23 February 2025 | Jennifer Parker
Summary points:
Chinese Task Group 107’s deployment to the Tasman Sea is a deliberate show of operational capability in the region, and Australia should head the message.
Live firing exercises on the high seas are standard training practices permitted under international law. Australia does this on our deployments, and we should avoid over-reacting. It’s not aggressive, it’s just what warships do on the high seas.
There is no legal obligation for foreign warships to notify coastal nations over 300 nautical miles away about live firing activities on the high seas.
Best practices require maintaining safe distances from civilian flight paths, implementing defined safety traces, and issuing proper communications.
While China’s manoeuvre underscores its blue-water capabilities, Australia should focus on addressing its naval capability gaps rather than overreacting to this event. An over-reaction hands China an unnecessary propaganda win next time Australia conducts live firings on the high seas while deployed, and may constrain our own training opportunities in the future.
Over the weekend, media coverage was dominated by reports of Chinese Task Group 107 stationed roughly 640 kilometres (348 nautical miles) off Australia’s coast. China’s rare deployment to our region—without stopping in Australia or New Zealand and far removed from major maritime routes—appears to be a deliberate display of its capability to deploy and sustain operations here. While concerns about China’s expanding naval might, especially in the South China Sea and East Asia, are valid, Australia should keep this ‘live firing activity’ in perspective. Here’s why.
Incident Overview
On Thursday 13 February, the Australian government announced that a Chinese naval task group—comprising a Jiangkai II frigate, a Renhai cruiser, and a tanker—was operating in the Coral Sea, with one of the vessels having transited the Torres Strait. Officials were quick to emphasize that the group was acting in accordance with international law. On 20 February, the Financial Times reported the task group had turned south and was roughly 150 nautical miles (approximately 278 kilometres) from Sydney, roughly the distance from Canberra to Sydney.
By Friday 21 February, it was about 640 kilometres (approx. 345 nautical miles) off Eden (roughly the distance from Canberra to Melbourne), issuing radio warnings of an imminent live-fire exercise and reportedly adopting a ‘firing formation’—likely formation one, in which ships align in a straight column to deploy a target.
The media reported that flights had to be diverted and the Australian government initially expressed that they had not received the required warning.
Maritime Law and Sovereign Rights
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994, coastal states may claim various maritime zones. Two zones are relevant here: the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Generally, a state’s territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles (approx. 22km) from its coastline, though overlaps can occur with other countries reducing this. Coastal states have the ability to regulate activities in territorial sea. Foreign ships, including warships have the right to transit through the territorial sea under the ‘innocent passage’ regime, foreign ships may transit this zone without prior permission, as long as they do nothing to threaten the security of the coastal state and their passage is continuous and expeditious. In practical terms, warships retain the right of innocent passage but may not conduct live-fire exercises, or similar activities without the coastal state’s explicit approval.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is the second maritime area of interest and has featured prominently in recent media coverage. Generally, the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles (Approx. 370 kilometres) from a state’s coast, unless it overlaps with another country’s zone. Within its EEZ, coastal states, including Australia exercise certain sovereign rights—particularly for resource management—but they do not enjoy full sovereignty. Crucially, foreign warships may operate within Australia’s EEZ so long as they do not interfere with its resource-related activities or infrastructure. Importantly, warships may conduct exercises, including gunnery drills, within the EEZ—a right Australia itself exercises.
Beyond the EEZ (beyond 200 nautical miles) lie the high seas, where only limited restrictions on warships apply—most of which are not relevant here. Essentially, warships may conduct exercises, including gunnery drills, as long as they do not interfere with others’ lawful use of the sea or airspace.
The Routine of Live-Firing Exercises
The key point is that these live firing gunnery drills happen routinely. Australian ships, for example, perform live firing during deployments commonly to train crews and maintain proficiency with their gunnery systems.
For the Chinese task group, these guns range from medium-range guns—like the 130 mm (5-inch) gun on China’s Renhai cruiser or the 76 mm gun on the Jiangkai II—to close-in weapon systems, 12.7 mm guns, and small arms.
Importantly, warships have the right to undertake these routine drills on the high seas.
Best Practices for Gunnery Drills
Safety Protocols and Monitoring
Procedures vary by country, but from my experience conducting medium-range gunnery exercises in two different navies, each commanding officer is responsible for safe execution. This typically involves both visual and radar monitoring of a defined ‘safety trace,’ whose range and altitude depend on the weapon system and the Navy in question's safety rules. For a 130 mm (5 inch) gun like the Renhai’s, for instance, the weapon’s maximum range of about 23 km (12.5 nautical miles) might be extended by a 2,000-yard safety buffer, plus a 4,000-yard corridor on either side, up to around 37,000 feet to generate a safety trace. The height of the safety trace will be dependant on the weapon and the range of the target they are firing at. These figures are merely illustrative; each navy applies its own safety rules.
Civilian airliners typically cruise at around 35,000 feet—a range that can overlap with a warship's safety trace. This underscores the importance of planning to ensure that vessels maintain a safe distance from established civilian flight routes.
Maintaining Distance from Civilian Flight Routes
When planning a gunnery exercise, best practice is for ships to conduct it away from known civilian flight paths. The exact distance varies by national regulations, but for a medium-calibre weapon, a 10-nautical-mile buffer was standard for medium range guns in my own gunnery days.
Although the details remain unclear, indications from flight diversions suggest that the Chinese warships may have been too close to civilian air transit routes. If this is the case, it represents poor practice that warrants diplomatic discussion.
Effective Communications and Notifications
Before commencing live firings, warships should transmit a secure message on the designated VHF channel for surface ships and the aviation guard circuit. The aviation guard circuit—set at 121.5 MHz for civilian use (International Air Distress or VHF Guard)—is reserved exclusively for distress communications and is actively monitored by air traffic control and related agencies. Ships will also fly Flag Bravo—a red-dovetail flag—to signal to nearby vessels and aircraft that live firing is in progress.
Prior to live firing, a warning should be broadcast to alert nearby aircraft, with periodic updates during the exercise. According to the Defence Minister, the Chinese warships did issue such notifications. The timing of these alerts depend on a Navy’s procedures, but issuing them a few hours in advance is generally prudent.
It should be noted that there is no requirement to notify a country 345 nautical miles away about such live firing. While Australian ships inform air services 48 hours in advance—who produce a Notice to Airmen NOTAM)—when exercising in domestic waters, no such mandate applies to foreign vessels operating on the high seas.
Conclusion: Focusing on Capabilities
Warships routinely conduct live firing exercises on the high seas to maintain training and operational readiness. The Chinese task group’s recent manoeuvres occurred well outside Australia’s EEZ—approximately 640 km (345 nautical miles) from the coast. While there is some evidence that these firings may have encroached on civilian flight routes, details remain unclear; if confirmed, interference with civilian air traffic would merit diplomatic discussion. Importantly, there is no requirement for foreign vessels on the high seas to notify a nation 345 nautical miles away of their activities.
Australia should indeed be concerned about China’s demonstrated capability to deploy and sustain a task group in the Tasman Sea. However, rather than overreacting to actions that align with international law and standard gunnery practices—thus providing additional propaganda fodder for Beijing—we must focus on what this blue-water capability means for our own maritime security. It is time to seriously invest in and address the evident capability gaps in our navy.
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