25 November 2024 | Jennifer Parker
Image: HMAS Larrakia in Darwin Harbour: Leo Baumgartner/Department of Defence.
The maritime domain is increasingly contested. From attacks on shipping and undersea cables in Europe to grey zone threats in the South China Sea, risks to maritime security are mounting. China’s use of maritime militias and reports last week of a China-flagged tanker breaking subsea cables highlight the blurred lines between civil and military threats.
With the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world, Australia must ask itself the question: is our maritime security architecture ready to deal with the increased threats? My new paper Time for a Coastguard with the Australian Naval Institute argues it is not and it’s time to consider setting up an Australian coastguard.
Australia differs from many of its Southeast Asian, Indian Ocean and Pacific neighbours in not having a coastguard. Several agencies execute Australia’s civil maritime functions. Notably, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority coordinates Australia’s maritime search and rescue functions, while the Maritime Border Command (MBC) coordinates and executes Australia’s civil maritime security operations.
MBC is a multi-agency taskforce under the Department of Home Affairs that relies on Australian Defence Force and Australian Border Force (ABF) assets in executing its role. Importantly, the MBC does not have its own assets or personnel; instead, its structure relies on support from the relevant maritime security agencies.
This is an important distinction, as the MBC is often referred to as ‘like a coastguard’ or a ‘de facto coastguard’. However, the similarities are limited: it is fundamentally a coordination body. Staffed primarily by personnel from the ADF and ABF, the MBC directs assets from those forces.
The Defence Strategic Review recommended that ‘Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.’ Relying on the ADF for maritime constabulary work is another example of resorting to it for civil functions.
The ABF maritime unit workforce is about 550 personnel, and it presently has 11 patrol vessels, one large-hull vessel and two fast-response boats. To assist in its maritime surveillance role, the ABF leases 10 Dash 8 aircraft and two helicopters. This is a small civil maritime footprint for a country with the third-largest exclusive economic zone in the world.
There have been reports of billion-dollar warships being used for constabulary functions. The MBC drawing on Royal Australian Air Force aircraft is just as inappropriate—for example, when $250 million P-8A Poseidon aircraft designed for anti-submarine warfare are needed for supplementing ABF aerial surveillance. Not only is this uneconomical, but it will not be feasible in the event of regional crisis or conflict. The National Defence Strategy is clear that the ADF must be focused on high-end warfighting.
Compounding the MBC’s over-reliance on the ADF is the structure and capabilities of the ABF’s maritime element, which has regularly struggled to meet government-directed targets for sea patrol days and aerial surveillance hours, among other issues.
Maritime security trends in the region suggest these pressures will only intensify, placing more strain on the current structure.
The ABF, as a law enforcement organisation, has been unable to develop the expertise needed to maintain maritime capabilities and execute complex maritime operations. In most regional countries, these responsibilities fall to a coastguard paramilitary organisation.
Despite the secrecy surrounding Australia’s maritime border operations, there has been enough anecdotal media reporting to show that the structure has not worked effectively. This includes reporting on concerns around professionalism, maintenance issues and capacity.
The ABF is a civilian law enforcement organisation that lacks the capability, flexibility and training to manage the nature of grey zone and hybrid maritime threats that Australia will likely face. This is a different level of threat than traditional law enforcement and will require different capabilities and skillsets.
The answer is not simply bolstering the maritime unit of the ABF through increased funding. The structures of the ABF maritime unit are not such that they could readily support such an increase in capability, as it was not designed or trained to undertake the full burden of civil maritime security roles in the absence of the ADF.
The MBC multi-agency command structure relies on ADF skillsets that could not easily be replaced by a bolstered ABF maritime unit. A complete restructure would be required—a coastguard.
Given the reduction in warning time for crises and the increasing complexity of maritime security threats, it is time to rethink Australia’s maritime security structure.
My paper Time for a Coastguard advocates for a layered defence model, including the establishment of a coastguard to address Australia’s civil maritime security and maritime home defence. This would enhance our capabilities while relieving pressure on the RAN and ADF.
We must address Australia’s maritime security structural issues now to strengthen our maritime resilience.
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