*This talk was delivered by Jennifer Parker at an event at the United States Studies Centre on 16 September 2024
Image credit: CSIS Project workshop on nuclear issues at USSC, Sydney 16 September 2024
Introduction
I’d like to acknowledge to the traditional owners of the land we gather on today. Also, thanks to CSIS and the United States Studies Centre for convening this panel, and welcome to my fellow panellists – it’s a pleasure to be joined by such esteemed colleagues.
We’ve been asked to think about three key areas in our discussion today:
Have perceptions and priorities towards disarmament, U.S. extended deterrence, and the U.S.-Australia Alliance’s nuclear mission changed, given evolving security challenges?
How can these priorities be advanced within the frameworks of ANZUS and AUKUS?
How have Australian public, parliamentarians, and NGOs influenced the nuclear debate?
I’ll touch briefly on each to set the scene, confident that my fellow panellists and our discussion throughout the day will explore these further.
Evolving Perceptions and Priorities
Australia’s historical stance on nuclear weapons has been largely driven by an active commitment to disarmament, while simultaneously relying on U.S. extended deterrence for its security. Key moments in this history include:
1950s and 60s: Australia’s latent capability was briefly explored in support of UK nuclear testing at sites like Maralinga, and for a short time, Australia considered developing its own nuclear weapons. Although how serious this exploration was is debated. This capability faded with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ratification in 1973.
1984: One of the most significant moments in Australia’s nuclear disarmament movement, when 250,000 Australians marched for nuclear disarmament across major cities like Sydney, Perth, and Canberra—representing 1.5% of the population at the time. The Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) was even founded, winning 7.23% of the vote in that year’s election.
Although the NDP experienced internal struggles and eventual dissolution, the 1980s and 1990s were marked by significant grassroots support for disarmament. For instance, in 1995, anti-French sentiment surged over nuclear testing in the Pacific, with Australia leading the regional charge against these tests. Both countries recalled their ambassadors in a diplomatic spat, while union members refused to refuel Air France planes in Sydney.
Despite this strong anti-nuclear stance, perceptions have gradually evolved, particularly as regional security dynamics change. A pivotal turning point came with the AUKUS agreement in 2021, which announced Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Notably, these submarines do not involve nuclear weapons, but their announcement indicated a significant shift in Australian willingness to engage with nuclear propulsion technology.
Since the AUKUS announcement, support for nuclear-powered submarines remains high, with Lowy polling indicating that 65% of Australians in favour of the technology, slightly down from 70% in 2022, but still indicative of broad public backing.
Nuclear energy seems sets to be an important election topic at the next Australian election. According to the 2024 Lowy Institute poll, 61% of Australians expressed support for nuclear energy, marking a stark contrast from 2011, when 62% opposed it.
This demonstrated how Australian thinking on nuclear issues can change.
When it comes to nuclear weapons, however, public opinion remains more hesitant. The Lowy poll shows that while support for Australia acquiring nuclear weapons has risen from 16% in 2011 to 35% in 2022, it remains a minority view. The overall trajectory indicates growing acceptance of nuclear-powered technology for defensive purposes, but widespread support for acquiring nuclear weapons is unlikely in the near future.
Whilst polling on the issue of extended deterrence is not readily available, nearly 20 years of polling on the US alliance suggests that Australians view the alliance as important to Australia’s security.
Extended Deterrence and ANZUS
Extended deterrence has been a cornerstone of Australia’s security strategy, though its application has been nuanced. Unlike U.S. alliances with Japan or South Korea, extended nuclear deterrence is not explicitly mentioned in the ANZUS Treaty. Instead, Australia’s role has primarily been through the Joint Facilities, such as Pine Gap and the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station, which contribute to U.S. nuclear early warning systems.
In practice, successive Australian governments have been cautious about discussing how they contribute to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in operational terms. As Kim Beazley once noted, these facilities give Australia significant influence over nuclear issues, but they also represent the only operational-level commitment Australia has made to U.S. nuclear deterrence.
Despite this, the Strategic Policy Dialogue (SPD), initiated in 2019, aimed to address growing regional threats through deeper collaboration on deterrence and arms control. Yet, Australia remains the only major U.S. ally without a formal extended deterrence consultation process. In this regard, Australia lags behind other allies in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan and South Korea.
Publicly, Australia’s contribution to extended deterrence has revolved around the ‘sole purpose’ approach, formalised in the 1993 Strategic Review and reaffirmed in the 1994 Defence White Paper. According to this doctrine, Australia would only seek U.S. nuclear protection in the event of a nuclear threat to its territory. However, U.S. administrations have never explicitly endorsed this stance, leaving Australia in a unique position among U.S. allies.
The evolving security environment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, is challenging this traditional position. The rising nuclear threat from North Korea, which now has the capability to reach Australian territory with intercontinental nuclear missiles, as well as China’s growing nuclear arsenal and Russia’s aggressive posture, are prompting a re-evaluation of Australia’s role in nuclear deterrence.
As many in the think tank community have argued, including in a January 2024 paper in the Australian Journal of International Affairs by Peter Dean, Stephan Fruehling and Andrew O’Neil argue, bolstering Australia’s contribution to extended nuclear deterrence is crucial to ensuring the robustness of U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific.
This could involve hosting more U.S. military assets, including B-52 nuclear-capable bombers, which are already operating from northern Australia. While there have been some calls on the fringes for tactical nuclear weapons to be rotated through Australia, Prime Minister Albanese’s position makes this highly unlikely. Instead, we are more likely to see greater dialogue and Australian involvement in planning and consultation processes regarding U.S. nuclear strategy.
Following Australia’s abstention on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the U.S. Embassy in Canberra reportedly stated that “the treaty would not allow for U.S. extended deterrence relationships, which are still necessary for international peace and security.” This reflects the complex balancing act Australia faces as it seeks to maintain its anti-nuclear stance while strengthening its strategic reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence.
As outlined in the 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy, “Australia’s best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.” While the National Defence Strategy only makes a single reference to this, it highlights the government's reliance on U.S. nuclear capabilities to deter emerging nuclear threats.
Public, Parliamentary, and NGO Engagement
The Australian public’s relationship with nuclear issues has historically been one of anti-nuclear sentiment, rooted in the disarmament movements of the 1980s and 1990s. However, as security threats grow, perceptions are beginning to shift, particularly regarding nuclear energy and propulsion technologies.
Within Parliament, there have been notable debates on nuclear policy. For example, in 2011, the Labor Party nearly split over the question of selling uranium to India, with Anthony Albanese leading the opposition, citing concerns over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Albanese’s stance on nuclear issues continues to influence his government’s policy today, as seen in the 2022 decision to abstain from the TPNW rather than oppose it outright.
In civil society, NGOs and advocacy groups have played an important role in shaping the nuclear debate. Organisations like the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) continue to call for regional arms control frameworks and confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Their 2023 letter urged the Australian government to promote disarmament initiatives and engage more actively in nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy.
Despite these ongoing efforts, public opinion remains split on the issue of nuclear deterrence. While support for nuclear energy is increasing, the question of nuclear weapons remains more divisive, with many Australians still wary of moving closer to nuclear capabilities, even in the context of deterrence.
Extended deterrence gets a cursory mention in the public version of the 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy: ‘National Defence Strategy ‘Australia’s best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.’
Conclusion
In conclusion, Australia’s historical commitment to nuclear disarmament remains a core value, but strategic realities—particularly the growing nuclear threats from North Korea, China, and Russia—are shifting the conversation. As the AUKUS partnership deepens, and the ANZUS alliance evolves, Australia must navigate the delicate balance between maintaining its anti-nuclear stance and enhancing its role in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.
While tactical nuclear weapons on Australian soil are unlikely under current leadership, there is a growing recognition that greater dialogue and involvement in U.S. nuclear planning will be crucial to safeguarding regional security. The challenge for Australia will be finding a path that strengthens its Defence capabilities while staying true to its non-proliferation commitments.
Thank you.
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