30 November 2024 | Jennifer Parker
While the relationship must progress, glossing over the facts and real risks is dangerous – Canberra and Beijing are far from ready for closer defence ties.
Image: Image: Anthony Albanese/X.
On the tenth anniversary of the Australia-China comprehensive strategic partnership this week, Chinese ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian praised recent improvements in bilateral ties, declaring the relationship “back on track”, and advocating for closer defence co-operation.
This call to restore defence ties is unrealistic at best. At worst, it ignores the realities of the relationship.
While China has lifted most of its coercive tariffs on Australian industries, its regional aggression and support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine preclude a renewed defence partnership.
The relationship must progress, but glossing over the facts and real risks is dangerous. Australia and China are far from ready for a closer defence relationship. Such relationships require strategic trust and China’s actions erode rather than build it.
Globally, China continues to enable Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine through its no-limits partnership – trade between China and Russia is at an all-time high. Regionally, China continues to destabilise the South China Sea through aggressive tactics, including ramming and water-cannoning the Philippine Coast Guard and government vessels.
China is crucial to Australia. It is both our largest trading partner and a regional great power. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Australian strategists embraced the idea of China’s peaceful rise and dedicated significant effort to building strategic trust and strengthening ties, including in defence.
While the defence relationship was never comprehensive, it grew through collaboration in humanitarian disaster relief exercises, low-level land-based activities and increased naval ship visits. This activity culminated in China’s participation in Exercise Kakadu, Australia’s premier multilateral maritime exercise in 2017. This increased interaction was underpinned by senior-level defence dialogues.
Shifting strategic environment
In the early 2000s, Australia was optimistic about the future of its relationship with China, This optimism led Australia to overlook China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea and the subsequent militarisation of these islands with airstrips, radars, and missile sites from 2013 to 2018.
All of this occurred despite President Xi Jinping’s assurances that China would not militarise the South China Sea, through which two-thirds of Australia’s maritime trade transits.
For some time, Australia was reluctant to acknowledge the shifting strategic environment and avoided publicly addressing China’s actions even as Australian ships, along with those of our partners and allies, faced growing harassment. Australia also endured foreign interference and suspected cyberattacks from China.
Ultimately, Australia was compelled to confront China’s regional aggression, which directly impacted its national interests and undermined institutions it has long championed, including international maritime law.
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update identified China’s regional actions as a dramatic shift in the threat environment. It eliminated strategic warning time from defence planning, acknowledging that Australia could no longer assume it would have at least a decade to reorder our defence posture. This implicitly – although not explicitly – acknowledged the risk of miscalculation or conflict driven by China’s aggression.
After years of deterioration Australia publicly revealed China’s harassment of Australian Defence Force assets in 2022. In February of that year, a Chinese fighter jet deployed chaff in front of the engines of an Australian patrol aircraft in international airspace over the South China Sea. In May 2022, a Chinese destroyer in the Arafura Sea, within Australia’s exclusive economic zone, endangered ADF personnel by shining a military-grade laser into the cockpit of an Australian P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. These actions continued to erode strategic trust – and risk ADF lives.
Relations thaw
After winning the 2022 federal election, the Labor government prioritised re-engagement, recognising the relationship’s importance and the need to prevent further deterioration. This was a vital step – Australia must maintain a functional relationship with China where it can. However, we cannot ignore actions that threaten our national interests.
After relations thawed in late 2022, Australia and China resumed defence ties with the Senior Leader Defence Co-operation Dialogue in March last year.
In November, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited China, the first Australian leader to do so since 2016. In his meeting with Xi, the two reaffirmed their commitment to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and stressed the importance of stability in their bilateral relationship. Yet within a month, a Chinese destroyer aggressively confronted an Australian frigate in international waters, violating international law and injuring Australian sailors.
This behaviour is not an anomaly. In May this year, a Chinese fighter again endangered Australian sailors by deploying flares in front of HMAS Hobart’s helicopter while it was undertaking United Nations sanctions enforcement against North Korea in international airspace, later blaming Australia for the incident.
Chinese officials often frame challenges in the China-Australia relationship as driven by third parties, particularly the United States. However, China’s use of force to uphold its debunked nine-dash line claims against coastal states like the Philippines directly impacts Australia’s national interests.
In many ways, closer Australian defence ties with China would be seen to endorse these behaviours – something Australia cannot afford to do. Closer to home – China’s actions towards Australia must be addressed and amended for closer defence ties – an outcome not yet apparent.
While increased communication and the resumption of talks through the Defence Co-operation Dialogue are valuable, a mature relationship requires China to change its behaviour – until then, the notion of a “back on track” defence relationship ignores the serious strategic challenges posed by China’s actions.
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