Jennifer Parker | 9 August 2024
2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announceables. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results.
Image: The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, joined their counterparts US Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken and US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III ahead of the 34th AUSMIN Photo Credit: Defence Images
The unremarkable communique issued following the 34th Australia-US Ministerial consultations (AUSMIN) could be interpreted as a stagnation in the relationship.
In many ways it highlights the strength of the relationship and an increased alignment in strategic thinking. However, the pressure will now be on at 2025 AUSMIN for the watershed of announcements in recent years to start delivering.
2024 AUSMIN moved away from defence announcements, towards updates on ongoing commitments. But progress on many of the key initiatives is yet to deliver tangible operational results.
Successes include the rotation of US bombers and other aircraft through Australia, which is slated to increase. Increases in the US marine rotational force capability and integration with the Australian Army are also a success.
What is lacking is progress on upgrades to northern bases and Australia’s Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO).
The downplaying of AUKUS in the communique could be interpreted as an attempt to take the heat of the AUKUS debate in Australia, which has reached a fervour pitch, at times devoid of facts.
But more broadly, it represents a comfort level between the four principles of AUKUS pillar one.
But the pressure will ramp up in coming years to deliver the infrastructure groundwork in preparation for phase one – the rotation of US and UK submarines through Western Australia.
The detailed comments on China, the Middle East and Russia make clear the level of strategic alignment.
But the priority should be completion of Australia’s upgrade of its northern air-base infrastructure, which the US clearly sees as central to its ability to project force from Australia in the event of a crisis of conflict.
The rotation of US aircraft through Australia’s northern air bases is another success story. But as the communique highlights, progress is still ongoing to upgrade RAAF bases Darwin and Tindal, with site surveys being undertaken of several of the remaining northern air bases.
The issue here is that upgrades to the northern air bases were a key feature of the 2012 Defence Force Posture Review and the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP).
While enhancing infrastructure in the north is complicated by workforce and resources, the lack of progress in 10 years clearly shows a lack of investment and prioritisation.
Australia’s fledgling GWEO Enterprise gets more of a focus in the 2024 communique and was clearly a major discussion point.
Another feature of the 2020 FSP, this is critical to sustaining the fight in the event of a conflict and likely crucial to the US’ clear plans to project from Australia in the event of a crisis or a conflict.
The challenge here too is insufficient progress, partially as this requires US support. Australia after all operates predominantly US weapons.
AUSMIN 2023 indicated the US was focused on providing this support, and AUSMIN 2024 takes the conversation further.
There is a commitment to streamlining co-operation on missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle technologies, shadowing agreements on the production of the army precision strike missile in Australia, and a re-statement on their focus on co-production of the army’s guided multiple-launch rocket systems in Australia by 2025.
But even this is symbolic. To make sure Australia’s GWEO Enterprise achieves its strategic objectives, it will need to expand to producing more complex and readily used missiles such as the anti-ship and anti-air missiles used by the navy.
As the Red Sea has taught the countries who chose to send ships, these expensive missiles are depleted quickly in a modern conflict.
AUSMIN 2024 represents more than a decade of hard work to rapidly enhance the defence relationship between the US and Australia.
In many ways, 2024 represents a high point in alliance achievements. But this should not give rise to a false sense that the outcomes are where they need to be.
For AUSMIN 2025, announcements need to transition into more accelerated outcomes for the alliance to be prepared to deal with the rapidly evolving strategic circumstances.
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