23 February 2025 | Jennifer Parker
Image: Defence Images From left - People’s Liberation Army-Navy Fuchi-class replenishment vessel Weishanhu, and Renhai-class cruiser Zunyi.
To safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances, and develop and resource a comprehensive maritime strategy.
China now fields the world’s largest navy, and this week’s rare foray into our exclusive economic zone should be a wake-up call for Australians. Our most critical economic and security interests travel by sea, and in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, we can’t afford complacency. It’s time for Australia to step up as a genuine maritime power.
Over the last decade, China has morphed from a modest coastal navy into a true blue-water force. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s battle force – submarines, surface combatants and aircraft carriers – stood at 255 vessels, according to the US Congressional Research Office. That figure has soared to 400 in 2025, with further growth on the horizon. The fleet’s quality has also jumped, with around 70 per cent of China’s current battle force built since 2010.
Australia’s navy fields just 16 battle-force vessels – its smallest and oldest in decades. That includes six submarines aged 22 years to 29 years, seven ANZAC-class frigates (19 years to 27 years old), and three much newer Hobart-class destroyers that lack the firepower of true destroyers. While the government plans to grow the fleet to levels not seen in decades by the 2030s and 2040s, the current shortfall is compounded by dwindling support capabilities – like replenishment, hydrography and mine warfare – after decades of underinvestment by successive governments.
Comparing ship counts alone may be crude, but it highlights China’s drive to become a true blue-water maritime power. Its rapid fleet expansion goes hand in hand with sweeping structural reforms, including the creation of a coast guard in 2013 – now the world’s largest maritime law enforcement outfit, boasting over 142 vessels.
Among them is the so-called “monster ship”, Coast Guard 5901 – nearly four times the size of Australia’s ANZAC-class frigates, which form the backbone of our surface combatant fleet.
The growth and modernisation of China’s navy has gone hand-in-hand with an increasingly expeditionary strategy. Chinese naval deployments to the Indian and Pacific oceans are on the rise, marked by the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 and increasingly common Pacific port visits, including stops in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea as well as hospital ship deployments to the South Pacific. Against this backdrop, Australia shouldn’t be shocked to see a Chinese navy task group off our east coast.
It’s rightly considered an uncommon occurrence, particularly since Australia’s east coast isn’t exactly on the way to anywhere – making it clear this was a deliberate show of capability. But we should expect it to become increasingly common.
Why should Australia care about China’s growing naval and maritime power? Because our core vulnerabilities lie at sea. Some 99 per cent of our trade travels by ship, and 99 per cent of our data travelling to the rest of the world passes through undersea cables. But it’s not just about data and trade – it’s the critical goods that keep our economy running and ensure our security, from fuel and ammunition to pharmaceuticals and fertiliser. Cut off those supplies, and we cripple our economy and security – no fuel means grounded F-35s and idle trucks nationwide.
In a crisis or conflict, an adversary wouldn’t need to invade our shores to bring Australia’s economy – and by extension, our defence – to its knees. All they’d have to do is cut off our critical seaborne supplies: fuel, fertiliser, ammunition, pharmaceuticals, and more. In a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, Australia must be able to defend its maritime domain.
Recognising this vulnerability means Australia must develop the capacity to protect critical seaborne supplies in a crisis. It demands focus, structural reform, speed and investment. The 2021 announcement of AUKUS (our nuclear-powered submarine pathway), the planned surface combatant fleet expansion, and the army’s move to adopt maritime strike are all crucial steps, but they aren’t enough – we must address the wider gaps in the fleet, and do it at speed.
We must recognise that maritime capability isn’t just hardware – it’s also structure and mindset. We need to reform our civil maritime security, establish a coastguard to free the Royal Australian Navy from border policing, and adjust our legislative architecture to build a genuinely capable maritime strategic fleet.
Australia shouldn’t – and can’t – hope to match China’s naval might. Our maritime strategy hinges on alliances and partnerships across the region, including deeper co-operation with partners like the United States, Japan, and India. Yet to safeguard our vital interests at sea, we must demonstrate self-reliance within our alliances – we must develop a comprehensive maritime strategy and resource it.
China’s naval demonstration on Australia’s east coast should serve a reminder of our vulnerability, and a warning that addressing this vulnerability requires Australia to truly recognise its place as a maritime power – our future prosperity and security depend on it.
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