East Area of Operation under Operation MANITOU. Australia’s commitment to the CMF has also seen Australia command CMF Task Forces 9 times, the last of which was command of the Coalition Task Force 150, in which Australia executed counter-smuggling operations in the maritime domain. Australia has also had a longstanding footprint in the CMF Headquarters based in Bahrain, filling the planning, operations, communications, analysis and administration positions. In 2020 following the completion of HMAS Toowoomba’s deployment to the Middle East Area of Operations, Australia reduced its maritime element in Bahrain to 3-5, but retained the position of CMF Director of Operations which it has held for over 20 years. Following the request to support Operation Prosperity Guardian, under CMF CTF 153, Australia once again increased its footprint in Bahrain, now reported to be 11 personnel. Although it has not been publicly released what roles these additional personnel, Australia’s previous support to International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) gives some insight. During the 2019/2020 Gulf Crisis Australia joined IMSC to protect international shipping from Iranian harassment and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In addition to the support of HMAS Toowoomba, Australia’s support consisted of the Director Plans, the Deputy Director plans, air planners, communications planners and crucially maritime trade operators’ expertise. It is likely the additional Australian staff support consisted of these skill sets. Whilst the US has been clear to highlight strikes against Houthi targets were not carried out under CMF, Australian staff in CMF have always had a dual role, supporting not only CMF but also serving as Australia’s liaison to 5th Fleet / US Naval Force Central Command supporting operations as directed by the ADF Joint Headquarters (HQJOC). A role they may have played during the US / UK strikes on Houthi targets on 11 January 2024.

December 18 | Jennifer Parker *Originally published in The Australian 18 December 2023 Image: Jennifer Parker, Combined Maritime Forces December 2022. Department of Defence Images. Over the past month, the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen has recommenced its attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea. Attacks and attempted attacks included the seizure of a British-owned, Japanese-operated merchant ship, reportedly linked to an Israeli businessman, and the militia says it will continue to attack merchant shipping transiting to Israel. That is a significant threat to global commerce given that more than 12 per cent of global trade transits through the Red Sea, as does more than 40 per cent of Europe’s trade with Asia. Australia has been asked to join a US-led maritime coalition to protect traffic through the Red Sea. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, Australia has very strong reasons to do so. The extent of Australia’s reliance on the international shipping network is often quickly set aside in discussions of what is, or is not, in the nation’s strategic interests. That has left us with an under-resourced Royal Australian Navy. That issue must be embraced if Australia wants to be able to protect itself in an increasingly contested world. The Red Sea attacks put at risk all shipping transiting through this area, not just those heading to Israel. Most recently, the Houthi militia has used uncrewed aerial vehicles and anti-ship cruise missiles against its targets. The Houthis have previously used less discriminate weapons, including floating mines, which generate a risk to all shipping in the area. The waters of the Red Sea are patrolled by ships from numerous countries, including those operating under the Combined Maritime Forces and the International Maritime Security Construct, multinational naval coalitions. Australia was a founding member of both. The Combined Maritime Forces is a 39-nation coalition formed in 2002 to combat non-state threats such as terrorism, and smuggling. The International Maritime Security Construct was established in 2019 in response to Iranian attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, and focuses on state-based maritime security threats in the Middle East. This week’s call from the US for Australia to provide a warship to help protect international merchant shipping in the Red Sea, again raised the question of why would we deploy a warship outside our region? Over decades, Australia has undertaken many military deployments in the Middle East. Each decision was made for its own strategic reasons. From the early 1990s until late 2020 Australia almost continuously deployed warships to the Middle East area of operations. They operated across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. These deployments were driven by strategic reasons that included supporting the alliance and generating skills and exposure for RAN personnel in a complex maritime environment. However, the predominant reason is that Middle East maritime security matters a great deal to Australian national security. Ensuring unencumbered shipping through the Middle East and across the Indian Ocean is one of Australia’s key maritime strategic interests. Much of Australia’s unrefined fuel comes from the Middle East, transits across the Indian Ocean into Southeast Asia, is refined and is carried to Australia. The fact that 91 per cent of Australia’s fuel is imported amounts to a significant maritime vulnerability. The European Union is Australia’s third-largest trading partner, behind China and Japan; given 98 per cent of Australia’s trade is by sea, much of this trade with the EU transits through the Red Sea. With the possibility of a regional conflict continuing to increase as a result of China’s aggressive posture towards nations in Southeast and Northeast Asia, calls for the government and the ADF to focus on our immediate region seem sound if taken at face value. But they underplay the importance of any interruption to maritime trade, and the lengthy sea lines of communication that service that trade, on Australia’s security and prosperity. To secure that trade, Australian warships will need to deploy to critical choke-points great distances away. A lack of understanding and acceptance of this reality, and the consequent need for a strong navy with very effective capabilities has contributed to a critical vulnerability to Australia. Australia should again send a warship to protect international shipping in the Red Sea, not because of any romantic obligations to the US alliance or to the international rules-based order – both of which are important – but to protect our maritime strategic interests. No longer can we afford to be blind to our dependence on the maritime domain and what that means for Australia’s security. We cannot draw a neat regional bubble around Australia and say that this is where we will operate our ships, blind to our dependence on those long sea lines of communication. The threat to international shipping in the Red Sea should serve as a wake-up call that Australia needs a clear maritime strategy, with articulated maritime strategic interests and a Royal Australian Navy with enough ships to defend them.